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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse whether contracts made by electronic 
agents
1
 might be made enforceable under Islamic law. It discusses what constitutes an 
enforceable contract under Islamic law and whether this is applicable when a contract is 
made by an electronic agent. The enforceability of these contracts under Islamic law is 
especially important in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) where Islamic law 
constitutes the legal system. Ignoring the doctrine of Islamic law in relation to the 
enforceability of these contracts could, therefore, fundamentally affect the future 
viability of these contracts in the KSA. 
 
The dissertation argues first that the principle of mutual consent under Islamic law is 
not satisfied in contracts made by electronic agents because there is no communication 
of an offer and acceptance by the contracting parties (users). Secondly, while electronic 
agents function like human agents, there are a number of doctrinal requirements under 
Islamic agency theory that prevent electronic agents from being agents proper. Thirdly, 
the term „legal personality‟ is categorised in Islamic law under ‘Dhimmah’, an ethical 
concept designed principally for human beings which cannot, therefore, be attributed to 
electronic agents. 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that Islamic law creates conceptual obstacles which 
prevent contracts made by electronic agents being enforceable in the KSA. One 
implication of this will be a risk of negative impact on the development of these 
contracts in the KSA because they are contradictory to Islamic law. Islamic law must 
avoid narrow traditional interpretations of its legal concepts, because a lack of reform in 
this area will create difficulties and barriers against the enforceability of these contracts 
under Islamic law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
An electronic agent could be a software linked to a hard drive and programmed by a person to 
correspond to his/her needs. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Contracts made by electronic agents
1, termed “automated contracts", today constitute 
one of the most fundamental challenges to the central doctrines of the law in general 
and of contract law in particular. The emergence of electronic agents that form contracts 
and complete all the stages of the contractual process autonomously without the 
involvement of their users has generated many doctrinal questions at a conceptual level, 
and has challenged the traditional rules of contract as they apply to the enforceability of 
automated contracts.
2
 
 
 For example, in common law, it is generally stated that the enforceability of any 
contract is based on a general principle known as “mutual consent”.3 The 
communication of an offer and the acceptance by two capable persons is the general test 
which demonstrates mutual consent between parties.
4
 When a contract is formed by the 
involvement of an electronic agent, questions arise over whether the individual (the 
user) on whose behalf the electronic agent is working has genuinely consented to the 
                                                 
1
 It must be noted here that it is not necessary to use strictly the term electronic agents. There are many 
other names that can be used to refer to the agent technology. For instance, “software agents”, “software 
robots”, “soft bots" etc. I choose to use the term of electronic agents because it is the common term used 
in the literature. See, Jennings, N & Wooldridge, M. (1995)Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice, 
Knowledge Engineering Review, 10 (2), p. 56.    
2
 Under German law,  see Wetting, S & Zehender, E. (2003)  The Electronic Agent: A Legal Personality 
under German Law?, The Law and Electronic Agents, Proceedings of the 2
nd
 LEA Workshop, University 
of Edinburgh, UK. (online) Available at: 
http://www.lea-online.net/publications/Paper_8_Wettig.pdf  [Accessed March/30/2010]. Under the US 
and EU law, see Lerouge, F. (2000) The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law: 
Suggested Solutions on a European and American level, The John Marshall Journal of Computer and 
Information Law, 18: 2, pp.403-433. Under Polish law, see, Jurewicz, A M. (2004) Contracts Concluded 
by Electronic Agents – Comparative Analysis of American and Polish Legal Systems, Berkeley Electronic 
Press. Contracts made by electronic agents were also discussed under Italian law. See the work of Sartor, 
G. (2002) Agents in Cyperlaw, In Proceedings of the workshop on the Law of Electronic Agents, LEA02. 
(online) Available at: 
 http://www.lea-online.net/publications/Sartor.pdf [Accessed  March/30/2010].  
3
 Atiyah, (2006) An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 6
th
 ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
4
 Ibid. 
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contract i.e. the user has made the necessary communication or acceptance of the offer.
5
 
If the communication/acceptance of the offer in an automated contract is seen as 
actually being made by the electronic agent and not by the user, it may fail to satisfy the 
requirement of the principle of mutual consent, rendering automated contracts 
unenforceable.
6
 A further issue is the problem of how electronic agents can initially 
conclude contracts on behalf of others and ensure that the latter is bound when the 
electronic agents are neither natural persons nor legal entities. This raises the important 
question of the legal capacity of electronic agents when performing legal actions on 
behalf of others. As Balke and Torsten point out: 
It becomes obvious that the use of software agents for the conclusion of 
contracts leads to considerable doctrinal discussions. How can software 
agents that have not been attributed judicial personhood initiate 
contractually binding contracts for their principals and a third party?
7
 
 
The lack of legal capacity of electronic agents also raises questions about the 
relationship between the user and the electronic agent acting for the former‟s interest. 
The law of agency helps us to understand how electronic agents can become agents and 
their users can become principals.
8
 However, under the common law of agency, some of 
the requirements of agency, especially those relating to capacity, cannot be easily 
satisfied by electronic agents.
9
 Furthermore, in order to create an agency relationship 
between electronic agents and their users, the former needs to be granted authority by 
the latter.
10
 According to the common law of agency, this authority can be actual, 
                                                 
5
 Dahiyat, E. A (2007) Intelligent agents and contracts: Is a conceptual rethink imperative?, Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, 15 (4), pp.375-390. 
6
 Ibid. Also, see the article of Barrio, F. (2008) Autonomous Robots and the Law. (Online) Available at: 
http://www.scl.org./com  [Accessed March/30/2010]. 
7
 Balke,T. & Torsten, E. (2008) The Conclusion of Contracts by Software Agents in the Eyes of the Law, 
Proc. of 7th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems(AAMAS), p. 773. 
8
 Fisher, P J. (1997) Computers as Agents: a proposed approach to revised U.C.C Article 2, Indiana 
Journal Law, 72(2), p. 557.  
9
 DeMott, D. (2006) Agency Law in CyberSpace, Duke Law School Working Paper Series Duke Law 
School Faculty Scholarship Series. (Online) Available at: 
 http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=duke/fs [Accessed March/30/2010]. 
10
 Reynolds, F M B. (2001) Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency. 17
th
 ed.Sweet & Maxwell, [1-001]. 
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apparent or ratificational.
11
 Some of the requirements for each of these authorities 
appear too complex to be applied to electronic agents.
12
 Because of these difficulties 
posed by the common law of agency, there is a question about whether electronic agents 
can be considered to have an extended legal personality.
13
 If they are, they will be 
deemed capable of agency with the ability to enter into contracts, acquire rights and 
duties on behalf of others.
14
 However, there are numerous doctrinal concepts of legal 
personality relating to the concepts of intention and consciousness which are essential 
attributes of legal persons, and whether they can be applied to electronic agents.
15
 Other 
concepts of legal personalities, such as assets, also constitute a critical challenge to 
electronic agents.
16
 
 
These background and contextual issues, and questions and experiences of common 
law regarding the enforceability of automated contracts reveal a problem concerning 
these new methods for creating contractual obligations via electronic agents. After 
examining the issues surrounding the enforcement of contracts in common law the 
dissertation shifts its focus to Islamic law examining the enforcement of contracts under 
Islamic law.  To my knowledge, there here has been no analysis of the implications of 
these changes in trading technologies for the substance of Islamic law. There seems to 
be a lack of knowledge and understanding from the position of Islamic law which has 
not identified, investigated or confronted this problem yet. So, the aim of this 
                                                 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Balke T. & Torsten E. (2008) The Conclusion of Contracts by Software Agents in the Eyes of the Law, 
Proc. of 7th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems(AAMAS), p. 774.  
13
 Steffen,W. & Eberhard,Z. (2004) A Legal Analysis of Human and Electronic Agents, Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, 12 (1) , pp. 111–135 
14
 Chopra, S.& White,L. (2004) Artificial Agents-Personhood in Law and Philosophy, In Proceedings of 
the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,(Online) Available at: 
 http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/agentlawsub.pdf [Accessed 5/March /2008]. 
15
 Sartor, G. (2009) Cognitive automata and the law: electronic contracting and the intentionality of 
software agents, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 17 (4), pp. 253-290 
16
 Andrade, F;  Novais, P; Machado, J. & Neves, J. (2007) Intelligent Contracting: Software Agents, 
Corporate Bodies And Virtual Organizations, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, 
243, pp. 217-224. Also for the same authors, see, Andrade, F;  Novais, P; Machado, J. & Neves, J. (2010) 
Software agents and virtual organisations: consent and trust, International Journal of Services and 
Operations Management, 6 (3), pp. 352 –361. 
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dissertation is to evaluate critically the relevance of existing Islamic conceptions of 
contract formation when applied to the formation of contracts made by electronic 
agents. 
 This discussion will be made in light of the sources available to Islamic law such as 
the Qur'an (divine book), Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet of Islam), and secondary 
sources such as human reasoning which is known in Arabic as (ijtihad). The concept of 
ijtihad is related to the public interest or al- maslaha al-mursalh, as it is called in 
Arabic. The interests of the public under Islamic law are mainly connected to the 
relationships between humans, mu'amalat. When making ijtihad, Muslim jurists should 
look for the best possible public solution, taking into consideration the interests of the 
public and using this as a basis to prohibit or permit something. The underlying 
consideration of the public interest under Islamic law is that since rules and cases 
covered in orthodox Islamic law are finite and the changing demands (social and 
economic) of the public are beyond measure, the mu'amalat part of the Islamic law also 
needs to be mutable. Thus al- maslaha al-mursalh or public interest is a significant 
theme of this dissertation and will be used to facilitate the discussion of contemporary 
transactions such as the enforceability of automated contracts within an Islamic 
framework.  
1.2 The Significance of the Dissertation  
The significance of this dissertation is fourfold. First, due to opposing views about 
Islamic law, carrying out research on the feasibility of enforcing automated contracts 
under Orthodox Islamic law has become important. On the one hand, Muslim scholars 
have repeatedly claimed that Islamic law exists under an umbrella of flexibility in which 
Ch: 1 Introduction 
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the rules are valid for each time and place.
17
 For instance, Albna claims that: "Islamic 
law has the flexibility to co-exist at all times and places, and this proves its validity".
18
 
On the other hand, such writers such as Siddiqui have expressed doubt about the 
flexibility of Islamic law to accommodate contemporary transactions: "Today, Muslim 
scholarship is re-examining Muslim history and traditions, looking in depth at how far 
its flexibility will permit a change within Islamic tradition".
19
 
  
These contrasting perceptions stem from the unique way Islamic law came into 
existence, developing across very different historical epochs. During the emergence of 
Islam as a religion, the laws were subject to change according to the needs of people. 
The first change was presided over by the Prophet Mohammed, albeit authorised only 
through his companions. After this, the ability to change Islamic law was restricted to 
his followers alone. During the ninth and tenth centuries, the option of amending the 
Islamic laws was repudiated. It was thought that all matters of law had already been 
settled in the Qu‟ran. It was therefore decided that all future activities should be limited 
to the interpretation of classical jurists. Obeid claims that “this is the difficult task which 
faces the legal practitioners of the Islamic world and also the economic operators of the 
Western world in their commercial relations with Muslim countries”.20 Karl also holds 
that in a country such as Saudi Arabia where Islam is the source of law, there is no 
distinction between legal and religious rules.
21
 According to Karl, this can lead to 
                                                 
17
 This rule is a fundamental principle under Islamic law. Commenting on this statement, El-Gamal states: 
"With sufficient flexibility in the definition of what constitutes Islam, this statement would be rendered 
tautological. With sufficient rigidity, it would be rendered patently false. Champions of this slogan span 
the entire spectrum of degrees of flexibility...". See, El-Gamal M. (2002) The Economics of 21st Century 
Islamic Jurisprudence, Proceedings of the Fourth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance. 
Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies Harvard University. (Online) Available at: 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/jurists.pdf, [Accessed 29/March/2010]. 
18
 Albna,G. (2008) Ala'slam Cualh Lkl Zman Wmkan,Tanweer, 136. (Online) Available at: 
http://www.kwtanweer.com/articles/readarticle.php?articleID=1910, [Accessed 1/Sept/2009].  
19
 Siddiqui, A. (1997) Ethics in Islam: key concepts and contemporary challenges, Journal of Moral 
Education, 26(4), p. 23. 
20
 Obeid, N. (1998) Origins of the Sanctity of Contracts in Islamic Law, Arab Law Quarterly, 13 (3), p. 
260. 
21
 Karl, J.(1992) Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know,George 
Washington, Journal of International Law and Economics, 25(131), p. 136. 
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misunderstandings about and conflicts within Saudi law because the right to interpret 
and amend laws according to contemporary values and needs is restricted.
22
 Karl makes 
this observation: 
Secular principles are very much the fundamental aspect to individuals‟ 
thinking today, therefore those legal systems that depend on religious 
laws, as the case in Saudi Arabia, can appear irrational and inflexible. 
This is because laws made by God are not subject to any sort of alteration 
or change. By contrast, civil or common law is devised by human being 
to human being and it can therefore be changed or altered over time in an 
efficient way.
23
 
The significance of my thesis derives from the persistent claim that because Islamic 
law dates from the sixth century, it is incapable of dealing with modern transactions and 
therefore should be disregarded. Given the views and assumptions expressed by the 
traditional construction of Islamic legal texts, it is essential that Islamic law can 
embrace the challenges of dynamic technological change which fundamentally affect 
the economic health of a country. 
 
Second, the fact that Saudi Arabia strictly adheres to Islamic law means that the 
acceptability of any new transactions (such as automated contracts) must be 
conceptualised within an Islamic framework. This is particularly important in Saudi 
Arabia where Islam is constitutionally the official religion and the source of all laws. 
Article 1 of the Saudi Arabian constitution states: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Snh of His 
Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution".
24
  
 
Article 1 suggests that all transactions must be compatible with the values of Islam. 
The way that Islamic law responds to automated contracts will have an important effect 
                                                 
22
 Ibid  
23
 Ibid. 134. This is generally true. Unlike jurists under Islamic law, jurists under both common and civil 
legal systems have the ability to question the value of laws which cannot protect the rights and needs of 
individuals. 
24
  The Saudi Arabian‟s constitution, art, 1. The basic Saudi Arabian‟s Constitution. (Online) Available at:  
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sa00000_.html. [ Accessed 23/March/2010]. 
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on the future development of this method of contracting in Saudi Arabia. By bridging 
these gaps in the doctrine of Islamic law in relation to the enforceability of automated 
contracts, the public‟s confidence will be assured about the future viability of automated 
contracts. Fasli states: 
The doubts of the potential users have to be allayed. In order for this 
vision to materialize, one fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is 
that of trust. Users need to be assured that any legal issues relating to 
agents trading electronically are covered to an extend as they are in 
traditional trading practices.
25
 
 
 
Third, research on automated contracts and their application in Islamic law is much-
needed due to the lack of existing scholarship on or legal analysis of this emerging 
problem and how an effective legal response should be made. Thus the objective of this 
thesis is original; it is an initial point of reference within the subject and its findings 
would be the first of its nature in the literature. Moreover, this study will be of general 
benefit to the subject of legal studies in Saudi Arabia and, more specifically, to an 
understanding of the enforceability of automated contracts. 
  
Also of significance is that the findings from the perspective of Islamic law are 
useful to consumers, online traders, and legislative authorities whether they are in Saudi 
Arabia or beyond. Within Saudi Arabia, the study focuses with particular interest on the 
government committee attempting to develop the Electronic Transactions Regulation 
(ETR) 2007.
26
 The study can also suggest recommendations to government bodies that 
might be of use to them.
27
 From another perspective, the study benefits many 
individuals including but not limited to: Internet users in Saudi Arabia who regularly 
use automated methods in order to generate their purchases; Saudi law-makers, 
                                                 
Fasli, M. (2007) On agent technology for e-commerce: trust, security and legal issues, Knowledge 
Engineering Review, 22 (1), pp. 3–35.  
26
 Hereinafter ETR 2007 [SA]. This legislation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of the thesis.  
27
 A good example here is the Saudi Capital Market Authority that uses automated computer programs in 
their transactions. They are looking to adopt appropriate regulation for this technology.  This is according 
to an invitation to me from the Saudi Capital Market Authority in Dec-15-2009 to present a seminar on 
the legal challenges associated with using this technology in business.     
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especially in the Council of Ministries and the Consultative Council; relevant 
government authorities and departments responsible for promoting electronic commerce 
in the country; judges who may have to rule on future disputes over whether automated 
contracts should be enforced in Saudi courts; the Saudi private sector which may be 
planning to target their customers via electronic agents; academics, lawyers and 
researchers.  
 
Globally, the outcome of this dissertation might be of particular interest to 
international bodies, mainly the Model Law of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Not only does this international body aim to 
develop trade relations between countries and facilitate the world trade relationship 
between international communities,
28
 it will also help with the understanding of the 
perspective of Islamic law on online trading via the use of electronic agents. In addition, 
the United Nations views the harmonization between different legal systems to be a 
crucial aspect in overcoming impediments for online commerce and making it globally 
effective. With this in mind, it is easy to understand the importance of this study with 
regard to an international harmonization of legislation for electronic commerce. As 
automated contracts are relatively unaccounted for on the Internet, be it internationally 
or locally, harmonization between international legislations can create understanding 
and agreement between various parties in different countries which ultimately will serve 
the greater success of electronic commerce worldwide.
29
 Harmonization between 
                                                 
28
 Mills, K. (2005) Effective Formation of Contracts by Electronic Means Do We Need a Uniform 
Regulatory Regime? Paper presented at World Summit on Information Technology in Tunis, p. 4. 
(Online) Available at: 
http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/2307092552667.pdf, [Accessed 20/March/2010].  
29
 See the work of Xiping Lv, Delin Hou where the authors highlight the lack of legislation in this region 
of China and point out some legal regulations relevant to electronic agents in the UN, US and Canada. 
They make some suggestions concerning e-commerce legislation in China.  See, Xiping L. & Delin H. 
(2008) On the Legal Status of Electronic Agent in International Trade, Management of e-Commerce and 
e-Government. International Conference, International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and 
e-Government. pp. 189-191. 
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international legislations generally creates common solutions to problems arising from 
similar facts in different countries.
30
  
1.3 The Methodology of the Dissertation  
The methodology used in examining the enforceability of automated contracts from 
the position of Islamic law is a literature review which includes information collected 
from various sources such as libraries, codes, reports, books, articles, legislation and bill 
reports. The dissertation identifies the literature concerning common law in order to list 
and discuss workable and effective approaches to the enforceability of automated 
contracts. This review serves three main purposes.  
 
Firstly, since the beginning of 1990s, the enforceability of automated contracts has 
been debated under common law, particularly in the United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK).
31 
There is a wealth of research on this issue and many scholars who hail 
from countries that operate a common law system have written about these kinds of 
contracts. All of the studies investigate the enforcement of automated contracts and 
suggest practical means of legalizing them. Since there is an absence of studies looking 
at the enforceability of automated contracts from the perspective of Islamic law, an 
analysis of the literature on common law has provided the backbone to this dissertation.  
 
The second purpose of reviewing common law is the similarities between common 
law and Islamic law. The former system comprises judges presiding over court cases 
while the latter system is centred upon the opinions and views of classical Muslim 
                                                 
30
 Mills argues that although many of questions regarding contracts made by electronic agents are being 
addressed by the various lawmakers in their own way all over the world today, it seems obviously 
important that because of the borderless nature of these contracts, to be a single universal framework on 
an international scale within which all legal systems will eventually operate. Mills, K. op, cit., p. 14.  
31
 See for the example the article of Wein, L. (1992) The Responsibility of Intelligent Artificial: Toward 
an Automation Jurisprudence, Harvard Journal Law and Technology, 6 (103), pp. 103-154. 
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jurists.
32
 In this regard, common law and Islamic law are very different to many of the 
existing legal systems in the world today.
33
 
 
Thirdly, the review of common law is pertinent because it is adhered to by countries 
such as the US and UK, which make up two of the largest trading blocs in the world. 
These two countries are the best markets to test electronic commerce because they 
comprise the largest proportion of electronic commerce transactions in the world. It is 
important in this thesis to highlight the positive proposals presented by the 
policymakers, legislators and scholars in these countries vis a vis the topic of automated 
contracts‟ enforceability. In particular, Saudi Arabia has considerable trade relations 
with the US and UK which reaches, according to the latest statistics revealed by the 
Saudi Ministry of Trade, around SR. 137,698 Million and SR. 17,298 Million 
respectively in the year 2005. For example, KSA exported SR.104,746 Millions to the 
US and imported SR.32,952 Millions; while KSA exported SR.6,855 Million to the UK 
and imported SR.10,443 Millions.
34
  
 
The common law debates on the enforceability of automated contracts shapes the 
discussion of this issue from the position of Islamic law, specifically by asking the 
following questions: would contracts made by electronic agents be enforceable based on 
the Islamic principle of mutual consent? Can electronic agents be classed as agents 
under Islamic law, thus allowing agency principles to be employed for automated 
contract enforcement? Is legal personality necessary for agents under Islamic agency 
                                                 
32
 See El-Gamal, M. (2003) Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 
Fordham International Law Review, 27 (1), p. 130. Also, Rosen argues that the emphasis on precedent 
and reasoning by juristic analogy under Islamic law gave rise to a body of transactions law that is very 
similar to contemporary common law traditions. Rosen made this observation: "In the course of studying 
Islamic law in its everyday practice I have been increasingly struck with its similarities to the common 
law form..." Rosen, L. (2000) The Justice of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 39.  
33
 In civil law jurisdictions, laws are made by legislatures i.e. judicial precedent is given relatively less 
weight. That is to say, courts are not supposed to create laws but do play a role in interpreting obscure 
statutes. In addition, legal experts have an important function in the change of law. 
34
 Trade statistics between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United States of American and the United 
Kingdom in the year 2005, Ministry of Trade Statics, issued in 2009. 
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principles? Can electronic agents then be extended independent legal personality under 
Islamic law? 
 
These questions are investigated in light of the two major doctrines within Islam: Snh 
and Shiite. The Snh doctrine is subdivided into Shafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Hanafi. 
Because Saudi Arabia is of the Snh school, the researcher examined only the traditional 
manuscripts and texts of this particular doctrine which features four schools to match 
the opinion of the public majority, called in Arabic Aljmhwr. That is to say, the opinions 
of Shiite doctrine are excluded from the dissertation. The method of data analysis used 
will examine the legal concepts of Islamic law i.e. mutual consent, agency theory, and 
legal personality.  I will identify the rules and principles of each of these legal concepts 
and scrutinize whether they are applied and followed when a contract is carried out by 
an electronic agent. I will discuss the application of these rules and principles in 
automated contracts, their challenges, and most importantly how those challenges can 
be confronted under Islamic law. In addition, information has also been collected from 
what is known under Islamic legal system as “Fatwa” or Reasoning.35  
1.4 The Structure of the Dissertation 
Aside from the introduction and conclusion, the dissertation is organised into six 
chapters.  Chapters 2, 3 and 4 review the legal literature about the enforceability of 
automated contracts. The aim of these chapters is to identify theoretical approaches 
related to automated contract enforceability. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the 
enforceability of automated contracts under Islamic law. 
  
In brief, the aim of Chapter 2 is to explore the concept of „automated contracts‟ and 
identify the method used to constitute these contracts. The chapter explores the 
                                                 
35
 A sample of the fatwa (in Arabic and translation of its full text follows) is reproduced in the Appendix 
III. 
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development of electronic agent technology and main features that enable it to conclude 
contracts autonomously and without human beings' intervention. In Chapter 3, the aim 
is to discuss whether automated contracts can be enforceable based on the principle of 
mutual consent. This principle and whether it is applicable in these types of contracts is 
examined. Chapter 4 assesses whether automated contracts can be enforceable based on 
the principles of agency theory. The aim here is to explore agency principles and 
examine whether they can allow electronic agents to bind their users. This chapter will 
also establish whether or not legal personality can be extended to electronic agents.  
 
 Having discussed the approaches to the enforceability of automated contracts under 
common law, I will then develop the discussion further by examining how Islamic law 
conceptualises these technological developments. Chapter 5 explores the peculiarities of 
Islamic law in order to determine what sources can be used to facilitate the discussion of 
the enforceability of automated contracts under Islamic law. In chapter 6, the aim is to 
explain the principle of mutual consent as an essential condition for contract formation 
under Islamic law. It presents Muslims' views on how this condition can be achieved 
and how contracting parties should be consenting to enter into contract. The issue of 
whether or not this condition is satisfied in automated contracts is then investigated. The 
objective of Chapter 7 is to examine whether automated contracts can be enforceable 
based on Islamic agency law. It presents a discussion on the definition of agency under 
Islamic law, the conditions required for being an agent, and necessary requirements to 
establish agency agreement. The question of whether electronic agents meet these 
requirements and have an agency relationship to bind their users is then answered. The 
discussion here will also examine the flexibility of Islamic law in attributing and 
recognizing the independent legal personality of electronic agents. Finally, chapter 8 re-
examines and summarises the implications of the thesis in light of the research 
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questions, draws some final conclusions and highlights limitations and implications of 
the research.  
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CHAPTER 2: An Explanation of the Characteristics of an Automated 
Contract 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses automated contracts which, in the commercial transactions 
world, are still at early stage of development.  This chapter also defines automated 
contracts by identifying their formation and how they are generated and concluded 
online. However, I intend to focus more upon the characteristics of such contracts rather 
than on technical descriptions of the electronic agents involved. The technology used is 
analysed in order to distinguish between those electronic agents who work 
„automatically‟ and those who work autonomously. The advanced agents‟ manner of 
their operation as well as the concept of autonomy are both explored below.  
 
The aim of the chapter is to establish a basic understanding of automated contracts 
before this study goes on to examine the approaches that determine enforceability of 
such contracts. Several authors have written: “Many of the legal implications of 
electronic agents‟ actions (e.g., gathering information, negotiating terms, performing 
transactions) are not well understood".
1
 The overall objective is to address the following 
point made by McLuhan: “One cannot begin to regulate online contracts without 
understanding the impact of technology as a complex background force to such 
contracts”.2  
2.2 Electronic Agent Technology 
In this modern era of electronic technological development, it is inevitable that 
business activities move to an online environment for the purpose of enhancing 
efficiency, quality, cost-effectiveness as well as minimizing time-consumption. Today, 
                                                 
1
 Brazier F.,  Oskamp, A; Corien, P; Schellekens, M. & Wijngaards, N. (2004) Law-Abiding and Integrity 
on the Internet: A Case for Agents, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 12(1-2), p. 7.  
2
 McLuhan, M. (1992) Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 23-31. 
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both the private and public sectors of industrialized and developing countries are aware 
of the importance of handling business transactions online. Many international 
companies have already moved over to the electronic environment due to their need to 
increase their presence in various markets across the world, including the KSA. 
At the early stage of electronic commerce, companies and businesses used computer 
programs which acted according to pre-determined instructions, without any ability to 
alter such instructions or generate additional types. The UNCITRAL Model Law 
defines these types of computer software as "a system for generating, sending, 
receiving, storing or otherwise processing data messages".
3
 These kinds of computer 
software are basic, lack any degree of mobility, intelligence, or autonomy and do not 
make independent decisions. They only perform pre-programmed tasks according to 
previous programming. They lack control over the contractual terms and details such as 
prices, means of payment, and the quantity and quality of the goods. One example of 
this is vending machines and electronic data interchange systems (EDI). EDI is used to 
communicate business transactions between the conventional computer systems 
belonging to different entities according to a standard format specified within a trading 
partner (interchange) agreement signed by such entities prior to the commencement of 
trading.
4
 With EDI, a computer can be automatically programmed to pass on data, 
transmit a purchase order when the inventory slides below a certain level, or to agree to 
any order that meets pre-determined criteria. However, EDI lacks the ability to act 
differently to programmers or the ability to divulge instructions.  
The progressive evolution of computer software has shifted from simply receiving 
orders and sending automated confirmations to a more autonomous state. They are far 
                                                 
3
 Model Law on Electronic Commerce of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
article 2 (f). 
4
 The UNCITRAL defines EDI as "the computer-to-computer transmission of data in standardized 
format". See Report of the Working Group on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) on the Work of Its 
Twinty fifth Session, [11993] 24 UNCITRAL Y. B. at 193, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/373.   
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more advanced than the first generation of computer software which worked strictly 
automatically and purely according to instructions. The highly-developed computer 
software of today is known as "electronic agents". Russell and Norvig define the term 
“electronic agents” as “anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment 
through its sensors and acting upon that environment through effectors”.5 Janca asserts 
that this definition is fairly broad
6
 and suggests his own: “software that knows how to do 
things you could probably do yourself if you had time”.7 Jennings and Wooldridge argue 
that this definition is too simple and unhelpful.
8
  
 
Jurewicz highlights that in the actual analysis, it is difficult. to provide a universally 
accepted definition of electronic agents.
9
 This is because the term electronic agent refers 
to an “interdisciplinary area” in which different scientific fields of research such as 
artificial intelligence, information and communication systems, social science, computer 
science, and law all use electronic agent with a different emphasis.
10
 That is to say, 
electronic agents are developed into several forms and used for many purposes. 
Therefore, the definition of "electronic agent" should depend on the function an 
electronic agent demonstrates on the internet.  
 
For instance, a model known as Consumer Buying Behaviour (CBB), devised by 
members of the Software Agents Group at MIT Media Laboratory, has shown that there 
are many electronic agents which could work on only one transaction.
11
 The CBB 
contains six phases as follows: (a) identifying the needs of a user for merely gathering 
                                                 
5
 Russell, S. &  Norvig, P. (2002) Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. Prentice Hall.  p. 35. 
6
 Janca, P. (1995) Pragmatic Application of Information Agents, BIS Strategic Decisions, Norwell, U. S, 
p. 33. 
7
Ibid. 
8
 Jennings, N. & Wooldridge, M.  (1998) Applications of Intelligent Agents, Heidelberg, Germany, p. 4. 
(Online) Available at: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/3/sichman.html [Accessed 07/Feb/2008]. 
9
 Jurewicz, A M. (2004) Contracts Concluded by Electronic Agents – Comparative Analysis of American 
and Polish Legal Systems, Berkeley Electronic Press, p. 4. 
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Guttman, R. H;, Moukas, A.G & Maes, P. (1998) Agent mediated Electronic Commerce, A Survey, 
Knowledge Engineering Review, 13(3), p. 2. 
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information; (b) product brokering i.e. selecting a product that meets the needs of the 
user; (c) merchant brokering which is designed to select a supplier of the selected 
product; (d) negotiation stage in which electronic agents negotiate the terms of the 
transaction; (e) purchase and delivery and finally; (f) service and evaluation where 
electronic agents evaluate the satisfaction of the overall purchase and decision-
making.
12
 With reference to these six phases, electronic agents can be classified into 
two sub-sections; search and decision electronic agents.
13
 On the one hand, search 
agents receive instructions such as words, subject matter or other similar items from 
users. Through response, these electronic agents produce a certain type of information. 
Feliul refers to such electronic agents as “navigation tools”.14 This name is apt because 
search agents are necessary only for locating websites in order to provide commercial 
information such as who is selling what, and who is offering the cheapest product.
15
 
Their main duty is to gather information and they do not work outside the user's 
environment.
16
 According to Stuurman and Wijnands, such agents are frequently used 
in online commerce and their capacity to locate a number of websites and collect 
detailed information in a short time has increased consumer transactions.
17
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 See such classification in the work of Feliul, S. (2001) Intelligent Agents and Consumer Protection,   
International Journal of Law and IT, 9(14), p.240. Nwana, S & Ndumu, T. (1998) A Brief Introduction to 
Software Agent Technology, in Agent Technology, Foundations, Applications and Markets. (Berlin 
Heidelberg: Springer Verlag) Chapter 2. 
14
 Feliul, S. (2001) Intelligent Agents and Consumer Protection, International Journal of Law and IT, 
9(14), p. 240. 
15
 Search agents are types of agents which are usually owned by the distributors or independent agents 
owned by independent companies ("Fido the Shopping Doggie, http: //www.Shopfido.com or “Bargain-
Finder” d'Andersen Consulting, http: //bf.csstar.ac.com/bf). A great number of electronic agents exist for 
the operators or for the vendors. A lot of web sites are proposing independent information search agents 
which are selecting the information on sites opened to them. The “Galeries Lafayette” can propose a 
virtual clothing advisor in which someone can enter a picture of her, size, hair and skin color…The 
advisor is creating the person a new dressing style, it also gives her make-up and hair style advises. 
16
 An example here is Personnalogic which is an independent agent on the web which gives advises on all 
sort of products: animals, travels, cars…It gives products a rate depending on answers & questions style. 
If the user already know the product that fits with his/her needs, Personnalogic can establish attributes 
comparison matrix between different brands.  
17
 Stuurman and Wijnands refer this type of electronic agents as passive agents. According to these 
authors, passive agents are those programs which interact within the user‟s own environment in order to 
organize data on the user‟s computer, gather and process information and email or filtering news lists for 
the user. See Stuurman, K. & Wijnands, H. (2001) Intelligent Agents: A Curse or a Blessing? A Survey of 
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On the other hand, decision agents do more than just facilitating users with specific 
information, they are also active in negotiating and concluding contracts.
18
 These 
electronic agents can complete and finalize transactions without the full and direct 
intervention of human beings. They have the ability to navigate websites in many parts 
of the world, looking for products and services to either make purchases or sales. They 
have the capability to interact with unknown and even unseen business partners. They 
may perform business transactions with other website servers and take the relevant 
decisions about forming contracts without having to come back to their users.  
 
One example of an electronic agent‟s operations is "MarketSpace" which has been 
developed by the Swedish Institute of Computer Science.
19
 It consists of an 
infrastructure information model that describes users' interests and an interaction model. 
It also defines basic vocabularies for searching, negotiating and settling deals. Several 
examples of interests are “buy things cheaper than $1”, “buy pizza within an hour”, 
“sell these books”, etc. The interaction model uses a small set of messages such as: Ask, 
Tell, Negotiate, Offer, Accept and Decide.
20
  
 
Another group of such electronic agents that has been developed to automate online 
shopping transactions is known as Kasbah. This prototype has been developed by the 
MIT Media Lab. This system is described as an “online, multi-agent classified ad 
system”. It is simply an agent marketplace for buying and selling goods. When a user 
wants to buy goods, s/he creates an agent, gives it some directions, and then sends it off 
into a centralized agent marketplace. The objective of the electronic agent is to procure 
                                                                                                                                               
the Legal Aspects of the Application of Intelligent Software Agents, Computer Law and Security Report, 
17( 2),p. 92. 
18
 Because this type of electronic agents have the capacity to conclude transactions, Stuurman and 
Wijnands find that they should be referred as transaction agents. See Stuurman, K. & Wijnands, H. (2001) 
Intelligent Agents: A Curse or a Blessing? A Survey of the Legal Aspects of the Application of Intelligent 
Software Agents, Computer Law and Security Report, 17(2), p. 92. 
19
 For more information see, Eriksson, J; Finne, N. & Janson, S. (1999)  SICS MarketSpace- an agent- 
based market infrastructure, in Proceedings of the 1998 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic 
Trading Springer, Heidelberger. 
20
 Ibid. 
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a deal which meets the constraints established by the user, such as the highest or lowest 
acceptable price and the date by which the deal must be completed. Once the electronic 
agent has interacted with someone and concluded a transaction in accordance with the 
user‟s constraints, the agent notifies the user that a deal has been struck.21 Upon 
notification, the agent ceases to negotiate and automatically asks the system to be 
removed from the list of „active agents‟.22 It is then the user‟s responsibility to execute 
the deal by arranging delivery and payment.
23
  
 
Artificial intelligence scientists such as Russell and Norvig predict that electronic 
agents of the future will be able to negotiate and conclude transactions more 
independently with less instruction from their users.24 Kerr writes: 
[A]gents will no doubt be employed to assist human interaction through 
the various stages of a transaction, from product and merchant brokering 
through to negotiation, sale, distribution and payment. It is not 
unreasonable to predict that in time, agent technology will become 
sufficiently sophisticated to perform many if not all of these sorts of tasks 
without human oversight or intervention.25 
Similarly, Balke and Torsten argue that it is not unreasonable to predict that in the 
future, electronic agents will operate as the initiators of electronic transactions assisting 
human interaction through all stages of the transaction process.
26
 Electronic agents will 
be having the ability to roam in less controlled environments, within remote servers in 
                                                 
21
 For more information, see Chavez & Maes (1996) Kasbah: an agent marketplace for buying and selling 
goods, Processing of the First International Conference on the Practical Application of Intelligent Agents 
and Multi- Agent Technology London. 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 More examples can be given under this category of electronic agents is in a situation when a company 
wishes to increase its market share. The company programs an electronic agent to purchase any products 
of less than $2 per unit in any part of the world market. Based on these given instructions, the electronic 
agent navigates aggressively on various websites searching for products that meet the specified 
instructions and data. Through this navigation, the electronic agent finds a company which announces that 
it is selling two million shares on the website. The electronic agent which is acting on behalf of the 
company purchases these two million shares at the rate of $1.75 per share autonomously without the 
knowledge of the company. I give this example only to demonstrate how these electronic agents can 
operate online. 
24
 Russell, S. &  Norvig, P. (2002) Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. Prentice Hall. p. 35. 
25
 Kerr, I. (2000) The Legality of Software-Mediated Transactions, Proceedings of IASTED International 
Conference: Law and Technology, IASTED /ACTA Press. p. 90. 
26
 Balke T. & Torsten E. (2008) The Conclusion of Contracts by Software Agents in the Eyes of the Law, 
Proc. of 7th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), p. 774.  
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which a human user will never find himself in.
27
 In addition to that, human users will 
not be able to forecast what these electronic agents do or know vis a vis whether a 
contract has been completed and to whom it is addressed.
28
 The user will have no 
substantial influence over the agent's choices, and s/he might not even be aware that any 
transactions or communications are taking place. These decisions taken by the 
electronic agents might be to purchase or sell assets and they may start negotiating the 
price of the produce or the services within a short time.
29
 Electronic agents will also 
employ electronic payment mechanisms to effectively circumvent the need for users to 
execute agreements that have been pre-arranged, for instance, the purchase of flights, 
hotel bookings and theatre tickets. Such purchases will be carried out based on the 
user‟s travel schedule available in his/her electronic diary. An email will then be 
automatically sent to the electronic diary confirming that the purchase has been made. 
The electronic agent might also obtain information about the user‟s travel itinerary from 
his/her telephone calls which the agent can gain access through a computer program.30 
 
These types of advanced generation agent technologies can even propose a bid at an 
auction. This does however need some form of assessment and judgment as to the most 
favourable price to be bid. Electronic auction systems these days are programmed to be 
compatible with intelligent agent systems. An example of this is the worldwide e-Bay 
system. Yahoo.com also allows a bidding agent to place bids on the operator's behalf at 
the lowest possible increments. The electronic agents in these instances can negotiate 
and finalize other elements of the contract such as the time of delivery, quantity and 
                                                 
27
 This proves clearly the advanced capacity of this computer software.  
28
 Mass, P. (2000) Agents that Reduce Work and Information Overload Communication . Quoted by Kerr, 
I. (2000) The Legality of Software-Mediated Transactions, Proceedings of IASTED International 
Conference: Law and Technology, p. 88. 
29
 Consider also the function of electronic agents called electronic liquidity finders' (ELFs) in the area of 
electronic stock trading. Such agents are used extensively to find counterparties to a stock trade, and to 
negotiate and perform the trade on the user's behalf. 
30
 Russell, S. &  Norvig, P. (2002) Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. Prentice Hall.  p. 35. 
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method of payment to the other partner.
31
 These tasks can be conducted autonomously 
without full control of the person employing them.
32
 
 
Contracts generated by these advanced electronic agents are generally referred to as 
"automated contracts" and because they are formed autonomously by electronic agents 
without the involvement of the users. Therefore, the next section attempts to identify the 
nature of these electronic agents and the technical background that enables them to 
acquire the capacity to complete all the stages of the transaction process independently 
with less instruction from their users.  
2.3 The Nature of Electronic Agents 
Scientists in the field of artificial intelligence argue that electronic agents have the 
capacity to complete all the stages of a transaction independently because of the 
distinctive features they possess. Those distinctive features are: autonomy, social 
ability, reactivity, and pro-activeness.
 33
  Electronic agents possess the pro-activeness 
feature which means that they do not simply act in response to their environment, rather 
they are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative. They also enjoy 
what is called „social ability‟ which refers to interaction with other agents (and possibly 
humans) via some kind of agent-communication language. Reactivity in this instance 
means the way in which electronic agents perceive their environment (which may be the 
physical world, a user via a graphical user interface, other agents, the internet, or 
perhaps all of these combined) and respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in 
                                                 
31
 For example, the MIT group has developed Tete-a-Tete (T@T) a program that enables electronic agents 
to negotiate not only price, but several other terms of a transaction, including warranties, shipping, 
service, returns, and payment options. For more information, see http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/tete-a-
tete/.  
32
 Later in this chapter, I'll qualify the term „autonomously‟ and comment on the controversy that comes 
with using the term „autonomously‟. 
33
 Jennings, N & Wooldridge, M. (1998) Applications of Intelligent Agents. Germany: Heidelberg, pp. 56-
70. General view about the book (Online) Available at: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/3/sichman.html 
[Accessed 07/Feb/2008]. 
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it. Reactivity is based on what is called (UNIX) daemons.
34
 Finally, electronic agents 
are autonomous which means that they have the ability to interact without the direct 
intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and 
internal state.
35
  
 
Weitzenboeck discusses certain features common to all electronic agents that she 
terms “weak features”: autonomy, social ability, reactivity, and pro-activeness.36 She 
names them as such to distinguish them from the more advanced features or "strong 
features" so-called because they allow electronic agents to function online 
autonomously. These strong features include mobility, benevolence, veracity, 
rationality, and collaboration.
37
 The mobility of electronic agents affords them the 
ability to move freely around an electronic network. The veracity feature prevents 
electronic agents from communicating false information knowingly or creating 
conflicting goals. The rationality feature is defined as the ability to achieve goals, at 
least insofar as its beliefs permit. The advanced feature of collaboration stops electronic 
agents from accepting instructions unthinkingly. Instead they are obliged to take into 
account that their users might make mistakes such as giving an order that contains 
conflicting goals. In the same vein, the electronic agent should not unthinkingly omit 
important information and/or provide ambiguous information. For instance, an 
electronic agent can verify details by asking questions of their users or by applying a 
built-up user model to solve problems. In addition, the collaboration feature allows 
electronic agents to refuse to execute certain tasks if its result would be an unacceptably 
                                                 
34
 Daemons are system processes that continuously monitor system resources and activities, and become 
active only when certain conditions are met.  For more information on the UNIX system, see Hermans, B. 
(1997) Intelligent Software Agents on the Internet, An Inventory of Currently Offered Functionality in the 
Information Society and a Prediction of Near Future Developments, Peer-Reviewed Journal on the 
Internet.  
35
 Jennings, N & Wooldridge ,M. (1998)  Applications of Intelligent Agents. Germany: Heidelberg, pp. 
56-70. General view about the book (Online) Available at: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/3/sichman.html 
[Accessed 07/Feb/2008]. 
36
 Weitzenboeck, E. (2001) Electronic Agents and Formation of Contracts, International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology, 9 (3), p. 4. 
37
 Ibid. 
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high load on the network sources or the possibility of damage caused to their users.
38
 
Other artificial intelligence scientists, mainly Shoham and Bates, argue that electronic 
agents are able to enjoy such capacity online because they possess features and concepts 
such as emotion, knowledge, belief, intention and obligation which are more commonly 
applied to humans.
39
 
 
There is a problematic issue in what artificial intelligence scientists consider as the 
features underpinning the operations of electronic agents. It is however evident that 
electronic agents do not work automatically and merely upon instruction; this is obvious 
enough throughout the literature studied which demonstrates how the work of electronic 
agents is always described as having a flexible autonomous capability. To the literature 
frequently describes the autonomous functioning of electronic agents that does not 
require direct intervention or control from any human beings nor full forecasting of their 
behaviour.
40
 Unfortunately, very few authors attempt to clarify to what extent autonomy 
is applied to the work of electronic agents.
41
 
 
For example, Friedman and Nissenbaum (who have published a number of articles 
on the autonomy of electronic agents)
42
 argue that in a relationship between a user and 
his/her electronic agent, the user takes on the electronic agent to perform work that s/he 
would like, or needs to have done and, for whatever reasons, chooses not to do 
him/herself.
43
 Perhaps the work is unexciting, complicated, risky, or time-consuming. 
The electronic agent then acts for and on behalf of the user. The role of an electronic 
                                                 
38
 For more information on these advanced features, see N & Wooldridge, M. (1998) Applications of 
Intelligent Agents, Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 56-70. General view about the book (Online) Available at: 
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/3/sichman.html [Accessed 07/Feb/2008]. 
39
 See Shoham, Y. (1993) Agent-oriented programming, Artificial Intelligence, 60(1), pp. 51-92.  
Bates, J. (1994) The Role of emotion in believable agents, Communications of the ACM, 37(7), pp. 122-
125. I will clarify these particular concepts in chapter 4 and look whether electronic agents can legally be 
attributed these concepts where attempts in there are to grant electronic agents legal personality. 
40
 See our discussion of electronic agents in the previous section of this chapter. 
41
 The views of these authors will be presented shortly in this section.    
42
 These articles are discussed in this section.   
43
 In Chapter 4 of the thesis, we will see that this type of work that electronic agents do for their users is 
very similar to the work human agents do for their principals.  
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agent in such cases undermines the user's autonomy in favour of the electronic agent. To 
put it simply, when the autonomy of the user is undermined, the autonomy of the 
electronic agent is extended.
44
 During the contractual process it is unlikely, if not 
impossible, to negotiate with an electronic agent i.e. during the contractual process 
communication with the electronic agents is disconnected. That is why, as stated above, 
artificial intelligence scientists consider that users in automated contracts cannot always 
forecast the behaviour of their electronic agents and do not know all the instructions and 
information that his/her electronic agent is privy to. Sartor states: 
The user lacks the ability to precisely forecast all contexts in which the 
agent is going to operate; the ability to forecast what computing 
operations the agent‟s software will perform in all those contexts; and the 
ability to forecast what data and what instruction will form the agent at 
the time in which it will operate.
45
   
According to Sartor, the impossibility of forecasting the operations of electronic 
agents by users implies that electronic agents can deviate from their expected behaviour. 
He states that: 
[W]e need to assume that the user has a complete knowledge of all 
instructions included in the agent, and has simulated the functioning of 
these instructions in all possible environment [or]circumstances… it is 
difficult to assume that the user wanted what has been declared by the 
agents or knew every piece of information that played a role in the 
agent‟s operation. 46 
Friedman and Nissenbaum present the example of an electronic agent named 
"CyberDog" to demonstrate the possibility of electronic agents acting differently from 
their users' wishes.
47
 They mention that CyberDog can be programmed by a user to 
                                                 
44
 Friedman, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (1997) Software agents and user autonomy, Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Autonomous Agents New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery 
Press, pp. 466-469. 
45
 Sartor, G. (2002) Intentional concepts and the legal discipline of software agents, in: Open Agent 
Societies: Normative Specifications in Multi-Agent Systems.London: Wiley. (Online) Available at: 
http://www.cirsfid.unibo.it/~sartor/GSCirsfidOnlineMaterials/GSOnLinePublications/GSPUB2002agents
Wiley.pdf [Accessed 15/March/2010]. 
46
 Ibid. This result is very important when examining the principle of mutual consent in Chapter 3 and 
whether automated contracts can be deemed consensual contracts.  
47
 Friedman, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (1996) User autonomy: Who should control what and when? 
Conference companion of the conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI 96, New York: 
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"trash all mail from a particular individual and s/he can also add except when the 
headline is ”Urgent”".48 According to Friedman and Nissenbaum, the user in this 
example loses the communication with his/her electronic agent as the agent is 
programmed to trash those emails coming from that particular individual. Consequently, 
the user loses control of his/her electronic agent and cannot therefore identify how the 
electronic agent would perform the task. Sometimes the headlines can take different 
forms of expressions such as "Important", "Help", or some other word requiring an 
urgent response. The electronic agent would be unable to identify these and this is not 
what the user would want.
49
  
 
This result is very important for the assumptions underpinning this dissertation. That 
this type of electronic agent can act differently to their users‟ behaviours proves that 
they are not tools. It is true that deviant tool behaviour can normally be ascribed to 
personal mistakes i.e. the owners of these tools still, generally speaking, have control 
over them. Maes points out that even if the user wanted to discipline their electronic 
agent to make them more accurate in representing their intention and improving 
performance, such a path is too difficult to take. She writes that: 
[T]he approach requires too much insight, understanding and effort from 
the end-user, since the user has to recognize the opportunity for 
employing an agent, take the initiative to create an agent, endow the 
agent with explicit knowledge (specifying this knowledge in an abstract 
language), and maintain the agent‟s rules over time (as work habits or 
interests change).
50
 
                                                                                                                                               
Association for Computing Machinery, p. 433. This example is not given in the context of contract 
formation but it can still explain the extent of autonomy that electronic agents may enjoy in their 
operations.   
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Maes, P. (1994) Agents that reduce work and information overload, Communications of the ACM, 37(7) 
p. 32. 
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Norman argues that the user‟s attempt to take excessive control over the operations 
of the electronic agent will restrict the agent‟s movement and therefore obstruct the 
advantages of using them altogether in business.
51
  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the features of electronic agents that are important when 
considering and analysing the conclusion of automated contracts. It also highlighted the 
way in which automated contracts are presented and constituted via computer software. 
However, this computer software is not simple; it operates strictly according to users' 
instructions but does not require the users' direct involvement. This developed computer 
software are known as electronic agents and have the autonomous ability to conclude 
contracts and complete all the contractual communications on behalf of the users. 
  
The electronic agent discussed in the chapters below refers to a definition of 
“electronic agent” outlined above. Given that the advanced computer software 
mentioned is a new way of concluding contracts, it is important to examine how the law 
should/would enforce contracts formed by such software. In the following two chapters, 
we discuss scenarios and approaches adopted under common law regarding the 
enforceability of automated contracts in order to improve the debate vis a vis Islamic 
law. 
  
It should be noted that the term „operator‟ is used rather than „user‟ in order to denote 
the entity on whose behalf the electronic agents are operating. Firstly, the reason for this 
is that the word „user‟ may give a wrong impression to the customer or to the person 
interacting with the electronic agent. Secondly, some authors have referred to electronic 
agents as „agents‟ on the grounds that the term „electronic agent‟ may interchange with 
                                                 
51
 Norman, D. A. (1994) How might people interact with agents, Communications of the ACM, 37(7) p. 
68-71. 
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„agent‟ in the context of agency law.52 To clarify this, the term „agent‟ is used in this 
thesis to refer only to a category of computer software. The term „agent‟ used in this 
thesis has nothing to do with agency principles, unless the context indicates otherwise.   
 
                                                 
52
 Middlebrook, T & Muller, J. (2000) Thoughts on bots: the emerging law of electronic agents, Business 
Lawyer, 56(1), p. 342. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Enforceability of Automated Contracts and Principle 
of Mutual Consent 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the first approach to explaining the enforceability of 
automated contracts. This approach claims that automated contracts should be 
enforceable because they originate from the legal entity where the electronic agent is 
operating. In such cases, electronic agents are assumed to be merely passive devices in 
the contractual process and the extension of human interaction. Therefore, any 
transaction or action concluded by these devices will usually be traced back to those 
who operate them (operators).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish if this approach is legally sufficient and 
compatible to render automated contracts binding. The beginning of this chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of the legal framework of this approach. The discussion 
investigates whether automated contracts are consensual, as this is a fundamental 
condition for an enforceable contract under common law. It can be assumed the 
operators of electronic agents have sufficiently manifested their assent on forming these 
kinds of contracts. The specific analysis here is of an objective theory under common 
law about the concept of mutual consent. At the end of the chapter, general comments 
will be provided on whether the concept of mutual consent under common law is 
satisfied and if automated contracts are enforceable based on this approach.  
3.2 The Legal Framework of the Electronic Agent as Tool Approach  
As will be demonstrated shortly, most legislatures in the world today conceptualize 
electronic agents as communication tools and as merely extensions of the operators' 
interaction. Transactions generated by these electronic agents are therefore attributed to 
the operators. All the actions of the electronic agents are attributed to the agent‟s 
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operator, whether or not they are intended, predicted or mistaken. On this basis, 
contracts entered into by an electronic agent will always bind the operator. The 
„electronic agent as tool‟ approach predominates in proposed legislative attempts to deal 
with electronic contracting. For example, under the UNCITRAL Model Law, there is no 
mention of electronic agents.
1
 When called to comment on Electronic Commerce, the 
international Chamber of Commerce asserted that it does not seem appropriate to 
regulate in specific terms, the automatic making of contracts.
2
 Therefore, the 
UNICTRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, subsection 2(b), states that acts 
generated by computers are attributed to the operators of these computers: "[T]he data 
messages that are generated automatically by computers without human intervention 
should be regarded as “originating” from the legal entity on behalf of which the 
computer is operated"
3
 
 
The originator of a data message is defined in subsection 2(c) as the “person by 
whom, or on whose behalf, the data message purports to have been sent or generated 
prior to storage...”. In the comments on subsection 2, the drafters explain: 
The notion of “person” must be understood as referring both to natural 
persons and legal entities … data messages that are generated by 
computers without direct human intervention therefore fall into the scope 
of subsection 2(c). 
                                                 
1
 The UNCITRAL Model Law is indicated here because the legislative movement of many countries 
today, including common law counties, has been influenced by the work of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law. The Model Law was formulated by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to facilitate the development of uniform 
legislation to be adopted by member states. It was undertaken partly in response to the fact that many 
countries have inadequate or outdated legislation governing electronic commerce in general and 
electronic contract in particular. See, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce (1996) (hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce). (Online) 
Available at: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r162.htm [Accessed 04/Feb/2008]. 
2
 International Chamber of Commerce, report on draft UNCITRAL Convention on Electronic 
Contracting, ad hoc ICC expert group, December 5, 2001, par. 3.3. I cannot clarify the reasons why it 
does not seem appropriate to regulate automated contracts in specific terms. 
3
 See article 13, paragraph 2, of the UNICTRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce subsection 1996, 
2(b). 
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In a similar way, in the UK, there is no statute available that clarifies the term 
“electronic agents”.4 Regulatory initiatives in this regard are in fact very limited. 
Likewise, the Electronic Commerce Directive of the European Union does not make 
provision for electronic agents.
5
 According to the notes contained in the proposal of the 
Electronic Commerce Directive, Member States should refrain from preventing a 
contract being made by an electronic agent.
6
 The final version makes no reference to 
electronic agents in the main text or in the recital.
7
 Several authors argue that the 
exclusion of the definition for electronic agents is due to EU regulations which address 
e-contracts, generally, under those contracts made by the exclusive use of some form of 
“distance communications” without specification to contracts concluded by electronic 
agents.
8
 Cross has located a failure to refer directly to electronic agents, which 
effectively means failure to realize that the use of electronic agent in the contractual 
process could create major obstacles to the creation of contracts.
9
 Those major obstacles 
may sometimes be anticipated by the legislators but are not considered, as yet, 
sufficiently important to warrant legislation treatment.
10
 According to Todd, in the eyes 
of this legislation, electronic agents have not yet become a common feature of electronic 
commerce.
11
 Therefore, the approach of this legislation is similar to the UNICTRAL 
                                                 
4
 This includes the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 which incorporates 
Directive 97/7/EC, the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 which incorporates 
Directive 2000/31/EC.
 
None of the two regulations has clear reference regarding electronic agents. These 
two regulations are available at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002334.htm. In terms of the 
Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002, it discusses mainly electronic signatures which is available at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2002/20020318.htm [Accessed 06/Feb/2008] and 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20022013.htm [Accessed 06/Feb/2008]. 
5
 Poggi, C. T. (2000) Electronic Commerce Legislation: An Analysis of European and American 
Approaches to contract formation, Virginia Journal of International Law, 41(Fall) p. 727. 
6
 COM, (1998), p. 586 final (Online) Available at: 
 www.europa.eu.int.scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124202.htm  [Accessed 15/June/ 2009]. 
7
 Kierkegaard, S. M. (2007) E-Contract Formation: U.S. and EU Perspectives, Shidler Journal of Law, 
Communication & Technology, 3(12), p. 11. 
8
  Kafeza, E. Chan, F. W. & Kafeza, I. (2006) Legal Issues on Web Contracting, International Conference 
on Software Engineering IASTED, Innsbruck, Austria, p. 8.  
9
 Cross. S. (2003) Agency, Contract and Intelligent Software Agents, International Review of Law 
Computer and Technology, 17(2), p. 185.   
10
 Ibid.  
11 See, Todd, P. (2005) E-Commerce Law. London: Cavendish. p. 195. 
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Model Law on Electronic Commerce subsection 2(b) in which automated contracts 
would be taken as originating from the operators of these computers. 
 
By comparison, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)12 defines 
electronic agents as: "[A] computer program or an electronic or other automated means 
used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances 
in whole or in part, without review or action by individual"
13
 The UETA identifies in 
this passage what an electronic agent is and explains clearly what shape an electronic 
agent's performance will take i.e. the ability of an electronic agent to perform actions 
independently without the involvement of a human being:  
[A]n electronic agent is a machine. As the term "electronic agent" has 
come to be recognized, it is limited to a tool function ... an electronic 
agent, such as a computer program or other automated means employed 
by a person, is a tool of that person. As a general rule, the employer of a 
tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of that tool since the 
tool has no independent volition of its own.
14
 
                                                 
12
 The text of the UETA is Available at: www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ueta.asp [Accessed 20/March/2010]. 
13
 The UETA S. 102(27). See appendix I S. 102 (27). The Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act (E-Sign) S. 106(5) adds “...without review or action by an individual at the time of the 
action or response”. See appendix I S. 106(5). The Uniform Computer Transactions Act (UCITA) follows 
the UETA language in defining electronic agent, but at the same time clarifies that an electronic agent 
performs “on the person‟s behalf”. The text of the UCITA is available at: 
 http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita200.htm [Accessed 20/March/2010]. The UETA 
was the first act in the US that defined electronic agent in this way in the world of the internet. This 
makes legislation in the US the most obvious in so far as clear reference to the term of electronic agent. 
American lawmaking bodies have recognized the issue of electronic agents and their ability to make 
contracts since the late 1990s. See, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) Available at: 
  http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 [Accessed 20/March/2010]. 
The NCCUSL is a non-profit unincorporated association, comprised of state commissions on uniform 
laws from each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. It was founded in 1892. Commissioners are appointed in a manner determined by each state or 
territory, review and evaluate the law of states to “determine which areas of law should be uniform.” Over 
250 uniform acts have been proposed by NCCUSL. Many have been adopted by most states nationwide, 
the most notable of which is the Uniform Commercial Code. 
14
 See the UETA. S. 2 cmt. 5. In one section, the comment advises that should autonomous electronic 
agents be developed that can learn through experience, modify instructions, and devise new instructions--
"courts may construe the definition of electronic agent accordingly, in order to recognize such new 
capabilities." See appendix I S. 2 cmt. 5. This means, at some point in future artificial intelligence 
developments offer autonomous agents instead of automatic, the courts then may construe the definition 
of electronic agents accordingly. This, as I see it, is a clear confess that the provisions of this legislation is 
not sufficient to apply to the advanced electronic agents and its approach that treats electronic agents as 
tools cannot be upheld. This is to say there might be good reason to treat them as agents for example, 
rather than as mere instruments. However, as Kerr puts it, the UETA failed to predict the future and to tell 
courts how to response the situation when electronic agents are developed more autonomously. Kerr, I. 
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S. 2 (212) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) specifically validates any action 
performed by an electronic agent by stating: "An electronic record or electronic 
signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person or the person's 
electronic agent or the person is otherwise legally bound by the act"
15
 
 
The legal analysis of the use of electronic agents in contract formation under these 
provisions focuses on human operators as legal entities acting on behalf of these 
electronic agents. It adopts “a legal fiction”16 in that anything issued from an electronic 
agent is issued by the natural or legal persons who use them, such a person using a 
paper medium. That is to say, the policy-maker's conception of electronic agents is that 
they have no doctrinal significance and are merely instruments of communication.
17
 
Cross comments that: 
The reason that legislatives tend to treat electronic agents as natural or 
passive devices is because it is not controversial or difficult in either 
theory or application. It currently appears so common-sense to say 
anything emanating from the electronic agent is, in fact, to be construed 
as emanating from the legally capable party using the agent.
18
 
Allen and Widdison argue that this approach comprises several important 
advantages. First, there is no need to change the existing rules of contracting since the 
automated contract would still be formed between two recognized legal persons i.e. 
between the operators themselves. Secondly, the individuals who deal with the 
                                                                                                                                               
(2000) The Legality of Software-Mediated Transactions, Proceedings of IASTED International 
Conference: Law and Technology, IASTED /ACTA Press. p. 93. 
15
 See appendix I S. 212. This is despite the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in (UCC) § 2-
103(1) (g) admits similar to that found under the UETA S. 2(6), that electronic agent have the capacity to 
initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances without review or action by individual 
i.e.  independently from their operators.  See appendix I S 2-103. 
16
 In the next section when I discuss the validity of this approach, I will explain why this adoption is a 
“legal fiction”.  
17
 Mills argues that "…[t]ransactions… do not change in any material way simply because the contract is 
formed electronically. What has changed, and will continue to evolve, are primarily the means by which 
the parties, will communicate in establishing those contracts. Mills, K. (2005) Effective Formation of 
Contracts by Electronic Means Do We Need a Uniform Regulatory Regime? Paper presented at World 
Summit on Information Technology in Tunis, p. 2. (Online) Available at: 
 http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/2307092552667.pdf, [Accessed 20/March/2010].     
18
 See Cross, S. (2003) Agency, Contract and Intelligent Software Agents, International Review of Law 
Computer &Technology, 17(2), p. 180. 
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operator‟s electronic agent would not bear the risk of error made by the electronic agent 
as its actions are attributed to their operators. Thirdly, as all electronic agents' actions 
are attributed to the operators, the latter would be very keen to ensure that their 
electronic agents are properly operated and policed to avert any mistakes or errors.
19
 By 
comparison, one can argue that this approach would be seen to be unfair and 
commercially unreasonable if the operator of the electronic agents is attributed to a vast 
range of unexpected communications. Electronic agents might then conclude a contract 
that excludes all warranties and sells an inferior product. That operators do not control 
the operations of the electronic agents is unfair; such an attribution regime (holding the 
operator liable for every action made by the electronic agent) is more appropriate in 
relation to the use of cars or machines which are meant to be directly controlled by their 
owners. Electronic agents, by comparison, work autonomously and therefore cannot be 
controlled.  
 
However, with this approach, transactions generated by electronic agents are 
enforceable because they are considered to originate from the operators. In the next 
section I will examine whether the principle of mutual consent is satisfied in these 
contracts i.e. the operators have mutual consent to form these transactions, because this 
is an essential condition for and of an enforceable contract under common law. 
However, it is first of all crucial to discuss the conditions underpinning mutual consent 
and to understand where the law stands on the concept of common law. 
3.3 The Principle of Mutual Consent  
Under Common law, the concept of an enforceable contract requires the mutual 
consent of contracting parties. An offer and an acceptance between the contracting 
                                                 
19
 Allen, T. & Widdison, R. (1996) Can Computers make contracts?. Harvard Journal &Technology, 
9(1), p. 47. 
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parties is the general test in proving mutual consent. This is the principle for „simple‟ 
contracts under common law, which is typically the most common type of any 
contractual relationship. In Tinn v. Hoffman, it was ruled that communication of an offer 
and an acceptance is necessary under common law. The court held that identical cross-
offers do not create a contract. Although there is a meeting of minds on both parties in a 
cross-offers case, a contract requires an offer by one party, which is communicated to 
the other party and is followed by an acceptance of that offer by the other party, which 
must also be communicated to the party making the offer.
20
  
 
According to this conception, mutual consent under common law is made possible by 
the formation of a binding contract requiring apparent communication between an offer 
and an acceptance even if such communication does not represent or reflect the real 
intent or the inner psychological state of the party's mind. In Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank v. Burnhope, the House of Lords stated:  
[I]t is true the objective of the construction [of contract] is to give effect 
to the intention of the parties. But our law of construction is based on an 
objective theory. The methodology is not to probe the real intention of 
the parties but to ascertain the contextual meaning of the relevant 
contractual language. Intention is determined by reference to expressed 
rather than actual intention.
21
 
Common law then does not require contracting parties to have knowledge of the 
completed contract. It requires more than some subjective indication between such 
parties. A contractual obligation may be formed, and parties might be obliged even if 
there was no intention to make such contract or to be bound by its terms. In Hart v. 
Mills, Judge Hand states: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the 
personal or individual intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the 
                                                 
20
 Tinn v. Hoffman, [1873] 29 L.T. 271. 
21
 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. Burnhope [1996] 1 L1oyd‟s Rep. 113, 122. 
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mere force of law to certain acts of the parties usually words, which ordinary 
accompany and represent a known intent".
22
 
 
Furthermore, in the case of Storer v. Manchester City Council, Lord Denning states: 
In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in man's mind. You 
look at what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is, to all 
outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a contract by 
saying: 'I did not intend to contract' if by his words he has done so. His 
intention is to be found only in the outward expression.
23
  
In order to determine whether there is a contract, the task will be as Lord Eldon 
asserts: "Not to see that both contracting parties really meant the same thing, but only 
that both have their assent to the proposition which, be what it may, de facto arises out 
of the terms of their correspondence".
24
  
 
This point is important to bear in mind for the following section when discussing the 
enforceability of automated contracts. Since these contracts are concluded by electronic 
agents and not by the operators themselves, there is an argument here that the operator 
has no intention in these contracts. Under common law, a party is obliged to fulfil what 
he does/says because he has made others believe that the words/actions performed were 
intended by him. The objective test of evidence for an outward expression of a person is 
determined by evaluating how a reasonable man in the shoes of the other contracting 
party would have interpreted the contractual statements made by the first party, to see if 
they amounted either to a firm offer or an acceptance. What is relevant is whether a 
reasonable man would believe that assent to the contract was being manifested by the 
first party. Atiyah writes: "…The truth is a party is bound not so much because of what 
he intends but because of what he does … for the good reason that other parties are 
                                                 
22
 Hart v. Mills [1846] 15. M. and W.  p. 85. 
23
 Storer v. Manchester City Council [1974] 3 All ER 824. 
24
 See Kennedy v. Lee [1817] 3 Mer  p. 441. 
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likely to rely upon what he does in ways which are reasonable and even necessary by 
the standards of our society".
25
 
 
Turley explains that this trend of mutual consent has some merit. He argues that in 
any formation of a contract, the law relies on a clear communication between parties as 
intentions can appear ambiguous and therefore require some degree of evidence. This 
evidence may include a communication of an offer and an acceptance; the absence of 
which would, from the business‟s point of view, raise the question of whether the party 
meant or intended the contract.
26
 Turley states:  
An individual could escape their obligations merely by stating that they 
had no intention of being bound by any agreement. The courts thus 
require some outward objective evidence of the existence of an 
agreement. Any subjective element is subordinate to the objective one 
and is, to a large degree, of no consequence except where it corresponds 
with the intentions of the parties as ascertained by objective means.
27
 
In Civil law by comparison, the approach of mutual consent is different where the 
emphasis is on assent of a party as a subjective mental fact. According to this approach, 
in order to establish whether or not there was a valid contract, judges must look at the 
actual or subjective intentions of the parties to verify whether each party really intended 
to be bound by the contract. This means that subjectivists clearly consider a party's inner 
will as the determinant, and not its declared will.
28
 It is the actual intention of the party 
that is essential, not their external behaviour such as the apparent communication of an 
offer and an acceptance. This implies that the communication of an offer and an 
acceptance will have no value except in its conformity to the party‟s inner will and 
intentions. In order to ensure that this conformity was really achieved, it is necessary to 
                                                 
25
 Atiyah,  (2006) An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 6
th
 ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
26
 Turley, I. (2001) Principles of Commercial Law, 2
th
 ed. Routledge-Cavendish. p. 50.   
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Farnsworth, A. (1999) Contracts. 3
th
 ed, Aspen Law & Business. p. 116.   
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consider whether the party subjectively intended to be bound by the contract.
29
 
Questions always arise here on how to prove the party‟s actual intention.30 
  
However, common law is quite clear that mutual consent between parties is satisfied 
with an apparent communication of an offer and an acceptance between the parties. 
This, as has been noted, is a condition for any contract to be enforceable. As the aim of 
this thesis is to discuss the enforceability of automated contracts, it is important 
therefore in the following section to discuss this condition and whether it is met in these 
types of contracts. In other words, can we ascertain an apparent communication of an 
offer and an acceptance between parties in automated contracts? 
3.3.1 Application of the Principal of Mutual Consent to Automated Contracts 
There are arguments in the literature over whether mutual consent under common 
law is achievable in automated contracts i.e. operators of electronic agents giving 
consent to form these contracts. Allen and Widdison argue that the operators of 
electronic agents in automated contracts do not consent. According to the authors, there 
is still the question of whether there is an offer and subsequent acceptance of that offer 
when the operators of electronic agents do not know about the communication of 
contracting.
31
 As the operator is unaware of the fact that his electronic agent has made a 
transaction with the other party, Savirimuthu argues that it does not make sense to state 
that the operator has given his acceptance, or that mutual consent has been reached 
between two legal persons.
32
 Rahim suggests that the correct analysis in order to 
achieve the requirement of offer and acceptance between two legal persons is if the 
                                                 
29
 Owsia, P. (1994) Formation of contract: a comparative study under English, French, Islamic, and 
Iranian law. Heidelberger: Springer. p. 35. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Allen, T. & Widdison, R. (1996) Can Computers make contracts?, Harvard Journal &Technology, 
9(1), p. 47. 
32
 Savirimuthu, J. (2005) Online Contract Formation: Taking Technological Infrastructure Seriously, 
University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, 2(1), p. 105. 
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automated transactions were merely mediated by the electronic agents.
33
 However, 
according to Rahim, this requirement is not achievable since automated transactions that 
are initiated by electronic agents are autonomous and in a manner unknown and 
unpredicted by the operators.
34
 In the same vein, several authors argue that it would be 
equally less realistic to classify those communications made by electronic agents on 
behalf of the operators, as communications of the letter if they were unknown by the 
operators.
35
 Lodder and Voulon also suggest that if automated contracts are concluded 
without the actual knowledge of the operators, one cannot claim that there was an offer 
and an acceptance between contracting parties.
36
 According to the arguments raised 
above, insomuch as the offer and acceptance are communicated by the electronic agents 
and not by the operators so the operators have no actual knowledge that their electronic 
agents are making this communication, we cannot then have the condition of mutual 
consent satisfied between the operators.  
 
However, on the other hand, in the relationship between employers and their 
employees, the party is deemed to have consented to a contract made by his employee 
even though the former may not himself have made the contact communication. Under 
common law,  employers are bound for their employees' autonomous acts (vicariously 
liable) even if they have neither immediately influenced nor participated in the wrongful 
behaviour that occasioned the loss e.g. a person employed in his company is a 
dangerous person or the employer is devoutly questioned for injuries caused on third 
                                                 
33
 Abdel Rahim, E. (2006) Intelligent Agents and Intentionality: Should We Begin to Think Outside the 
Box? , Computer Law and Security Report,  22(6), pp. 472-480. 
34
 As explained in Chapter 2, these electronic agents do not only mediate communications, but also create 
and complete communications autonomously based on their own experiences. Therefore, it is difficult to 
claim that the contractual process was made by human operators. 
35
 Kafeza,I.   Kafeza, E. &  Chiu, D.K.W, (2005) Legal Issues in Agents for Electronic Contracting, 
proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences , pp. 7-8, (Online) Available 
at: http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/05/22680134a.pdf  
[Accessed 20/March/2010]. 
36
 See, Lodder, A.R. & Voulon. M. (2000) Intelligent agents and the information requirements of the 
Directives on distance selling and e-commerce, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 
16(3) p. 282. (Online) Available at: 
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/05/22680134a.pdf  
[Accessed 23/March/2010]. 
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parties by such persons.
37
 Under a legal doctrine referred to as “the respondent superior 
doctrine” (Latin for “let the superior answer”)38, an employer is legally accountable for 
the actions of his employee on the ground that the crucial defining feature of the 
employer‟s duty is its personal and non-delegable nature. Lord Macmillan described it 
thus in the leading case Wilsons and Coal Co Ltd v English:  
It remains the owner‟s obligation, and the agent whom the owner 
appoints to perform it on the owner‟s behalf. The owner remains 
responsible for the negligence of the person whom he has appointed to 
perform his obligation for him, and cannot escape liability by merely 
proving that he has appointed a competent agent. If the owner‟s duty has 
not been performed, no matter how competent the agent selected by the 
owner to perform it for him, the owner is responsible.
39
  
This rule, however, is only applied if the employee is acting within the course and 
scope of employment. That is to say, the employee‟s actions will be attributed to the 
employer based only on when the act occurred during the term of employment. As can 
be seen, although the employee may perform the contract formation using his own 
initiative, Common law held the employer liable for this contract. This model, as I see 
it, is comparable to contracts carried out by electronic agents because of the lack of 
knowledge the employer has over the contracting process made by his employee. 
However, unlike electronic agents, ultimately the employee is a legal person acting as 
an agent on behalf of the employer in the course of the employment. Electronic agents, 
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by comparison, until now lack this legal capacity and so the comparison is imperfect 
and incomplete.
40
 
 
However, the model presented by Katz and others may appear more convincing. 
Katz uses to the analogy of the relationship between masters and slaves in Ancient 
Rome to illustrate that the condition of mutual consent should be satisfied in a contract 
carried out by an electronic agent.
41
 Slaves in the Ancient Rome played an important 
role in the development of Trade and Commerce by acting on behalf of their masters in 
running their business. They were acting as estate managers, bankers, merchants, 
shopkeepers and so on. In this time of antiquity, slaves were regarded as "things" with 
no rights or real duties in law, similar to the current legal status of electronic agents. 
Nonetheless, Romans still allowed these slaves to conduct business on behalf of their 
masters. According to Katz, the model of slavery in the Roman era could be suggested 
as a model for transactions formed by contemporary electronic agents. That is to say, 
the masters are not aware of the formation of contracts made on their behalf i.e. the 
communication of the offer and acceptance, as nobody states that actions made by 
slaves are not enforceable because they do not satisfy the concept of mutual consent 
under common law.
42
 Barrio also suggests that since slaves are allowed to form 
contracts on their masters' behalf without the intervention of their masters in the process 
of the contract communication, this should prove to be a good mechanism to apply to 
contracts made by electronic agents.
43
 The mechanics are the same when operators limit 
their electronic agents with certain instructions and send them off to act on their behalf. 
Masters also limit the capacity of their slaves but encourage them to act on their behalf 
                                                 
40
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and do their business within the limitations drawn by the masters.
44
 Whilst slaves are 
able to make decisions on behalf of their masters in order to facilitate and increase the 
business transactions, the same can be applied to electronic agents as they have the 
capability to increase and expand the efficiency of the market to benefit of operators.
 45
  
3.3.1.1 The Objective Approach to Identifying Mutual Consent  
 
As explained above, the way that common law mutual consent operates within 
Common law is subject to an objective test in which the parties do not (subjectively) 
intend the contract.
46
 That is to say, an operator does not need to have actual knowledge 
of the completed transaction by his/her electronic agent. If an offer meets with an 
acceptance, neither party is allowed to say that they did not know the exact content of 
that contract or that they were unaware of the time when it was made. As Hedley states, 
“their agreement was of a slip of the pen or of the mouse”.47 If party A mistakenly 
believes party B made a certain declaration which B did not make, or A believes B had 
a certain intention which B did not have, this can sometimes produce the same effect as 
if B had made that declaration or that intention. As ruled in the case of the Leonidas D 
[1985], Goff LJ, Lord Brightman asserted that if party O so acts that his conduct, 
objectively considered, constitutes an offer, and party A, believing that the conduct of O 
represents his actual intention, accepts O‟s offer, then a contract will come into 
existence, and on those facts it will make no difference if O did not actually intend to 
make an offer, or if he misunderstood A‟s acceptance, so that O‟s state of mind is, in 
such circumstances, irrelevant.
48
 In the case of Thomton v Shoe Lane Parking, Lord 
Denning was in doubt about whether the offer was made by the proprietor of the 
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machine when he holds it out as being ready to receive the customer‟s money. Lord 
Denning‟s analysis of the contractual process in this case was that the activities of the 
machine are deemed to be those of the proprietor and they are bound by their apparent 
„intention to be bound‟ to the actions of that machine.49  
 
Therefore, operators in automated contracts should be legally bound, not because 
they wanted the contractual contents, but because they chose from the beginning to 
delegate the formation of the contracts to their electronic agents. To conclude the 
contract will not require the unexpressed intent towards a single contractual point or a 
specific transaction, but rather the apparent intention of the operators to appoint 
electronic agents. Courts under common law should not be interested in the 
psychological or inner state of the operator‟s mind but in the outward significance of the 
contractual statements made by their electronic agents. As Kerr states, the objective 
approach of mutual consent is applicable by holding on to the idea that by initiating an 
electronic agent to finalize a transaction on behalf of an operator, the operator is deemed 
to have consented to the concluded transaction and therefore will be bound by it.
 50
 In 
this regard, Lerouge states that 
We can assume that the operator has assented by conduct when using 
electronic agent. By using electronic agents to enter into contracts, it 
presumes the operator‟s assent to the contract even though he may 
subjectively intent otherwise.
51
  
In the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bock horst
52
, a 
motorist allowed his automobile insurance policy to expire. When he ran over and killed 
a pedestrian, he sent a cheque requesting the company to renew his policy retroactively. 
Due to the company's computer failing to deduce that the motorist was visibly 
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attempting to obtain coverage for an accident that had already happened, the motorist 
was able to pass the renewal request and the claim at the same time. The computer 
entered the details of the renewal request which later sent a notice to the motorist 
confirming that the policy had been renewed. State Farm claimed that the reinstatement 
of Bockhorst's policy resulted from the flawed processes of a computer as the actions of 
the computer were not intentionally based. State Farm also argued that the reinstated 
policy was accomplished without having knowledge of Bockhorst's accident. 
Furthermore, the company argued that it was the unavoidable result of the inexorable 
processes of a computer rather than the intentional relinquishment of a known right that 
enabled the reinstatement of the policy.
53
 The court nonetheless decided the contract 
was valid even though the person on whose account the contract was made did not 
know about it. Deciding in favour of Bockhorst, the judge ruled:  
[H]olding a company responsible for the actions of its computer does not 
exhibit distaste for modern business practices as [the insurance company] 
asserts. A computer operates only in accordance with the information and 
directions supplied by its human programmers. If the computer does not 
think like a man, it is man's fault. The reinstatement of Bockhorst's policy 
was the direct result of the errors and oversights of [the insurance 
company]'s human agents and employees. The fact that the actual 
processing of the policy was carried out by an unimaginative mechanical 
device can have no effect on the company's responsibilities for those 
errors and oversights...
54
 
According to the concept of mutual consent under common law, whether operators of 
electronic agents know about the formation of contracts and their terms or not should 
not prevent us from stating that the operators are inextricably bound to the actions of the 
electronic agents and that the activities of the electronic agents are deemed to be the 
operator‟s as well.55 People usually conclude their contracts without reading them and 
yet those contracts are still binding upon them. In the case of L'Estrange v. Graucob, the 
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court ruled that a person who signs a contract without reading it is normally bound by 
its terms, except if he has been lied to. Scrutton LJ states: "It was immaterial that 
L'Estrange had not read the clause. The fact that she signed it meant that she was bound 
by it. She is deemed to have read and agreed to the terms of the contract".
56
 
 
In the financial marketplace, for example, where electronic agents are programmed 
to buy and sell stock, if we ask for the operator's knowledge of the contract 
communication, the electronic agents will not be able to sell what they have just 
acquired before communicating the previous purchase to their operator. Obviously, this 
process would cause difficulties and hampers effective on-line trading.
57
 The general 
principle under common law is that whoever operates a device that has the ability to 
create both trust and reliance in the minds of others, commits himself to be legally 
bound by any generated consequences, even though he may subjectively intend 
otherwise.
58
 That is to say, whoever assents to the means also assents to the 
consequences. As Lerouge states: "The electronic agent is programmed by the operator 
and therefore, since he created this way of communicating, he should be held 
responsible...if a party creates a situation in which an electronic agent is to act on his 
behalf, then a party is bound by the actions of the agents".
59
 Allen and Widdison also 
write: "The operator chose electronic agent to act on his behalf, therefore, it should not 
be denied his liability. This is according to a “legal fiction” that the intention and the 
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whole risk of transactions should be put on the person best to control them- those who 
program and control the computer".
60
  
 
Accordingly, people should be deemed to be expressing their consent when using an 
electronic agent for the purposes of contract formation. The communication of the 
electronic agent will be inferred to be the communication of the (human) operator of the 
electronic agent. The only communication of an offer or an acceptance that is relevant 
(where a contract is formed in which at least one party is using an electronic agent) is 
that of the person using the electronic agent, and not of the electronic agent itself. That 
is to say, the communication of the offer or acceptance is made between those who 
operate these automated programs. 
3.3.1.1.1  Some Problems with the Objective Approach 
 
Certain critics argue that the objective approach as described in the previous 
section
61
 suggests that a party is obliged to what he does/say as he made others believe 
that he intended the words/actions performed. A contracting party will only be able to 
escape the contract if he can prove that the other party knew or reasonably ought to have 
known of the mistake, malfunction, or error, and that it is unreasonable under any 
circumstance for the counterparty to believe that they would assent to the contract.
62
 
The objective test of evidence of an outward expression of a person is determined by 
looking at how a reasonable man in the shoes of the other contracting party would have 
interpreted the contractual statements made by the first party, to see if they amounted 
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either to a firm offer or an acceptance. As Atiyah explains, what is relevant is whether a 
reasonable man would believe that assent to the contract was being manifested by the 
first party.
63
 It is not sufficiently convincing that there is an apparent communication of 
contract formation between the operators in automated contracts. Such communication 
does not in fact exist. What is actually apparent and known is that the communication of 
the contract formation of automated contracts was made by electronic agents and not by 
the operators. According to Cross, these electronic agents are not the first generation of 
computer software which functions automatically and only according to the operator‟s 
determinations.
64
 In the advanced generations of computer software such as these 
electronic agents, the function of the whole contact formation communication and its 
stages are fulfilled autonomously (as explained in the previous chapter) by these 
electronic agents. This makes electronic agents different from fax machines, telephones, 
or any alternative medium by which a contract is concluded. As Sommer puts it, it is not 
a plausible argument to characterize electronic agents in a similar fashion to these 
passive devices.
65
 This is because electronic agents participate in the contract formation 
process as well. The telephone conveys the voice of one contracting party to another. A 
fax conveys the handwritten or typed communication sought to be exchanged. If there is 
distortion in the signal or the connection is severed, the contracting parties can rectify 
this accordingly by re-sending the fax message. Ultimately, the contracting parties 
remain in control of the contractual process
66
 
  
To satisfy the condition of mutual consent and therefore bind operators to their 
automated contracts, we cannot rely solely on the fiction of an engagement of an offer 
and its acceptance between operators. Such nonexistent communication cannot be the 
                                                 
63
 Atiyah, P.S. (2006) An Introduction to the Law of Contract.6
th
 ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  p. 
22. 
64
 Cross, S. (2003) Agency, Contract and Intelligent Software Agents, International Review of Law 
Computer and Technology, 17(2), p. 180. 
65
 Sommer, J. (2000)  Against Cyberlaw, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 15(3), p. 1145. 
66
 Cross, S. op, cit., p. 180. 
Ch: 3 Common Law Principle of Mutual Consent 
 
47 
 
sole reason constituting the operators' mutual consent. According to Savirimuthu, the 
communication of an offer and acceptance must underscore what is generally referred to 
as "the voluntary aspect of contract".
67
 As Kerr puts it, the traditional understanding of 
what makes a contract binding under common law is the underlying idea that parties to 
a contract have each exercised freewill: each person has freely chosen to enter into the 
contract.
68
 When an electronic agent makes an acceptance autonomously without their 
operator's knowledge or even expectation, the operator has not exercised freewill 
because the operator is unaware of the completion of the contract and did not choose to 
send the communication of acceptance.
69
  
 
In addition, Allen and Widdison argue that the application of such rule to automated 
contracts could provide judges with "a fuzzy margin of manoeuvre".
70
 They suggest that 
it will be very difficult for the judges in automated contracts to distinguish the 
reasonable from the unreasonable and in deciding on a case-by-case basis whether or 
not a person can reasonably believe that the operator of the electronic agent has 
manifested assent to the contract. The judgment here will be made according to various 
principles, aspects and criteria; discretion therefore will differ from judge to judge and 
vary from time to time and even from one place to another.
71
 To illustrate this, Howarth 
suggests that
72
 there are different types of objectivity. First, there is promisor objectivity 
in which the court tries to decide what the reasonable promisor would have intended. 
Second, there is promisee objectivity where the focus is on what the reasonable person 
to whom the promise is made would know what was intended. Third, there is what is 
called detached objectivity which evaluates the consent of a party through the eyes of an 
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independent third party.
73
 In Smith v Hughes (1871), where the dispute centred on the 
type of commodity (oats) the parties had agreed a contract about, the test was made as 
to whether the party who wished to deny the contract acted in a way that a reasonable 
man would believe the party was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party: in 
other words promisee objectivity.
74
  
 
Furthermore, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bockhorst, Rahim 
argues that judges in such a case could reach different conclusions about similar facts 
and situations.
75
 For example, the court, as seen previously,
76
 has decided that the 
contract was valid even though the person on whose account the contract was made did 
not know about it. Another judge could decide differently and rule that it is 
unreasonable for the motorist to believe that the insurance company would consent to 
make a contract with someone who was clearly attempting to obtain coverage for an 
accident that had already happened. This mistake was or should have been very obvious 
to the motorist.
77
  
 
A further example, which could explain the difficult task faced by judges in 
distinguishing the reasonable from the unreasonable, is online pricing. In online pricing, 
it is not clear how judges should decide between what a reasonable price for goods is 
and what is not. Online prices are not stable over time and people cannot be made fully 
aware of all these updated changes i.e. a person might believe that very low prices are 
sometimes offered online for promotional reasons; therefore a web store might find it 
difficult to argue that such prices are unreasonable for customers. On 21 September 
1999, Argos advertised the sale of televisions on its website for only £2.99. Customers 
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started placing orders over to take advantage of this excellent offer. However, Argos 
refused to deliver the televisions on the grounds that they had been incorrectly priced by 
mistake. Argos claimed that the correct price was £299 not £2.99.
78
 Likewise, even 
though it is stated that the operator in an automated transaction has conducted himself in 
such a way that a reasonable man would believe the transaction was assented by the 
operator, one can still challenge this as an unreasonable belief due to the fact that 
operators do not participate in the contractual process generated by the electronic agents 
and the operators have no knowledge of the transaction being made.
79
  
 
Thus the courts may not be consistent about which type of objectivity is used and can 
change between one and the other. Hedley argues that in applying the objective test to 
automated contracts there will usually be room for argument about whether or not the 
act of an electronic agent is reasonable.
80
 This method of contracting can thus create 
uncertainty within online business and lack of public confidence.  
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed whether or not the principle of mutual consent is satisfied in 
automated contracts in order that these contracts become enforceable. Common law is 
clear about whether the test of a party's assent is objective and whether parties need to 
be aware of the transaction or to have knowledge of it. As such, mutual consent between 
parties is usually satisfied with an apparent communication of an offer and an 
acceptance between the parties. We also explored the issue of apparent communication 
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of an offer and an acceptance between parties in automated contracts. Two opposing 
views featuring their own weaknesses can be thus identified.  
On the one hand, there are opinions that find automated contracts are consensual 
because there is an apparent communication of an offer and an acceptance between 
operators of electronic agents. According to this opinion, the fact that both the 
communication of the offer and its acceptance was achieved by electronic agents means 
that the operators may not be aware or do not have knowledge of it does not free them 
from being bound. It was clear under common law that the operators will be bound 
because by using electronic agents online they make others to believe that this is their 
own contract communication.  
On the other hand, there are convincing arguments that negate the consent of 
operators in automated contracts and suggest that the objective approach of mutual 
consent is inapplicable. This is because the application of the objective approach 
requires the earnest belief of a reasonable person that the offer and acceptance of the 
contract had been manifested by the contracting party. ”Apparent intention" that can be 
relied upon by the other party is what makes the objective approach applicable. For the 
other party it becomes difficult to argue that a reasonable person would conclude that 
the communication of the offer and acceptance in automated contracts was apparently 
made by the operators as what is really apparent is that such communication was made 
by electronic agents. The objective approach is resistant to being adapted to contracts 
made by electronic agents because those who conduct such business cannot reasonable 
believe that the contract communication was made by the operators. The law is clear on 
the fact that a transaction made by an electronic agent is autonomous and the offer and 
acceptance is made without the operator‟s knowledge. It cannot be argued that some 
people may have limited knowledge of these facts as the use of electronic agents in 
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forming contracts is more generalised today. That is to say, the public cannot deny their 
knowledge that automated contracts are formed by electronic agents autonomously and 
without the operators' awareness or direct intervention.  
In conclusion it would seem that the way electronic agents work online has not been 
taken into consideration when operators determine whether automated contracts have 
been communicated. The autonomous characteristic of electronic agents has had no 
influence on the operators‟ decision, affecting the way they look at the enforceability of 
contracts formed by them. The next chapter takes into consideration the fact that the 
computer software used to form automated contracts, is not of the first generation which 
operates automatically and solely according to the operator‟s determinations. These 
electronic agents utilize advanced generations of computer software that works 
autonomously and without any intervention of the operators. Hence, an alternative 
approach must be recognised, one that characterizes electronic agents as agents with 
rights to act on behalf of their operators. This approach requires the employment of 
agency law to enforce contracts concluded by electronic agents.  
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CHAPTER 4: The Enforceability of Automated Contracts and Agency 
Theory 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an alternative approach to explaining the enforceability of 
automated contracts. This approach suggests that electronic agents behave on the 
internet just as human agents do and contracts made by electronic agents therefore 
should be enforced according to agency principles.  I will assess the validity of this 
approach, specifically evaluating whether it is legally sufficient to enforce the binding 
nature of automated contracts. 
 
The chapter starts by discussing the legal framework of this approach. It presents a 
discussion on how the operations of electronic agents can be viewed as the same as 
human agents‟ operations. Secondly, it discusses the common law principles of agency 
and whether electronic agents can be granted agency. It proceeds by analysing what 
authority electronic agents have to bind their operators. Is it actual, apparent, or 
ratification authority? Each of these categories is subject to an investigation to examine 
its applicability to electronic agents. In line with the approach of treating electronic 
agents the same as human agents, the chapter examines whether electronic agents can be 
considered to have an extended legal personality. Finally, the chapter assesses whether 
agency principles can be used to enforce automated contracts under common law. 
4.2 How Electronic Agents Use Agency Principles 
This approach suggests that an electronic agent as agent acting on behalf of his/her 
operator. According to this approach, agency principles are perfectly embodied by the 
role in which electronic agents play by conducting transactions online and completing 
all the transaction processes autonomously on behalf of their operators. This in contrast 
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to the previous approach which conceptualizes electronic agents as communication tools 
by establishing that the contract communications in automated contracts are made by 
the operators of electronic agents. This outlook establishes that electronic agents are not 
merely used as mediums or passive devices but rather as agents who have been given 
instructions, sent off online to make transactions on behalf of their operators and 
completed all stages of the transaction process independently of their operators. This is the 
same function human agents normally perform; they operate based upon predetermined 
instructions and enjoy the ability to perform transactions in favour of their principals 
without the latter's direct intervention. Fischer makes this observation: 
When computers are given the capacity to communicate with each other 
based upon pre-programmed instructions, and when they possess the 
physical capability to execute agreements on shipments of goods without 
any human awareness or input into the agreements beyond the original 
programming of the computer's instructions, these computers serve the 
same function as similarly instructed human agents of a party….1  
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)
2
, S.107 (d) states: "A 
person that uses an electronic agent that it has selected for making an authentication, 
performance, or agreement, including manifestation of assent, is bound by the 
operations of the electronic agent…".3 The Official Comment considers that: "The term 
„selects‟ does not imply a choice from among alternative agents but rather a conscious 
decision to use a particular agent. The concept stated here embodies principles like 
those in agency law…".4 
 
It is clear then that the Official Comments of the UCITA consider agency principles 
to be embodied in the role that electronic agents play on the Internet. In such a situation, 
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an operator selects an electronic agent and gives the latter the power to bind him.
5
 
Furthermore, S. 212 (a) of the UCITA 1999 [USA] states: "An electronic authentication, 
display, message, record, or performance is attributed to a person if it was the act of that 
person or its electronic agent, or if the person is bound by it under agency or other 
law..."
6
 
 
The Official Comment on this section explains this kind of attribution as "might 
involve reliance on agency law principles."
7
 Middlebrook and Muller
8
 give eBay online 
auction as an example to prove the functional similarity between electronic and human 
agents. The authors explain that in a classical auction, if a buyer is unable to go and bid 
for himself, he asks a friend to go (as an agent) to bid on his behalf. Normally, he will 
also tell the friend his maximum bid amount. According to Middlebrook and Muller, the 
same scenario happens in eBay auctions. For instance, a buyer enters his or her 
maximum bid in the bidding system together with their user ID and password number. 
The system will then act as a proxy bidder in the buyer's absence and will try to keep 
the bid within the maximum amount nominated by the buyer.
9
 That is to say, the proxy 
bidding system is in fact the buyer‟s friend (the agent).10 
                                                 
5
 §107 cmt. 5. Although the Official Comment of the UETA asserts that there is a functional similarity 
between electronic and human agents, nevertheless they assert that electronic agents do not depend on 
agency law. See the UCITA, S. 107 (d), cmt. 23. See appendix I. This position is described by several 
legal authors as very complex. According to Kerr for example, the drafters did not point out clearly why 
and on what basis electronic agents do not depend on agency law. In Kerr's words, "by referring to the 
law of agency without articulating it, the provision of S. 213 (a) confuses rather than clarifies the issue". 
This chapter attempts to answer whether or not electronic agents can be granted agency and discusses 
what barriers exist against this application.   
6
 S. 212 (a)   
7
 The UCITA, S. 213 (a), cmt. 2. See appendix I. These references to agency principles are the major 
addition in this legislation. For this reason, the Act has been described as the most insightful and 
innovative legislation in the existing corpus of e-commerce legislation today. See, Kerr, I. (2001) 
Ensuring the Success of Contract Formation in Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Electronic 
Commerce Research Journal, 1(1)-(2), p. 45. It should be noted here that the UCITA 1999 [USA], as it 
has been seen, has not referred through its provisions to the existence of agency principles in transactions 
made by automated  contracts, even in its most related provisions to electronic agents. Rather, it is the 
Official Comment which make reference to agency principles. Nevertheless, the drafters have not 
clarified how agency principles would be applied to automated contracts. 
8
 Middlebrook, S. T & Muller, J. (2000) Thoughts on bots: the emerging law of electronic agents, The 
Business Lawyer, 56(1), p. 354. 
9
 It appears exactly as follows: “Our bidding system operates as proxy bid system. This means that a 
bidder can submit a maximum bid amount and our system will act as a proxy bidder in their absence, 
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Consequently, insomuch as electronic agents act like human agents on the Internet, 
they should therefore be treated as nothing less than that. Fischer states:  
When a human actor uses a computer in the same manner as medium to 
send a message to another human actor, the computer functions in the 
same way that a fax machine or posted letter does. However, when a 
principal uses a computer in the same manner that it uses a human agent, 
then the law should treat the computer in the same manner that it treats 
the human agent.
11
 
In the next section, I will discuss whether agency principles of common law accept 
such treatment i.e. electronic agents being treated as such. Before that, it is important to 
first explain these principles.  
 
4.3 The Common Law Principles of Agency 
 
In order to be competent to act as an agent under common law, the agent need not be 
a person possessing full contractual capacity.
12
 A cogent example is infants who, 
although they are considered to be incompetent, however, under the common law of 
agency, they can act as agents. A minor may act as an agent to bind a principal although 
                                                                                                                                               
executing their bid for them and trying to keep the bid price as low as possible. This way a bidder does 
not have to be at the auction every minute”.  See www.ebay.com. One should bear in mind that eBay has 
consented to act as a bidder not only for a particular user, but rather to all individuals bidding on eBay 
site.  
10
 Middlebrook & Muller, op, cit., pp. 357-358. See also the example given by Sylvie and Wodka which 
proves the functional similarity between electronic and human agents. The authors provide that: Jenn 
wants to go to a wedding but she has nothing to wear. Jenn is hesitating to go shopping outside because 
she knows that shopping represents a big time investment. Jenn turns on her computer and asks her 
electronic agent to buy some trousers and an elegant vest. Jenn also tells her electronic agent not to 
exceed $300. After quick search, the electronic agent provides Jenn with 10 models which could 
correspond to her previous purches and desires. Jenn chooses her favorite one. The electronic agent buys 
the item from the store Y using Jenn's credit card details which are already stored in electronic agent's 
memory. In that short example, the electronic agent "MINI-ME" has performed all the stages of Jenn‟s 
transaction instead of her. Jenn‟s attitude toward the contractual process has been totally induced by the 
electronic agent. Sylvie, R & Wodka, D. (2003) Electronic agents on the Internet: A New Way to Satisfy 
the Consumer, 12th international conference on Research in the Distributive, Paris, France, pp.2-3. 
(Online) Available at: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/14/30/40/PDF/E_satisfaction.pdf 
[Accessed 30/March/2010]. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Beale, H. (2008) Chitty on Contracts. 30
th
 ed .Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 31-083. By comparison, Islamic 
law requires full contractual capacity in order to for agents to pass the competence test. The theory behind 
this is that a person who lacks capacity to bind himself to a transaction should not be allowed the capacity 
to bind others. Chapter 7 of this thesis will provide more discussion on Islamic agency theory.  
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the minor would lack capacity to bind him or herself to the same transaction.
13
 Under 
common law, if the principal consents to the agent to act on his/her behalf and the agent 
accordingly agrees to act on behalf of the principal, an agency relationship is 
established. According to Bowstead: 
Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, 
one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on 
his behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of 
whom similarly consents so to act or so acts. The one on whose behalf 
the act or acts are to be done is called the principal. The one who is to act 
is called the agent. Any person other than the principal and the agent may 
be referred to as the third party.
14
 
In light of this definition, the concept of agency relationship under common law is a 
consensual relationship in which it is clear that no special formality is required; only the 
requirement by an agent and a principal to consent to their association with each other. 
When the agent consents to act on behalf of the principal, the agent then under common 
law obtains what is so-called actual authority to bind the principal.
15
 That does not 
necessarily mean that an agency relationship under common law can only be established 
by a manifestation of consent between the principal and the agent (express authority).  
 
The consent of the principal, which is regarded as the basic justification for the 
agent‟s power to affect his principal‟s legal relations, may be implied from his conduct 
or from his position towards the agent, and vice versa.
16
 This means that the agent's 
actions can also sufficiently constitute his/her implied consent to enter into an agency 
relationship.
17
 In such circumstances, the agent is deemed to have what is called implied 
authority in order to bind the principal. An agency relationship can be established if the 
principal does not manifest assent to the agent but the agent reasonably believes, in 
accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes 
                                                 
13
 Anderson, T. R, (1991) Agents' Legal Responsibility. Natl Underwriter Co, p. 33. 
14
 Reynolds, F M B. (2001)  Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency. 17
th
 ed.Sweet & Maxwell, [1-001]. 
15
 Anderson, op, cit., p. 32. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid.  
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him/her to act and the agent acts accordingly. In the case of Pole v. Leask, Lord 
Cranworth states: 
As to the constitution by principal of another to act as his agent, no one 
can become the agent of any person except by the will of that other 
person. (this can) simply by placing another in a situation in which, 
according to ordinary rules of law, or perhaps it would be more correct to 
say according to the ordinary usages of mankind, that other is understood 
to represent and act for the person who has so placed him...
18
 
So, the existence of the agency relationship is generally based in contract with its 
emphasis being upon contractual notions between the principals and the agents. In 
Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance v Orion Marine Insurance, Colman J held that: "an 
agency relationship is almost invariably founded upon a contract between principal and 
agent. Agency is essentially a creature of contract".
19
 However, as it is explained in 
common law texts, agency relationships are not always created in this contractual 
format i.e. an agent and principal consent to their association with each other. Reynolds 
writes: "The agreement between the principal and the agent does not have to be 
contractual. There may be no consideration or intention to create contractual 
relations..."
20
 
 
For example, an agency relationship can be established when a third party assumes 
that the agent has a representative authority to bind the principal when in fact the agent 
has not. This is referred under common law as apparent or (ostensible) authority, in 
which the agent has only an apparent authority to bind the principal.
21
 The difference 
between this type of authority and the implied authority is clear. In the case of the 
implied authority, there is an agreement between the agent and the principal but this 
agreement is implicit. In the case of the apparent authority by comparison, there is no 
agreement between the agent and the principal at all. All that happens is that the 
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 Pole v. Leask [1860] 54 ER 481.  
19
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20
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principal acted in a manner that led others to believe that the agent has an authority to 
act on the principal's behalf. The law of agency holds the principal liable to the acts of 
the agent because of this fake representation. 
  
Furthermore, the agent can still bind the principal even though there was no prior 
consent between the principal and the agent. This falls under what is called ratification 
authority. This type of agency can be established under common law by the principal's 
ratification of a prior act performed by the agent. The agent has no prior authority to 
make the transaction on behalf the principal, however, the principal then chooses to 
adopt that transaction by ratifying it.
22
 It is clear that the agent under ratification 
authority simply acts gratuitously. Common law also recognizes agency when the agent, 
faced with an emergency in which the principal's property or interests are in jeopardy, 
acts on the principal's behalf in order to protect the principal's property or interests. In 
White v Troups Transport (1976), an agency of necessity was created when the police 
were unable to contact the principal and engaged a third party to free the principal's 
lorry after it had become jammed under a bridge on a busy thoroughfare in a large 
town.
23
  
 
There are a number of different types of authorities that can be given by agents to 
principals which will be discussed below. Furthermore this thesis will ascertain whether 
or not any of these authorities can be adapted to electronic agents for the work they do 
on behalf of their operators. A specific focus will be placed on electronic agents and 
whether or not they possess actual, apparent, or ratification authority to bind their 
operators. That is to say, the notion of agency by operation of law is not included in this 
discussion because it is clear that this type of agency is an exception, created as a 
solution to very specific circumstances. The discussion therefore will tackle these 
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questions: can electronic agents be agents, and if the answer is yes, what type of 
authority would they have from their operators? Would it be actual, apparent, or 
ratification authority? 
4.3.1 Application the Principles of Agency to Automated Contracts  
   
As discussed in the previous discussion, the common law principles of agency do not 
require agents to have contractual capacity in order to be competent to act as agents. 
Anderson argues that the common law allows infants to act as agents although they are 
considered to be incompetent, on the grounds that they understand the nature of the act 
being performed and are able to perform principals' instructions. The author states: 
"they [infants] have the capacity of understanding and wanting required by the nature of 
the transaction to be effected".
24
 Having said that Kerr argues that there is a possible 
analogy here to electronic agents.
25
 The electronic agents, like infants, lack contractual 
capacity. Nevertheless, they can be regarded as agents on the same grounds that 
electronic agents have a minimum capacity to perform agency acts and have a greater 
capacity to foresee all the consequences of its action than any infant.
26
 
 
However, Weitzenboeck finds that there is still a difficulty impeding the 
consideration of electronic agents as agents when they have no legal personality.
27
 
According to her, infants are ultimately human beings. Although infants do not have 
contractual capacity, they [infants] are still legal persons. By contrast, electronic agents 
do not have contractual capacity and this not only results in an incapacity as if they are 
minors, but also means that there is no judicial life for them.
28
 Bellia explains this 
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perfectly: "Common law allows an infant to act as an agent, such an agent is a person 
nonetheless ... A person with limited capacity, such as a minor, may be an agent, but a 
person with no capacity whatever may not"
29
 
 
In the same vein, DeMott argues that because electronic agents are not persons, they 
can neither act as a principal nor as an agent.
30
 The Official Comment of the UETA 
explains that "[t]he legal relation-ship between the person and the electronic agent is not 
equivalent to common law agency since the 'agent' is not a human."
31
 As will be 
explained in the following section, the lack of personality of electronic agents can 
prevent them from establishing an agency relationship with their operators and gain 
what has been explained previously as „actual authority‟, to bind their operators.  
4.3.1.1 Electronic Agents and Actual Authority 
  
Actual authority is granted to the agent when s/he forms a consensual relationship 
with the principle. An agent, of course, does not need to manifest assent (express 
consent) to their principal. However, he or she must consent to an association with the 
principal and this can be implied by the agent's actions (implied authority).
32
 The 
question now is how an electronic agent would consent to the agency relationship when 
they lack personality? Certainly, the requirement of agents' consent cannot easily be 
satisfied in a straightforward way by electronic agents. Electronic agents are not persons 
and therefore do not have the legal capacity to give consent. Fischer states: "electronic 
agents cannot consent and to claim they can do so it is just clumsy trend".
33
 In other 
words, electronic agents' actions cannot be proof of an implied consent to accept an 
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 Bellia, A. (2001)  Contracting with Electronic Agents, Emory Law Journal, 50, p. 1062. 
30
 See DeMott, A. D. (2006) Agency Law in CyberSpace, Duke Law School Working Paper Series Duke 
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agency relationship. Under the implied authority, a person can be an agent if s/he did 
not communicate their consent, although they acted in accordance with the principal's 
manifestations wishing him/her to act.
34
 In return, because the electronic agent is not a 
legal person, they cannot be agents by merely acting in response to the introducing, 
installing and using by the operator.  
 
Fischer argues that the law for now can accept the use of a presumption or a legal 
fiction of electronic agents' consent; "at least until it can be said that electronic agents 
can give consent or current electronic agents are developed significantly enough to 
warrant saying that they can consent".
35
 According to Fischer, the law would need to 
assume electronic agents have "implied consent" just for the purpose of creating agency 
relationships. That is to say, once the electronic agent starts acting on the operator's 
behalf, they would be deemed to have consented to the agency relationship.
36
 Kerr 
argues that the law should not be bothered with the requirement of consent and whether 
the electronic agent can consent.
37
 According to him, the consent of agents is required 
under agency law because the agent may not only gain legal rights but also may assume 
legal duties.
38
 To justify the agent's legal obligations assumed to an agency relationship, 
s/he therefore is not committed to it until they give their consent. The electronic agent in 
return, is not supposed to gain any legal right or assume any duty so its consent should 
not be an issue preventing the application of agency to electronic agents.
39
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However, according to the common law notion of agency, agents are supposed to be 
involved in a number of disputes.
40
 For example, in the case of Rutter v Linton (1934), 
the court ruled that it is a presumption that the agent is personally liable since the 
contract involved an unidentified principal. A third party will be less inclined to 
contract with an unidentified principal without the agent assuming personal liability as 
well.
41
 In Watteau v. Fenwick & Co. [1893], H owned a hotel. He sold it to the 
defendants who retained him as manager. The licence continued to be held in his name, 
which remained over the door of the business. The plaintiffs supplied cigars to H, to 
whom alone they gave credit, believing him to be the owner. They had never heard of 
the defendants, who had forbidden H to buy cigars on credit. Upon learning that the 
defendants were the owners of the hotel, the plaintiffs sued them both (the defendants 
and H) for the amount outstanding. The county court judge gave judgment in favour of 
the plaintiffs and his decision was upheld by the Divisional Court.
42
 A common further 
liability that an agent may face under common agency law is when the agent is held 
liable for their wrongdoings. For example if an agent exceeds the principal‟s mandates, 
they may enter into a dispute with the principal. The agent is usually given certain 
instructions in which he or she must act accordingly. In case the agent does not act 
according to these mandates (i.e. their actions exceed the authority), the principal will 
not be held liable for such actions. Rather, it is the agent who will, in such cases, be 
held liable.
43
 This is a fundamental principle under the common law notion of agency; 
an agent must strictly comply with his/her principal's instructions.
44
  
 
An electronic agent can easily be involved in similar disputes. For example, if an 
electronic agent at the time of contracting with a third party does not disclose to him the 
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identity of whom the electronic agent is contracting for his behalf. As discussed above 
vis a vis the law of common agency, the electronic agent should be held liable by the 
third party even though its actions were authorized by the operator. Furthermore, an 
electronic agent can exceed their operator‟s mandates.45 It is common practice that 
electronic agents are not always perfect in their performance. As Wein points out, 
operators quite often programme or design their electronic agents to perform in a 
manner that is not negligent. However it is the decision-making and behaviour of the 
electronic agent which is considered to be negligent.
46
 There are cases of passive errors 
which occur on the internet as a result of electronic agents. Sartor presents an example 
to demonstrate how the electronic agent can make errors: an electronic agent is 
operating an antique shop and sells pieces of old jewellery according to their weight, 
age, and the material they are made from. Jewellery item number 25 has been 
mistakenly classified as being a silver ring with a gold coating when in fact it is a gold 
ring. The electronic agent then offers to sell Item 25 for £20 which is an appropriate 
price for a silver ring. A person sees the offer and accepts it without any hesitation.
47
 
Assuming the electronic agent is the agent here, according to agency principles, the 
electronic agent may be held liable for such errors. That is to say, electronic agents may 
be held liable for selling Item 25 at the appropriate price for silver. Bellia finds the 
electronic agent may also face disputes when given a specific task and they have to 
delegate part of it for some reasons to other electronic agents. For example, an 
electronic agent at some stage of the contractual process may ask another electronic 
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agent to complete a payment process or ask the other electronic agent to issue a receipt 
to the buyer.
48
 According to the common law notion of agency, the first electronic agent 
is to be held liable to the principal (operator) if the sub-agent failed to perform the tasks 
or performed them in an unsatisfactory manner
49
, such as the sub-agent did not 
complete the payment or the receipt was not issued to the buyer. 
 
Fischer suggests that agents under law are held liable because they are human 
beings.
50
 This rule of agency was designed because agents at that time were all human. 
However, these same laws should not apply towards electronic agents. When treating 
electronic agents as such, the rules of agency law should be directed towards the agents‟ 
function rather than their human aspect. This means that the theory of agency is 
applicable to the electronic agent only in a limited manner; the aspect of agency that 
holds the agent liable is not applicable to the electronic agent. Fischer states:  
Assuming that the only parts of agency are relevant to the question of 
computer agents, are the parts relating to the functions an agent serves for 
its principal, one must conclude that the part of the capacity concept 
relating to the liability of the agent is irrelevant.
51
 
Lerouge argues that by not holding electronic agents liable for their wrongdoings, the 
operators (the principals) are denied their rights that were set out under agency law to 
protect them from those acts made beyond their authority.
52
 However, the applicability 
of agency law to electronic agents is a little suspect. The application of agency law to 
electronic agents as explained above requires the allotment of two important principles 
of agency law: the consent of agents and the rule that would hold them liable. Lerouge 
argues that these exceptions to the application of agency law results in agents coming to 
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be attributed as uninterested.
53
 In Bellia's words, the way in which agency principles are 
applied to electronic agents works thus: “dribs and drabs of agency law… and this 
would not achieve its purpose”.54 Balke and Torsten conclude that the application of the 
law of agency to electronic agents, although attractive, cannot be used for electronic 
agents due to a number of exceptions to its principles being required.
55
 These authors 
indicate that electronic agents must conform to all the relevant principles and rules set 
out for agents under agency law.
56
 
4.3.1.2 Electronic Agents and Apparent Authority  
 
In contrast to the argument above, Reed argues that electronic agents do not have to 
consent because they only possess apparent authority to bind operators.
57
 According to 
common agency principles, a person does not need to consent to the principal in order 
to be an apparent agent. In the Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin and General 
Investment Ltd (1952), the court established that for an agency to be created by apparent 
authority, it was necessary for there to be: a representation by the principal or someone 
actually authorized by the principal on the existence of the agency; a reliance on that 
representation by the third party; and an alteration by the third party on their position as 
a result of this reliance.
58
 Thus, in order for a person to be an apparent agent, no 
agreement is required between the agent and the principal as apparent authority does not 
result directly from the principal‟s instructions, but “is derived from the circumstances 
of a situation.”59 It refers to a representation by a principal to a third party. The principal 
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represents to the third party that the agent has authority to act on the principle‟s behalf 
where, in fact, no authority was given to the agent.
60
   
 
Thus in order for agents to enjoy apparent authority and bind the principals, there 
should be reliance by a third party on a representation made by the principal. That is to 
say, the third party should believe the agent has authority to act on behalf of the 
principal and this belief must be traceable to the principal‟s manifestations. The third 
party‟s reasonable perceptions are used to decide whether the circumstances of the 
situation fairly denote the authority of the agent. This means that not every related 
action falls under apparent authority, and the standard of reasonableness is used to 
decide whether the agent has acted within their authority.
61
 According to the principal‟s 
behaviour in the circumstances, if the third party reasonably believes that the agent has 
the authority to act on behalf of the principal, the principal will be bound by the agent‟s 
actions. A principal is bound to those acts made by unauthorised agents because they 
have made the third party believe that the agent was acting with authority. Here, the 
third party is considered as an innocent party that should be protected by law.
62
  
 
In the case of Hoddeson v. Koos Bros., the furniture store was held liable under 
apparent authority even though the actor was not an agent or had any relationship with 
the store.
63
 Hoddeson had entered the furniture store knowing exactly what type of 
furniture she wanted to purchase.  A man in a suit had introduced himself to Hoddeson 
and asked if he could help her.  Upon telling him what she wanted, the man had shown 
Hoddeson a furniture arrangement. Hoddeson told the man that she liked the furniture 
and wanted to purchase it. She handed the man a check and was told that it would be 
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delivered to her in about a month.  After waiting beyond this period, Hoddeson 
contacted the furniture store.  She learned, to her surprise, that there was no record of 
her transaction and that the name of the man who had sold her the furniture was 
unknown to the store manager.
64
 The court "[b]roadly stated" that businesses owed a 
duty of care to "protect the customer from loss occasioned by the deceptions of an 
apparent salesman."
65
 
 
On the one hand, Bellia argues that the electronic agent has an apparent authority to 
bind the operator because when using the electronic agent on the Internet, the operator 
creates an appearance to the public that the electronic agent acts on his or her behalf as 
their agent.
66
 The operator would suggest that once the contract is concluded by the 
electronic agent, the contract would then be directly concluded by him. Bellia states: 
“When a human actor uses a robot to conduct transactions, he seems to give the clear 
impression to the other party that the robot is his agent.”67  
 
However, on the other hand, the attribution of electronic agents as having apparent 
authority to bind the operators has been criticised on the grounds that such authority 
cannot be applied in a straightforward way. The application of apparent authority 
requires reasonable belief from the third party that the agent has the authority to bind 
the principal. That means, if the third party had knowledge of the agent‟s lack of 
authority, the agent then is not considered to be an apparent agent from the point of 
view of the third party. This seems logical as the third party should not, in principle, 
make a transaction when s/he knows that the agent has no authority. If the third party 
deliberately dealt with that agent, according to common law, the principal will not be 
liable for that deal. Anderson states: 
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The principal cannot be liable for legal effects that he or she has never 
done or agreed to them only if they showed an apparent impression that 
these legal effects are authorized by them and a third party has without 
negligence, relied on the reality of this authorisation.
68
 
Lerouge argues accordingly that those who conduct their business with electronic 
agents can have no reasonable belief about the existence of an agency. This is because 
they are aware of the fact that they are communicating with mere computer software 
which does not have the capacity to act as an agent.
69
 This argument is convincing to 
many because it bears similarities with situations in which an individual uses an unwise 
agent to conduct transactions and gives a clear impression to the other party that this 
unwise person is his agent. My perspective under this scenario is that there is no 
apparent agency that the other party can reasonably rely upon. One cannot argue that the 
other party has reasonable belief about the existence of an agency because that party 
knows for sure that who they are dealing with is unsound of mind and cannot therefore 
establish an agency relationship. Of course some people may have limited knowledge 
and would believe that when interacting with Amazon.com, for example, Mr. Tom or 
one of his employees is typing on his keyboard at the other side of the telephone wire.
70
 
However, such an argument cannot hold up, as the use of electronic agents in forming 
contracts is more generalised now.
71
 That is to say, the public will not/cannot deny their 
knowledge of the identity of the contracting party in automated contracts. Accordingly, 
electronic agents cannot have apparent authority to bind operators.  
 
Having rebuffed the view that electronic agents are apparent agents online, the next 
section of this thesis will examine whether electronic agents can be agents possessing 
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ratification authority allowing them to enforce transactions concluded by electronic 
agents.   
4.3.1.3 Electronic Agents and Ratification Authority  
 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, even though the agent does not possess 
any power, an agency relationship can still exist and the agent can create or affect any 
legal rights and duties of the principal. In the case of Wilson v Tumman (1843), the 
court ruled that the principal may adopt a transaction made by an unauthorised agent by 
ratifying it. Tindal CJ argues: 
[T]hat an act done by a person, not assuming to act for himself, but for 
such other person, without any precedent authority whatsoever, becomes 
the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and 
well established principle of law.
72
 
Under the doctrine of ratification authority, the agent himself is not granted authority 
to bind the principal. Therefore, at the time of contracting, the agent is in fact acting 
without authority. That means, through the ratification method, that the agent is 
considered to be acting gratuitously. Nevertheless, a person may ratify a contract made 
on his behalf by an unauthorized agent, and if he does so, he is in the same position as if 
he had been a party to the contract. The transactions made on behalf of the principal 
would not be applicable for ratification unless at the time of the contract the agent 
shows the third party that he is acting on behalf of the principal.
73
 
 
When the agent concludes the contract in this way, it will either bring negative or 
positive consequences for the principal as authorised agents do not always produce 
harm to their principals. When the agent acts without authority, the result of such acts 
can still be beneficial or more advantageous to the principal. In this instance, the 
principal would prefer to accept the contract, entered in excess of his agent‟s authority. 
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The principal might ignore the fact that the agent has breached his duty to act within the 
limits of authority and afterwards confirm the contract in order to protect the principal‟s 
relationship with the other party, his business reputation etc. However, the opposite 
effect can also happen. For example, the action concluded by the unauthorized agent 
could bring a negative impact or produce actual damage to the principal. In such cases, 
the principal may not ratify this action.  
 
The same thing can happen if ratification authority is adapted to automated contracts. 
The operator will accept the contract concluded by the electronic agent if the contract is 
beneficial and advantageous, otherwise, s/he will escape from it. To be sure, this will 
affect the stability of electronic commerce and make those who conduct their business 
with the electronic agents become uncertain of whether the operators will ratify their 
transactions. Because of these consequences, authors in the literature show no interest 
towards adapting ratification authority to contracts entered into by electronic agents. 
This proposal is proven to be ineffective in its practice and not only does it fail to solve 
problems, it actually increases the complexity of the situation. There have been no 
studies made of this proposal as opposed to other proposals which suggest that agency 
relationships can be created by electronic agents through actual or apparent authority 
from their operators. 
 
As is illustrated below, some authors argue that in order to apply agency law 
properly to electronic agents and therefore make automated contracts enforceable 
through agency principles, legal personality should first be attributed to these electronic 
agents. If electronic agents possess rights similar to those given to a human person or a 
legal entity, they can be agents with the ability to enter into contracts, acquire rights and 
duties on behalf of others and carry out liability that would result from their actions. 
With this proposal, people would feel confident interacting with electronic agents and 
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be protected from any suffering or loss that may occur as a result of an electronic 
agent‟s actions. Similar to legal actions against corporate bodies today, if the action of a 
body causes damages, claimants can sue the body itself rather than its members.
74
 The 
attribution of legal personality to electronic agents would also achieve the same, 
enabling people to sue the electronic agents directly.   
 
4.3.2 Electronic Agents and Legal Personality 
75
 
4.3.2.1 The Concept of Legal Personality 
 
Legal personality is viewed as a purely legal concept in which no extra-legal factors 
of any kind can be considered when conferring or withdrawing it.
76 
This means that 
legal personality is simply a legal capacity for rights and duties, and an engagement in 
legal relations that the policymaker grants to fulfil certain functions.
77
 Several authors 
have defined legal personality as "[Having] neither biological social or normal idea of a 
person and it is to be completely distinguished from those philosophical conceptions of 
the person which emphasise the importance of a person"
78
 
 
Kelsen concludes that legal personality is no more than the demonstration of the 
rights and duties one has, or the entirety of these rights and duties.
79
 To ascertain if 
certain beings comply to the above definitions of legal personality, it is not essential to 
establish whether these beings are commensurate with the concept of a person in the 
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philosophical sense of the word. If beings do fulfil this criterion of a “person” then they 
can be said to have subjective rights.
80
  
 
Courts define “legal personality” in the same way and treat it as a purely legal matter 
without taking into account any other factors.
81
 In the US, some courts consider slaves 
as non-legal persons, as they fail to meet the concept of legal personality defined above. 
Their humanity has been considered unrelated to the issue in question.
82
 In the state of 
Kentucky, in Jarman v Patterson, the Court of Appeals said: 
Slaves, although they are human beings, are by our laws placed on the 
same footing with living property of the brute creation. However, deeply 
it may be regretted, and whether it be political or impolitic, a slave by our 
code, is not treated as a person, but (negation), a thing, as he stood in the 
civil code of the Roman Empire.
83 
Consequently, being human is not a condition for being recognised as a legal person. 
There are numerous non-human entities which have been recognized as having legal 
personality including modern business corporations, ships and temples. Each one of 
these entities has individual reasons for being recognised by law. For instance, some 
modern business corporations (as limited corporations) are given legal personality 
because it helps distinguish business assets from personal assets, which then limits the 
liability of business owners.
84
 The term „limited‟ here refers to the liability of the 
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company members, not the liability of the company as a separate entity. A limited 
company has unlimited liability to pay all its debts and can be forced to pay them until it 
runs out of money. However, if the company cannot pay its debts, its members have 
limited liability to contribute further money to pay off these debts; they cannot be 
required to pay more than the limit on their liability.
85
 That is to say, in the case of the 
breaching authority, creditors can sue the corporation, and because the owners have no 
liability, the company members are not responsible for its debts.
86
 By doing so, 
individuals are encouraged to carry out their business without threats to their personal 
assets. 
 
Therefore, the concept of legal personality in this sense is secular.
87
 Legal 
personality is used here as a mere device to make it possible for policymakers to either 
grant the existence of or withdraw from a particular entity. Legal personality is subject 
to the policymaker‟s decision and not to any extra legal considerations such as the 
essential qualities of the entity concerned. The court in the case of Byrn v New York 
City Health & Hospitals Corp held that: 
What is legal person is for the law, including, of course, the Constitution, 
to say, which simply means that upon according legal personality to a 
thing the law affords in the rights and privileges of legal person…the 
process is, indeed, circular because it is definitional. Whether the law 
should accord legal personality is a policy question which in most 
instances devolves on the Legislature, subject of course to the 
Constitution as it has been "legal" rendered…the point is that it is a 
policy determination whether legal personality should attach and not a 
question of biological or "natural correspondence.
88
 
If granting legal personality does not depend on any extra legal considerations can 
electronic agents be granted legal personality?   
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4.3.2.2 Application of the Concept of Legal Personality to Electronic Agents  
 
In attributing legal personality to electronic agents, a problem arises. Unlike 
electronic agents, other legal entities function only through human beings. Legal entities 
such as corporate bodies are associated with human owners or representatives who can 
potentially display their actions. However, on the other hand, electronic agents function 
according to their own autonomy.
89
 Therefore, legal personality as it is ascribed to 
electronic agents is similar to that conferred to human beings. Legal personality, in this 
sense, is closer to moral agency. 
 
4.3.2.2.1 The Concept of Moral Agency  
 
Moral agency is seen generally as being composed of components such as cognition, 
autonomy, intention, free will etc.  Taylor defines the moral agent as "A being who 
encompasses purposes, who can be said to go after, and sometimes attain goals".
90
 
Likewise, a person for Moore is:  “a rational being, a being who acts for intelligible 
ends in light of rational beliefs.
91
 For Locke, “a person stands for … a thinking 
intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same 
thinking thing in different times and places".
92
 To be a person according to this 
definition one has to have "intelligence and the capacities for thought, reason, reflection 
and self awareness".
93
  
 
Frankfurt argues that the concept of will can distinguish persons from non-persons.
94
 
Desires that motivate one to act or refrain from acting can be classified into first and 
second order desires. First order desires are those that motivate one to do or abstain 
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from doing a particular act. Second order desires are those to have one particular desire 
as that which motivates will or would motivate someone to perform an act. While 
possessing desires and an ability to choose between them is essential in human beings, it 
is however insufficient in Frankfurt's possessive concept of will. In order to be a person 
one must be able to form second order desires, that is to be able to evaluate different 
first order desires and choose one or more of them to be the motive for performing or 
abstaining from an act and to become someone‟s will.95  
 
The evaluation of different desires and the choice that follows requires one to be 
rational too. Thus the rationality can be identified as an element of moral agency. In 
Frankfurt's possessive words,   
[I]t is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of 
becoming critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the 
second order. This structure of a person's will presupposes, accordingly, 
that he is being a rational being.
96
 
The autonomy element is also essential in Frankfurt's theory which he describes as 
"the freedom of will".
97
 He differentiates between two types of freedom: that of action 
and that of will. While the former pertains to first order desires and means the freedom 
to perform whatever actions one wishes, the latter relates to second order desire 
volitions and refers to the agent's freedom to will what s/he wants to. In Frankfurt‟s 
theories, this distinction makes it possible to classify persons from non-persons. That is 
to say, non-persons have freedom of action in common with persons because they can 
be shown to have the ability to act one way instead of another, but only the latter 
(persons) have the ability to freely form second order desires.
98
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These writings illustrate how human beings are conferred legal personality because 
they have the capability to freely make moral judgments. This involves evaluating the 
different choices available and selecting, out of free will, one or more of them to 
implement. Penrose argues that the capacity to act consciously is the valid test for moral 
entitlement to legal personality.
99
 Allen and Widdison also argue that legal personality 
is based on moral entitlement which refers to having certain characteristics such as self-
consciousness.
100
 That is to say, any entity that possesses self-consciousness is entitled 
to be morally recognized as a legal person.  
 
4.3.2.2.2 Moral Agency and Electronic Agents 
 
The philosophical debate in this section is essentially about whether electronic agents 
can act autonomously of their operators and thus be recognised as moral agents. Kerr 
makes this observation: "It is not [at] all certain that e-agents can achieve self-
consciousness, even if the e-agents are described as intelligent or as acting 
autonomously, it is nowhere near the point where these devices can make conscious, 
moral decisions of their own"
101
  
 
In the same vein, Penrose holds that “the validity of this argument is clearly 
debatable: it is not at all certain flint computers can achieve self consciousness.”102 
According to Searle, self-consciousness is linked to humanity: those possessing the 
genetic material of Homo sapiens and electronic agents therefore lack this critical 
element.
103
 Searle states: 
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[I]ntentionality as the property of mental states - non-physical processes - 
comes only from the soul, and not from any material process. Therefore, 
even if a computer program contains an extremely detailed and complex 
system of rules, this is not sufficient to say that the computer is able to 
exercise discretion or make judgments about what is fit and what is 
not.
104
 
According to Searle‟s argument, a computer system may manipulate symbols, but it 
could not really know the meaning of such symbols. It is only the human operator who 
can provide an interpretation of them since the computer program lacks the ability to 
process meaning. The computer just reacts to the shape of a symbol and by so doing it is 
merely imitating without understanding. According to Searle, one can interpret a 
cognitive state of electronic agents as "nothing more than an imaginary dream that only 
exists in the mind of the observer".
105
 Similarly, Finnis also finds that self-
consciousness is usually interpreted as a unique element of human conduct, rather than 
a practical phenomenon that exists wherever there is a plan, proposal, or systematic 
pattern of responses to the environment such as reasoning, trying, doing, or refraining 
from doing something.
106
 
  
Animal rights proponents are critics of the notion that moral agency and its attributes 
are human-specific. For them, the exclusion of animals from the class of persons is 
unjustified since animals meet all morally relevant criteria such as language and 
purposeful communication, intelligence, creativity, tool-using, autonomy,
107
 and self 
conciseness
108
. Animal rights proponents assert that: 
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Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from other animals. 
Animals also care passionately for their young: animals also exhibit 
desires and preferences. Features of moral relevance-rationality, 
independence, and love are not exhibited uniquely by human beings. 
Therefore, there can be no solid moral distinction between humans and 
other animals.
109
 
Furthermore, animal rights proponents hold that attributes such as autonomy and self 
conciseness are evolutional abilities that exist in different degrees, and so are prevalent 
in some animals at lower degrees.
110
 Pluhar argues against the belief that these attributes 
are human-specific thus: 
Is it really clear … that the capacity for moral agency has no moral 
precedent in any other species? Certain other capacities are required for 
moral agency, including the capacity for emotion, memory, and goal-
directed behaviour …[T]here is ample evidence for the presence of these 
capacities, if to a limited degree, in some nonhumans … Not 
surprisingly, then, evidence has been gathered that indicates that 
nonhumans are capable if what we call "moral" or "virtuous" 
behaviour.
111
 
The admission that some animals can, to a lesser degree, have the capacity for 
making autonomous decisions can be found in Frankfurt's concept of free will: 
Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making 
choices. They share these things with the members of certain other 
species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to 
make decisions based upon prior thoughts. It seems to be particularly 
characteristics of humans, however, that they are able to form…"second -
order desires.
112
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In addition, the argument that self conciseness and autonomy are human-specific 
traits can threaten the status of marginal humans. If such an argument is followed to its 
logical conclusion, such marginal humans will be deprived of legal personality due to 
the lack of these attributes. Animal rights proponents argue that if moral criteria are 
elements unique to humans then legal personality must be denied to humans lacking 
moral criteria such as infants, those with brain damage, and the insane. As Linzey 
argues: "If we accord moral rights on the basis of rationality, what of the status of newly 
born children "low grade" mental patients, "intellectual cabbages" and so on? Logically, 
accepting this criterion, they must have no diminished, moral rights"
113
  
 
The proponents argue that if the criteria for granting marginal humans legal 
personality are therefore lower, all animals that share the new, less-restrictive criteria 
should also be granted legal personality. As Singer states: 
[H]uman beings are not equal; and if we seek some characteristics that all 
of human possess, then this characteristic must be a kind of lowest 
common denominator, pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The 
catch is that any such characteristic that is possessed by all human beings 
will not be possessed only by human beings.
114
 
The responses to these arguments for marginal humans are various. Some of them 
such as Moore retain their original claims and accept the deprivation of legal personality 
from marginal humans. According to Moore:  
[V]ery crazy human beings are not enough like us in one of our essential 
attributes, rationality, to be considered persons to whom moral and legal 
norms are addressed. Crazy people are "excused" from responsibility for 
the hard they cause for the same reason that young children, animals 
stones, and perhaps corporations are excused: None of them has the 
status of being a person, the only kind of entity obliged by moral and 
legal norms.
115
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However, others choose to respond differently. For example, Rawls argues that being 
a moral person requires rationality and a sense with of consequences and justice. 
However, since many humans lack either one or both of these capacities, these do not 
have to be perfect and equally shared by all persons. They are degree-admitted and one 
need only to possess to a certain degree in order to acquire legal personality.
116
 That is 
to say, with regard to infants and children, it is enough that they have, instead of the 
capacities required, the mere capacity for developing them: 
[T]he minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a 
capacity and to the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, 
whether or not it yet developed, is to receive the full protection of the 
principle of justice. Since infants and children are thought to have basic 
rights (normally exercised on their behalf by parents and guardians), this 
interpretation of the requisite conditions seems necessary to match our 
considered judgements.
117
 
If these arguments are followed to their conclusion, because electronic agents are not 
humans they cannot therefore be treated as conscious entities. In opposition to this view, 
Resnick argues that electronic agents should not be denied intentionality or any of these 
other morally relevant criteria merely because they are not in possession of a brain.
118
 
Solum also points out that a: “computer should not be disqualified from legal 
personality on the ground that its self-consciousness does not emerge from biological 
processes”.119 In addition, as Johnson argues, hitherto there are no well-confirmed 
theories of underlying processes of consciousness which can be used to make firm 
judgments that consciousness is lacking in a particular case. Johnson states: 
There is no clear notion of this intangible concept (conscious) and so we 
cannot confirm that an agent behaves as if it is conscious when it is not 
                                                 
116
 Rawld, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 508, 510. 
117
 Ibid. p. 509. 
118
 Resnick, P. (1994) Intentionality is Phlogiston, Thinking Computer &Virtual Persons. E. Dietrich, 
Academic Press, p. 44. 
119
 Solum, L.B. (1992) Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, North Carolina Law Review, 
70(1231) , p. 1260.   
Ch: 4 Common Law Theory of Agency 
81 
really conscious, and there is no decisive evidence that this concept is by 
itself sui generis.
120
 
That is to say, if behaviour by electronic agents is similar to the processes of the 
human mind, then this is a good reason to treat these electronic agents as moral agents 
and therefore grant them legal personality.
121
 Wein states: "It seems unlikely that any 
machine will be deemed worthy of being considered a legal person possessed of 
inherent rights unless it is far more „person-like‟ and „intelligent‟"122 
  
Law, as Chopra and White argue, should not focus on the internal architecture of 
electronic agents, but rather on whether electronic agents have potentially engaged in 
the right kinds of behaviour.
123
 If electronic agents are able to reason about their past, 
modify their own behaviour, and plan their future, a reasonable conclusion must be that 
they are capable of demonstrating a separate intention.
124
 Electronic agents exhibit high 
intelligence in their performance and some extraordinary features that may be seen as 
possessing a much greater capacity than any other human being including minors who 
have already been accorded legal personality by legal systems.
125
 
 
4.3.2.2.3 Assets and Electronic Agents 
 
Another dilemma associated with the proposal to grant electronic agents legal 
personality is the lack of assets that enable them to fulfil their financial obligations and 
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liabilities. Any person or entity with legal personality must possess assets in order to 
ensure that they can fulfil their financial obligations and liabilities. Legal personality is 
associated with accountability. The exercise of the capacity for moral agency is 
associated with being morally accountable. The intimate connection between 
accountability and moral agency is evident insofar as accountability has been associated 
with personality and understood as a moral agency-based concept throughout history. 
When one voluntarily and consciously decides to perform or refrain from performing a 
particular act while other options are equally possible, s/he should be accountable for 
his or her choices.
126
 Locke proceeds to say that a person "is a forensic term 
appropriating actions and their merit and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of 
a law".
127
 As such, to be a person, one has to have the capacity for evaluating acts and 
choosing from them. As a result, individuals can be held accountable and so be credited 
or blamed for their actions.
128
 For electronic agents to be held accountable for their 
actions, they must have assets so that if they are sued and held liable their assets would 
directly be affected and sometimes liquidated.
129
 The dilemma with electronic agents is 
that they do not currently have assets. 
 
Sartor suggests that a
 
banking deposit could function as an asset for electronic 
agents;
130
 a minimum amount of “capital” should be established by operators, similar to 
how owners behave towards their commercial corporations. This fund would represent a 
warranty for those who contract with electronic agents, which would need to be secured 
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when finalising a contract.
131
 The problem with this proposal is that, since the funds 
deposited in the bank will be limited to a certain amount, electronic agents have to then 
ensure that they will not act beyond that amount. It might not be possible to guarantee 
this. It is expected that acting beyond the funds deposited would probably happen and 
so problems will arise concerning who would be held liable for those excesses. 
Furthermore, damages incurred by electronic agents could take several forms such as 
the breaching of privacy or the sustaining of damages against other computers through 
viruses. Additionally, because the funds deposited in the bank will be limited to a 
certain amount, compensation for all those who might suffer from the electronic agent‟s 
errors may not be practical.  
 
As an alternative method for electronic agents to fulfil their financial obligations and 
liabilities, some authors suggest they purchase insurance. Insurance policies could serve 
as a better alternative solution to the issue of assets for electronic agents.
132
 Thus an 
insurance policy should be purchased by the operators, similar to those purchased for 
organizations and companies. That is to say, the insurance policy bought by the operator 
would serve as a guarantee for the acts of the electronic agent; a security for those who 
interact with the electronic agent that will satisfy whatever financial obligation or 
liability caused by the electronic agent. 
   
Although potentially useful, the proposal to insure electronic agents generates certain 
application problems. For example, according to insurance principles, insurance 
companies must know before compensating for damages the proximate cause from all 
possible causes which will be held ultimately responsible.
133
 This principle of insurance 
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contracts is known as causation analysis.
134
 The application of the principle of 
causation analysis can be very difficult if the electronic agent is the insured party. To 
demonstrate this, consider an electronic agent sending a message to a computer system. 
This message then initiates a process leading the addressed system to crash due to a 
fault of that system. Suppose that message was a necessary condition for the crash to 
happen (without the message the crash would not have occurred).
135
 According to the 
principle of causation analysis, before the insurance company could compensate, they 
would need to identify the real cause of the crash. The company would have to decide, 
out of the many possible factors, what exactly had caused the crash. For example, did 
the message really cause the crash? Or was some defective procedure of the addressee 
system the real cause, with the message only providing the occasion for the internal 
fault to occur?
136
 One could also argue that other electronic agents may be involved in 
causing the crash. As can be seen, the insurance company will find it extremely hard to 
specify the proximate cause of the damage and cannot guarantee that the insured 
electronic agent involved is the potential cause of the crash. In the environment where 
electronic agents operate, it is practically hard to identify the source of the agent or its 
code that caused the damage. Due to the fact that it is hard to determine proximate 
cause, insurance companies may consider this to be the fundamental reason why they 
should not insure electronic agents.  
 
Karnow therefore suggests that insurance companies should not depend on the 
principle of proximate cause. The author calls this unique insurance company the 
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'Turning Registry'.
137
 The only factor needed for the Turning Registry to be able to 
compensate is the mere presence of the electronic agent in the disaster which occurred. 
There is no need to investigate what, who, when or why.
138
 Following this analysis, the 
Turning Registry, then, is not a traditional insurance company. If the causation analysis 
is not taken into account, insurance companies would need to compensate even though 
the insured electronic agent was innocent and unrelated to the damage. Questions arise 
on the practicality of this approach for insurance companies. 
 
Furthermore, it is not possible to confer legal personality on electronic agents when 
they do not have an identification. Allen and Widdison question where the location of 
electronic agents would be. Is it in the hardware, the software, or both?
139
 According to 
some authors, the proposal to adopt the Turning Registry can help to establish a location 
for electronic agents.
140
 Operators could be issued a certificate after having their 
electronic agent insured under the Turning Registry.  Such certificates should, amongst 
other details, identify the name and address of the insured electronic agents. Since the 
location of electronic agents is a merely procedural matter, it is always possible to rely 
on some type of registration. Electronic agents can, for instance, stand behind some sort 
of a registry system similar to that applied to corporate bodies. Electronic agents would 
then be registered and recognised by the legal system, much like companies registered 
today.
141
 Therefore, identification and location of electronic agents do not appear 
challengeable problems that cannot be resolved.   
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4.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion illustrates that the proposal to treat electronic agents as agents 
under agency law cannot be easily adopted. Not only does the proposal challenge the 
traditional concepts of agency principles under common law, it also demands too many 
exceptions. For example, although under common law agents need consent to gain 
actual authority to bind principals, it has been suggested that this requirement can be 
allotted according to different requirements, chief amongst them being that the law 
would need to assume electronic agents have "implied consent" or the electronic agent 
cannot gain any legal right or assume a duty and therefore to the need to consent. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that electronic agents should not be liable for any 
actions performed beyond their authority, against the principle of agency law. 
 
Furthermore, an agency relationship created via apparent authority requires the third 
party to trust that the contracting party is an agent acting with authority of 
representation as given by the principal.
142
 The proposal though suggests electronic 
agents can be apparent agents even though third parties have no reasonable belief about 
the authority of the electronic agents.
143
 This is because contracts made with an 
electronic agent involve communicating with computer software that lacks the legal 
capacity to form an agency relationship.  
 
The same thing can be said about the notion of attributing ratification authority to 
transactions made by an electronic agent. Under the doctrine of ratification authority, 
the principal is given the right to refuse any transactions which may seem negative or 
unbeneficial to him. However, if they are given such a right, online businesses and 
electronic commerce will be plagued with massive instability as operators will wonder 
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if each transaction made by electronic agents will be ratified later by the operators. It is 
therefore necessary to exclude the operators from this right and require them to accept 
all actions made by the electronic agent, regardless of whether they are beneficial or 
unbeneficial to them. It would seem that making exceptions to agency principles in 
order to accept electronic agents as such is misguided. On the one hand, the proposal 
calls for electronic agents to be agents, nevertheless, on the other hand it does not apply 
the relevant agency principles.  
 
The suggestion of conferring electronic agents with legal personality eases the 
application of agency principles on electronic agents as they will be able to enter into 
contracts, acquire rights and duties on behalf of others and carry out liability that would 
result from their actions. However, there are two challenges regarding this proposal. 
First, the kind of legal personality suggested to electronic agents is similar to that 
conferred on human beings and not non-human beings. Legal personality, in this sense, 
is closer to the moral agency of components such as consciousness, free will, rationality 
etc which are seen as constituting a valid test for moral entitlement to legal personality. 
There are challenges to recognising these concepts in relation to electronic agents 
because such concepts are linked to the biological or mental characteristics of human 
beings. Secondly, electronic agents are unlike other legal persons, as they do not have 
any assets in order to fulfil their financial obligations and liabilities. Proposals 
suggested in this instance are insufficient on many levels. The minimum amount of 
“capital” established by operators will be limited to an amount where there is no 
guarantee that the electronic agents will act within this amount. It is expected that the 
electronic agent will act beyond the funds deposited and so the question is who will be 
held liable for those excesses. Even though the model to provide insurance can serve as 
an asset for the electronic agents, there are observations on the principle of causation 
analysis which identifies "the proximate cause" that will be held ultimately responsible 
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from all the possible causes. The insurance company will find it extremely hard to 
specify the proximate cause of the damage and cannot guarantee that the insured 
electronic agent involved is the potential cause of the crash. In the environment where 
electronic agents operate, it is practically hard to identify the source of the agent or its 
code that caused the damage. Due to the fact that proximate cause is difficult to be 
determined, insurance companies may consider this as the fundamental reason why they 
should not insure electronic agents.  
 
However, despite the fact that there are a number of doctrinal requirements prevent 
electronic agents from being agents, what makes this proposal interesting is the attempt 
to appreciate the role of electronic agents in the contractual process by suggesting that 
we treat them as agents and legal persons. I feel this treatment towards electronic agents 
is not as negative as the previous approach as it does not treat electronic agents as 
communication tools. The supporters of this approach understand that electronic agents 
are not merely passive devices but they play a key role in the contractual process and 
any automated contract cannot take place without the aid of these electronic agents.  
 
In the following chapters, these Islamic legal concepts will be examined to determine 
whether automated contracts can be enforced within any such concepts. It is important 
to introduce the concept of Islamic law, its origin and resources to preface this analysis. 
This is the aim of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: The Concept of Islamic Law 
 
5.1 Introduction   
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the basic principles 
underpinning Islamic law. Since Islamic law forms the subject of the analysis and 
assessment of this thesis, understanding the essential elements of this legal system is 
crucial. This chapter starts by discussing Islamic law's legal framework in order to 
explore the sources that can be used to facilitate the discussion of the enforceability of 
automated contracts. Taking into account the fact that Islamic law is unlike other such 
frameworks and is seen as trans-religious law, this chapter discusses the availability of 
other sources such as human reasoning, in case modern positions/approaches appear 
inevitable to the enforceability of automated contracts.  
5.2 The Legal Framework of Islamic Law 
Islamic law is referred to as Shari'a.
1
 The term Shari'a literally means “the way” or 
“Pathway”.2 This meaning is apparent in its technical definition as it is said to concretely 
describe the way of life as ordained by God, to guide His worshippers in their life of 
obedience. Some writers express this as "the high way of good life".
3
 It is closely 
connected to the status of vicegerency of human beings. A vicegerent is a person 
appointed by God (Allah) to act as an administrative deputy vis a vis carrying out the 
requirements of Islamic law. Islamic law exists to guide human beings to fulfil their 
vicegerency through living in accordance with the divine will in all aspects of life.
4
 
                                                 
1
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2
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3
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Press, p. 158. 
4
 According to Pipes, this is similar to Jewish law. For Jews, living in accordance with the Halakha is the 
primary means of reaffirming God's covenant with Abraham. For Muslims, fulfilling the Shari'a permits 
them to live as Muhammad and his companions did. For both, the letter of the law counts as much as its 
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Therefore, Shari'a is divided into four categories:
5
 Firstly A'qtgadat which is a set of 
rules that regulate, for example, the belief in God (Allah), His prophet, His scriptures, 
and the Day of Judgement. Scholars consider this particular category as not subjected to 
any sort of amendment. Secondly, Ak'lag is a set of rules that regulate moral values. 
Thirdly, Ebadat is a set of rules that regulate the relationship between the creator (God) 
and the created (people). The fourth category is Moamlat, a set of rules that regulate 
people’s civil transactions.6  
 
We can see that Shari'a encompasses the entire duty of man. It regulates all affairs of 
human being, principally human beings’ daily social life: religion, ethics, lifestyle and 
the entire legal system. Critics suggest Shari'a is a comprehensive path for living that 
each individual Muslim should pursue.
7
 It covers, for instance, issues such as ritual 
purity, prayer, fasting and even when a wedding invitation may be properly refused. 
Shari'a has been described as trans-religious, moral, and legal system. Religion remains 
to be the basis upon which the whole system is built. This can be seen through the subject 
matter and the aim of the Shari’a law. As such, devotions occupy an essential part of 
Shari’a’s basic doctrine and even legal sanctions are typically associated with religious 
penalties.
8
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8
 Rahman, F. (1968) Islam. New York: Doubleday, p. 315. This is very similar to traditional societies 
such as Greek and Roman societies where religion determines every aspect of life such as laws, ethical, 
etc. Law in these traditional societies was purely of religious nature.  For example, in the code of 
Hammurabi (Hammurabi king of babylonia in the 18
th
 century B.C. A famous code of laws is attributed to 
him), there are 282 preserved laws that resemble Islamic law in that the rules in the code cover economic 
life, morality, ethics all in one. Pipes argues that this is not surprising as the code of Hammurabi was an 
important forerunner of the laws of Islam and Roman law also played a great role in the shaping of 
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Thus, the concept of Islamic law, which is vital to understanding the analytical basis 
of this thesis, shows that Islamic law in the conventional meaning is actually not a law. 
Many writers have rightly pointed out that it is quite misleading to describe Islamic law 
as a set of rules enforced by the sanctions of a state.
9
 The sources of Islamic law are 
purely religious. There are on the one hand the Qur'an (divine book) and Sunnah 
(traditions of the Prophet of Islam), and on the other hand, secondary sources to help us 
interpret the meaning of these two sources. The relationship between these sources, and 
the weight of each, is subjected to the Roots of the Science of Law, or Usual al-figh. The 
aim of this Science is to define the rules and methodology by "practical ruling of divine 
sources are extracted from their detailed evidence", that is, how they can removed from 
the roots to detailed determinations.
10
 Each one of these sources will be discussed in the 
following pages. 
 
5.2.1 Sources of Islamic Law 
5.2.1.1 Qur'an  
 
Muslims regard the Qur’an as the divine revelation from God, through the Angel 
Gabriel, to his last Prophet Mohammed.
11
 It is the most authoritative source and the first 
to be consulted when any determination is sought. Qur’an is not a created law that 
contains codes, nor a scientific study divided into several chapters. The majority of the 
legal principles discussed in the Qur’an are general in nature. For example, with regard to 
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Sawi, G. Living Shari`ah, IslamOnline. Available at:  
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contract and legal obligations, the Quran states: “Aufu bi al-Uqud” (Qur'an 5: 1). This 
verse means “O you who believe fulfil (all) your obligations”.12 The Qur’an also states: 
“O you who believe, do not devour your property among yourselves falsely, except that it 
be trading by your mutual consent, and do not kill yourselves. Surely Allah is Merciful to 
you”. (Qur'an 4:29). 
 
Such verses are the fundamental principles that govern the sanctity of all contracts, 
private, public, civil or commercial. The Qur’an considers usury (Riba) forbidden:13 
O you who believe fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand 
for usury if you are indeed believers … But if you are repent, you shall 
have your capital sums: deal not unjustly, and you shall not be dealt with 
unjustly (Qur'an 1:29).  
As can be seen, no specific details are given in this verse as to what is usury, types of 
usury and so on. The same can be argued about the first two verses. The Qur’an did not 
express which contracts and obligations should be fulfilled and which should not. The 
Qur'an's injunctions then are too general in nature. Sunnah, which is the tradition of the 
Prophet of Islam, is the source which helps provide more details for such matters. 
5.2.1.2 Sunnah
 
 
The Sunnah contains words, actions and speech undertaken by the Prophet of Islam 
(Mohammed).
14
 Muslims understand that Mohammed’s speech and behavioural conduct 
is a point of reference as he represents the example of a human being living in 
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accordance with the Qur’an. Therefore, he provides a model through which it can be 
understood how verses stated in the Qur'an must be implemented.
15
 The Sunnah can 
simply clarify details of what is stated generally in the Qur'an, making it specific and 
particular. In other words, when the Qur’an’s verses do not express an issue, the Sunnah 
becomes an essential source to interpret the issue more clearly and elaborately.
16
 For 
instance, when the Qur’an, as stated in the previous page, prohibits usury or interest, the 
Sunnah explains in details what forms of it that is prohibited. The Prophet Mohammad 
states that: 
Gold is to be paid for with gold, both being of equal weight and of same 
quantities; silver is to be paid for with silver, both being of equal weight 
and of same quantities. If anyone gives more or asks for more of it, it is 
then usury.
17
  
These traditions or known statements of the Prophet Mohammad were recorded after 
his death in the volumes known in Arabic literature as Hadeeth.
18
 However, not every 
statement is present; it is the tradition of the Prophet, shall be recorded in the volumes of 
Hadeeth. Muslim jurists developed a sophisticated science of tradition to verify whether 
or not a statement can and indeed be traced back to the Prophet.
19
  
 
Additionally, not all the statements recorded in the Hadeeth are conclusive in 
narration or denotation. Muslim scholars argue that statements of the Prophet 
Mohammad can be inconclusive. That is to say, not every statement recorded in the 
Hadeeth is definite in narration and denotation. Being definite in the denotation means 
                                                 
15
 Rahman, F.(1968)  Islam. New York: Doubleday, pp. 50-51. 
16
 This does not mean that the Sunnah is not an independent source. It can be contained issues which are 
not stated in the Qur’an. The Qur’an says “He will enjoin on them that which is the right and forbid them 
that which is wrong. He will make lawful for them all good things and prohibit for them only the foul: 
and he will relieve them of their burden and the fetters that they used to wear” (Qur’an 7:175). 
17
 This Hadeeth is reported by Muslim, number (699). 
18
 Hinchcliffe, D. (2005) Introduction to Islamic Law. London: University of London, p. 15. 
19
 This sophisticated science of tradition which verifies whether or not a statement can be traced back to 
the Prophet is known in Arabia as the science of Jarh wa Ta’deel. The authenticity of the Hadeeth and the 
sciences surrounding it determine whether a Hadeeth is authentic or otherwise. It is well known that there 
is nothing for the people except what has been written (of that science). See in Arabic, Saad. K. (2007) 
Mbahth Fi al Jarh wa Ta’deel, Dar Albshayer Al-islamiah, Riyadh. 
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that the statement concerned is clear and has only one possible meaning.
20
 Thus, 
statements can be inconclusive in either narration or denotation or both; that opens the 
door for a number of interpretations and meanings. In this case, recourse to reason out 
the most plausible meaning is inevitable. It should be noted that this was not the only 
justification for individual reasoning is necessary under Islamic law. It is also required 
vis a vis the interpretation of the Qur'an as textual evidence. The Qur'an states: "He it is 
who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic or fundamental (of established 
meaning); they are the foundation of the Book: others are allegorical." (Qur'an 7:2). This 
verse establishes that the Qur'an can also include verses which are not necessarily 
conclusive in narration or denotation. That is to say, some of the Qur'an’s textual 
evidence needs to be subjected to the interpretation of human beings in order for its most 
precise meaning to be yielded. In addition, because judgements in the divine sources are 
by nature finite, the death of the Prophet of Islam created a gap in Islamic legislation on 
issues that are not directly contemplated in the sources of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. So, 
the need for individual reasoning becomes necessary to fill in this important gap. In the 
next few pages, the role of human intelligence or reason will be discussed along with 
how it should be exercised under Islamic law. 
5.2.1.3 Human Reasoning 
Human reasoning is applied under Islamic law through a process of inquiry called 
figh, which can be translated into English as jurisprudence. Figh is developed through 
jurists' structured efforts to understand and apply principles and rules laid down in the 
divine sources (the Qur'an and the Sunnah). In other words, figh extracts and formulates 
detailed rulings stated in divine sources. This process is subjected to a highly formulated 
stipulations or methods outlined in the Science of the Principles of Islamic 
                                                 
20
 Najjar, A. (1999) The vicegrency of Man, between Revelation and Reason: A critique of the Dialectic of 
the Text Reason, and reality, International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), pp. 54-58. 
Ch: 5 The Concept of Islamic Law  
 
95 
 
Jurisprudence
21
 or the Roots of Law,
22
Usual al-figh as it is called in Arabic.
23
 One of 
these stipulations is that since figh is a highly formulated science, it demands special 
requirements of those practising it and so it is not open to everybody. Only those who are 
experts in the Qur'an and Sunnah can practice reasoning and this reasoning is called 
(Ijtihad) in Arabic. In Islamic law, Ijtihad plays a significant role. According to Usual al-
figh, Muslims jurists are required to follow any of the two methods when making an 
Ijtihad such as interpreting a statement from the primary texts. 
 
First, Muslim jurists can rely on consensus (Ijma), which is defined as “an agreement 
of a group (Jama’ah) on a certain question by action or by abandonment”.24 The 
authority of consensus is based on the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad when he stated 
that: “my people do not meet upon error”. It should be noted here that consensus cannot 
be perceived as a separate law. It has to be based on evidence derived from either the 
Qur’an or Sunnah. In other words, the consensus cannot be built in a vacuum, it must 
grow out of a legitimate interpretation of the primary sources.
25
 Second, Muslim jurists 
can rely on Analogy in the process of making the Ijtihad which is known in Arabic as 
(Qiyas). Unlike the consensus method, analogy is based only on a judgment of a man. It 
is defined as “establishing the applicability of a ruling in one case to another case on the 
grounds of their similarity, with respect to the attribute upon which the ruling is based”.26 
In other words, it is an individual reasoning (Ijtihad), a method of facing new situations 
and problems in light of the general principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah. For example, 
                                                 
21
 Zahraa, M. (2003) Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social 
science Research Methods for Islamic research, Arab Law Quarterly, 18(3), p. 216. 
22
 Rahman, F. (1968) Islam. New York: Doubleday, p. 75. 
23
 Zahraa,M. op,cit., p. 216. 
24
 Asherman, J. (1982) Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic Law, 
the International Lawyer, 16, p. 321. 
25
 The practical value of the consensus became in the course of time very limited since it is impossible to 
obtain consensus on particular issue by asking all Islamic scholars in all Islamic communities. 
Specifically, there is no single organization that represents all Islamic scholars. Alalwani, op, cit.. pp. 22-
30. 
26
 Karl, D. (1992) Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know? The George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, 25(131), pp. 66-79.   
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wine, unlike whisky, is explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an, so the prohibition of the 
former can be extended to the latter, as the motivating cause of prohibition is that it 
causes intoxication. This source plays an important role under Islamic law. The idea of 
analogy came from the fact that although the judgements in the limited number of divine 
text were by nature finite, the general principles behind it however could and should be 
applied in other contexts. Mu'adh ibn Jabal states that when the Prophet Mohammed sent 
him to Yemen, he asked:  
What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgement?" Mu'adh 
said: "I will judge according to the Book of Allah." The Prophet asked: 
"what if you find no solution in the Book of Allah?" Mu'adh said: "Then 
I will judge by the Sunnah of the Prophet." The Prophet asked: "And 
what if you do not find it in the Sunnah of the Prophet?" Mu'adh said: 
"Then I will make Ijtihad to formulate my own judgement." The Prophet 
patted Mu'adh's chest and said "Praise be to Allah who has guided the 
messenger of His Prophet to that which pleases Him and His Prophet.
27
  
This Ijtihad is further explained in the advice of Umar, the second president (Khalifa) 
after the Prophet Mohammad, given to Abu Musa when he appointed him a judge: 
"Judgement is to be passed on the basis of express Qur'anic imperatives or established 
Sunnah practices." Then he added:  
Make sure that you understand clearly every case that is brought to you 
for which there is no applicable text of the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Yours, 
then, is a role of comparison and analogy, so as to distinguish similarities 
-in order to reach a judgement that seems nearest to justice and best in 
the sight of Allah.
28
 
Umar also said to a judge: 
Use your brains about those matters that perplex you, to which neither 
law or practice seems to apply”.29 Prophet Mohammed himself 
encouraged his companions (Sahabah) to make Ijtihad by saying: "When 
a judge makes Ijtihad and reaches a correct conclusion, he receives a 
double reward; and if his conclusion is incorrect, he still receives a 
reward.
30
 
                                                 
27
 Abn kthyr, (2005) Albdayh walnhayh. Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, 5, p. 255 (In Arabic). 
28
 Ibid, Vol 7,  p. 185 
29
 Altbry, (2003) Jama' Albyan fy tfsyr Algran. Beirut: Dar Alktb Ala'lmya, p. 381 (In Arabic). 
30
 Abn kthyr . op,cit., p. 185.  
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5.2.1.3.1. Islamic Schools 
 
Such individual reasoning undertaken by Ijma and Qiyas creates what is called today 
“Islamic schools of thought”. Different areas of the Islamic world use different reasoning 
and consequently there are different schools of thought. This is understandable due to the 
distances between different areas, cultures and customs of the Islamic world. Two main 
doctrines under Islamic law emerged from this divergent centres of learning, Snh and 
Shiite.
31
 The Snh doctrine includes four main (Snh) schools of thoughts: Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi'i and Hanbali school.
32
 As stated in the introduction, Snh is the official adopted 
doctrine in the KSA. Muslims believe that the knowledge derived from these schools is 
not as reliable as the conclusive statements derived from divine sources (the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah). Statements derived directly from divine sources should be given priority 
over those that stem from reason. Abu Bakr al Siddiq, the second president (Khalifa) 
after Prophet Mohammad, said: "As far as the Prophet is concerned, his opinion was 
always correct because Allah (God) always guided him. In our case, however, we opine 
and we conjecture." In the same vein, Al-Faruqi states: 
The discoveries and conclusions [through reason] are not contain. They 
are always subject to trial and error, to further experimentation, further 
analysis and to correction by deeper insight. But, all this notwithstanding, 
the search is possible and reason cannot despair of re-examining and 
correcting its own precious findings without failing into scepticism and 
cynicism.
33
 
                                                 
31
 The Shiite school officially exists only in Iran. The legal background for Shiite school is completely 
different to that of the Sunni school.   
32
 The Hanbali School is found mainly in KSA, Syria, and Palestine. The other Snh schools exist in 
different permutations across the Islamic world. For example, the Maliki’s school’s influence can be 
found mostly in Western Africa and the Eastern Arabian coasts. The Hanafi school exists in the 
Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. Eastern Africa and South Arabia are influenced by the Shafi school. 
Daura, B.(1968)  A Brief Account of the Development of the Four Sunni Schools of Law, and Some 
Recent Development, Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, 2(9), p. 3. 
33
 Al-Faruqi, (1982) Al Tawahid: Its Implications for thought and Life, International Institute of Islamic 
Thought (IIIT), p.6. The Ijtihad of many of Prophet's companions was so accurate that in many cases the 
revelations of the Qur'an confirmed it, and the Prophet supported it. Obviously, their close association 
with the Prophet had afforded them a keen sense of the aims of the All-wise Lawgiver, of the basic 
purposes behind the Qur'anic legislation, and of the meanings of the texts; opportunities which those who 
came after them did not directly enjoy. 
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The consequence then from the above discussion is that Islamic law is not necessarily 
a divine source as is frequently stated so. Many writers use the term Islamic law to refer 
to the totality of rulings extracted from the Qur'an or Sunnah,
34
 whereas in reality, such 
rules were developed under figh (jurisdiction) and not necessarily from the divine 
sources. The difference between figh and divine sources under Islamic law is that, while 
the former is the revelation embodied in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the latter is the 
human reason based on that revelation for the purpose of extracting and formulating 
detailed rulings. In other words, divine sources are the way principles are revealed by 
God to His worshippers, while figh is the worshippers’ structured efforts to understand 
and apply it in their daily lives. God is the subject of divine sources while man is the 
subject of figh. That is to say, there are two uses of the concept of Islamic law. Firstly, 
the use of Islamic law refers to the way ordained by God and communicated to humans 
through His prophet. The other use of Islamic law refers to figh, which is the process by 
which rulings recorded in the Qur'an and Sunnah can be extracted and formulated. 
Therefore, Islamic law in here means the sum total of the rulings grasped through 
individual reasoning. In this thesis, the term Islamic law is used in a wider sense i.e. as 
the sum total of rulings extracted from revelation, primary sources or through human-
reason-based instruments, secondary sources (figh). 
 
Nevertheless, one can still argue that the difference between the two meanings of 
Islamic law is largely formal. As seen above, rulings grasped by human reason via figh 
procedures must be based directly or indirectly on the divine sources i.e., the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah. Not only does this allow it to be Islamically recognized, it also 
acknowledges that Islamic law focuses on the role of human reason within divine 
sources. Therefore, it makes no real difference to term their sum total divine or figh 
                                                 
34
 Zahraa, M. (2003) Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social 
Science Research Methods for Islamic Research, Arab Law Quarterly, 18(3), p. 217. In which Islamic law 
is defined as "the body of norms, principles, rules and rulings that are extracted from the primary Islamic 
sources (the Qur'an and Sunnah)". 
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statements so long as this meaning is borne in mind. These rulings, therefore, can always 
be attributed to divine sources. It is a requirement that in order to be Islamically 
recognized, figh or individual reasoning has to be based on evidence derived from either 
the Qur’an or Sunnah or grow out of legitimate interpretation of these primary sources. 
The practice of individual reasoning is dependent on divine sources, Qur'an and Sunnah. 
It is still an expander of determinations outlined originally in these two divine sources. 
That is to say, Islamic law focuses on the role of human reason within divine sources i.e. 
in understanding and applying the information from these sources. As such, it makes no 
real difference to term their sum total divine or figh statements as long as this meaning is 
born in mind. 
 
5.2.1.3.2. Role of Reason beyond Divine Statements 
 
The above argument that human reason operates only within divine sources leads to 
an important question about the role of reason beyond divine statements. Here, the 
question that arises in regard to human reasoning is, How does one determine a new issue 
under Islamic law when the divine sources are silent? When discussing the enforceability 
of automated contracts an issue may arise in which there are no divine statements 
concerning the issue in question. For example, extending legal personality to electronic 
agents under Islamic law is an issue that has not been narrated in the divine sources or 
discussed before by Muslim jurists. In such a case, human reasoning cannot seek 
evidence from the Qur’an or Sunnah in order to arrive to a legitimate interpretation of the 
divine sources. As Albna puts it: “Undoubtly, attempts to determine new issues from the 
point of Islamic law is sometimes difficult [because] there is no statement, either in the 
Qur'an or Snh
35
, which can be taken as a starting point”.36 
                                                 
35
 The word Snh used in this article is the same word Sunnah used throughout the thesis. There is no 
difference between them only that the last word is more used in the literature than the word Snh.   
36
  Albna, G. (2008) Ala'slam cualh lkl zman wmkan. Tanweer. (Online) Available at: 
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The issue of the role of human reasoning when the divine sources are silent, has been 
hotly debated among Muslim scholars. On the one hand, there are those strict scholars 
who suggest that the ability of making new laws was repudiated.
37
 That is to say, all 
matters of law have already been settled in the book of the Qur’an and Sunnah. This 
understanding suggests that every aspect of life has been directly or indirectly narrated in 
these divine sources. This perspective is grounded on a verse recorded in the Qur'an 
which states that: "This day, I have perfected your religion for you, completed My 
Favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion".
38
 It was therefore 
decided that all future activities of reasoning should be limited to what has been revealed 
by the divine, tracing and discovering them.
39
 The role of human reasoning should work 
only to expand determinations outlined originally in the Qur’an or Sunnah. That is to say, 
no obligation can be adopted except through these primary sources.  
 
However, it must be said that the majority of modern Muslim scholars hold the 
opposite point of view to the one outlined above. That is, issues can be scrutinized by 
human reason even if no reference can be found in revelation. Alshatbi states: “[human 
reasoning] cannot cease except at the end of the world when man’s subjection to the Law 
will cease.”40 Abd al-Jabbar and Abu Husayn al-Basri have “deemed [human reasoning] 
to be an indispensable ingredient in law.” Abn Tymyh argues that jurists must use human 
reasoning “even if this meant getting rid of much of the [jurisprudence] that had 
developed over the centuries.”41  
                                                                                                                                                 
 http://www.kwtanweer.com/articles/readarticle.php?articleID=1910, pp. 136. [Accessed 1/Sept/2009]. 
37
 This was mentioned in the work of Nyazee, I. (1994) Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of 
Ijtihad. Malaysia: A S Noordeen, pp. 46-47. 
38
 The Holy Qur'an, (Yusuf Ali translation), American Trust Publication, 1977, Surat Al-Mā'idah (5:3).  
(Online) Available at: 
 http://www.harunyahya.com/Quran_translation/Quran_translation_index.php [Accessed 01/Feb/2008]. 
39
 Nyazee, I. (1994) Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad. Malaysia: A S Noordeen, pp. 
46-47. 
40
 Alshatbi, (1998) Almoafkat. 2
th
 ed. Cairo: Dar Al-marifah, p. 327 (In Arabic). 
41
 Abn Algym, (1993) Elam Almoqeen. 3
th
 ed Beirut: Dar Alketab Alelmiah, p. 111 (In Arabic). 
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When reasoning is reached, there is an obligation to act upon this reasoning even if the 
revelation is absent. Then laws can be grasped and formulated regardless of any 
revelation statement having been found.
42
 Under Islamic law, such reasoning is called 
Fatwa.
43
 When making human reasoning on novel issues, principles such as istihsan or 
Islamic equity, al- maslaha al-mursalh or public interest, and urf or custom are suggested 
for use.
44
 According to this perspective, principles such as: “changing rules according to 
the changing of times circumstances and places”, “damage should be eliminated”, and 
“unlawfulness is permitted if necessary” should be taken into consideration when 
reasoning as they all serve the spirit of Islam.
45
 
As already argued in the introduction, al- maslaha al-mursalh can be a useful device 
for exploring the enforceability of automated contracts under Islamic law. Alkardawi 
argues that public interest can be defined as: “[E]verything that can benefit people here 
and hereafter. This could be seen in their daily lives and whether it is individual, public, 
about current or future interest”.46 According to Alkardawi, public interest is established 
by Muslim jurists simply to protect the object of Islam and the object of Islam is to 
protect human being’s believe, soul, brain, properties, security, rights etc.47 According 
to Alqrafi, this principle i.e. public interest is free of any limitations and can be relied 
upon by Muslim jurists when facing new issue(s), particularly “when there is no precise 
                                                 
42
 Ibid, p. 44.   
43
 A sample of an official fatwā (in Arabic and translation of its full text follows) is reproduced in the 
Appendix II.  El-Gamal explains some concerns regarding the method of Fatwa under Islamic law. He 
claims that "the current context of an Islamic law, which evolves through fatāwa instead of formal 
codification, is particularly problematic for the desired coherence of opinions. It is the nature of a fatawa 
that it is given for a specific time and specific set of circumstances, and therefore a collection of fatāwa is 
highly unlikely to exhibit any degree of internal consistency and coherence". See, El-Gamal, M. (2003) 
Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, Fordham International Law Review, 
27(1), p. 130. 
44
 Zahraa, M.  (2003) Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social 
science Research Methods for Islamic research, Arab Law Quarterly, 18(3), pp. 238-244. 
45
 Coulson, N. (1964) History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 59-60.  
46
 Hassun hamed Hassan, theory of interest in Islamic jurisprudence. 
47
 Alkardawi argues that there is no disagreement among Muslim scholars on the acceptance of the public 
interest under Islamic law. The school of Maliki and Hanbali, specifically Ibn Taymiyyah and Abn alqaim 
are the most scholars who accepted the use of public interest.  See, Alkardawi, Y. (2000), Alsyasah 
Alshra'iah fi dhou'a nsous Alshria'ah wmkasdha, Cairo: Alresalah, p. 200.  
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evidence in the divine statements on the issue in question either to approve or decline 
it”.48  
Public interest has been used by several Muslim reformers in recent centuries. The 
concept is better known to Islamic modernists. Among them, Alshatbi is especially 
recognized for using the concept of al- maslaha al-mursalh as the basis for reconciling 
modern trade with the traditional code of Islamic law. He focuses on the motives behind 
Islamic Law. Firstly, regarding questions related to God, eba'dat, he claims that humans 
should look to the Qur’an or the Sunnah for answers, however regarding relationships 
between humans, mu'amalat, humans should look for the best public solution. Given 
that societies change, Alshatbi asserts that the mu'amalat part of the Islamic Law also 
needs to change.
49
 
It would seem that the most useful perspective is that which endorses the notion of 
reason being used to determine issues separately without any textual reference to either 
the Qur'an or the Sunnah and that is based on the principle of “public interest”. As Al-
Faruqi succinctly points out: 
To know the divine will, man was given revelation, a direct and 
immediate disclosure of what God wants him to realize on 
earth...Equally, man is endowed with senses, reasons and understanding, 
intuition, all the perfection necessary to enable him to discover the divine 
will unaided. For that will is embodied not only is casual nature, but 
equally in human feelings and religions. Whereas the former half takes 
another exercise of the discipline called natural science to discover it, the 
second half takes the exercise of the moral sense and the discipline of 
ethics.
50
 
                                                 
48
 Algrafi, (1998) Alfrwg. Vol. 3 Beirut: Dar Alktb Ala'lmyh, p. 150. 
49
 I have already clarified the meaning of eba'dat and mu'amalat in previous sections.  See page 89 of this 
chapter.  
50
 Al-Faruqi, (1982) Al Tawahid: Its Implications for thought and Life, International Institute of Islamic 
Thought (IIIT), p. 6. 
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According to Usmani, the acceptance of human reasoning beyond divine statements to 
achieve the public interest would ensure the applicability of the statement that “Islam is 
for all times and places". Usmani states: 
...[W]hen we claim that Islam has a satisfactory solution for every problem 
emerging in any situation in all times to come, we do not mean that the 
Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet or the rulings of Islamic 
scholars provide a specific answer to each and every minute detail of our 
socioeconomic life. What we mean is that the Holy Quran and the Holy 
Sunnah of the Prophet have laid down the broad principles in the light of 
which the scholars of every time have deduced specific answers to the new 
situations arising in their age. Therefore, in order to reach a definite answer 
about a new situation the scholars of Shariah…have to analyze every 
question in light of the principles laid down by the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah.
51
 
 
    However, Muslim jurists generally agree that the decision about whether or not there is 
a public interest in a certain issue requires certain conditions that need to be satisfied 
first. Alqrafi for example, argues that the decisionabout the application of the public 
interest cannot be left merely to any individual. According to him, the decision maker 
should be aware of “Islamic ethics, his mind and attitude should be familiar to what 
would invalidate the morals of Islamic law”.52 Abn Bdran also argues that “there is no 
doubt that Muslim jurists should take into consideration the public interest when making 
new decisions however, this must be with careful and deep thoughts”.53 According to 
Althnqiti, the public interest is a matter that needs to be considered carefully by Muslim 
jurists in case it conflicts with other equal or upper interests of Islam, and does not lead 
to damages (mafsadh).
54
 Abuhamed Alqazali, argues that some public interests would be 
regarded as weird and therefore could have no grounds to be accepted in Islam. Alqazali 
states: 
                                                 
51
 Usmani, M-T. (1998) An Introduction to Islamic Finance. Karachi: Idaratul Ma`arif. p. 237. In addition, 
Al-Sahfi said: "… [E]verything which was revealed for the Muslims contains either a binding command, or 
a legal proof upon which future rulings can be based to uphold Truth and Justice. Thus, if revelation gave 
us a direct ruling [regarding the matter at hand], Muslims must follow that ruling; and if revelation did not 
make a ruling on this specific matter, then a proof for the just and true ruling must be sought". Al-Sahfi, M. 
(1939, reprinted n.d.) Al-Risalah. Beirut: Al-Maktaba Al-`Ilmiyyah (verified by Ahmad M. Shaker). 
52
  Algrafi, (1998) Alfrwg. Vol. 3 Beirut: Dar Alktb Ala'lmyh, p. 155.  
53
  Cited by Alotibi, S. (2007) Alestdlal bi Almaslaha Almursalh Wz'wabth. (Online) Available at: 
http://almoslim.net/node/83553, [Accessed 22/June/2010]. 
54
  Althnqiti, M. (1988) Rehlt Alhj ela Byt Allah Alhram. 1th ed. Jeddah: Dar Alshrwg, p. 181. (In Arabic).   
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Public interest is to bring benefits and remove damages in light of Islamic 
rules. That means, this principle is not free to any benefit. People may 
think certain interest should be taken in however, in the Islam’s thoughts 
this interest may not. That is to say, even if public found something of 
interest to them, this does not make it directly a valid interest under Islamic 
law. The principle of public interest under Islamic law is only established 
to protect the objects of Islam. When a public interest is in conflict to 
Islam, this does not make it really an interest. It is just desires and lust of 
human beings.
55
  
  
Using this argument i.e., the application of the public interest under Islamic law, as a 
point of departure, it can be argued that there is close similarity between Islamic law and 
other modern legal systems. This is because, on the one hand, a Muslim judge/jurist is 
restricted by Divine Ordinary: the Qur’an and Sunnah. On the other hand, a judge/jurist 
under most present legal systems is restricted by law codes. The consideration of the 
public interest under Islamic law should be similarly familiar to Western law. A given 
legal question under the western law can be decided based on public interest or custom if 
there is no available solution in the primary sources. Islamic law accordingly, has much 
in common with the modern legal framework employed throughout the West. Both of 
these legal systems are allowed to operate according to public interest or custom if there 
is no available solution in the primary sources. In the absence of knowledge located in 
revelation, reasoning and the interest of public should yield the required guidance. This 
idea is crucial to the present study as it shows the possibility of relying on human 
reasoning to discuss a topic such as enforceability of contracts made by electronic agents, 
where no divine statements concerning this novel issue exists. This thesis will also 
benefit from arguments and ideas found in common law literature.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
  Alqazali, A. (1999) Shfa' Alkh'lyl fy Byan Alshbh Walmkh'yl Wmsalk Altalyl. Baghdad: Mtbat Alershad, 
p. 188. 
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5.2.1.3.2.1 Position of Saudi Law 
 
Saudi policy-makers adopt this modern prospective on human reasoning mentioned 
above, believing that the rules and cases covered in the Qur'an and Sunnah are finite
56
 
and the changing demands (social and economic) of Saudi society are beyond measure. 
Therefore, Saudi policy-makers have had to admit that to fulfil such demands, the door 
for regulatory sources (positive (wadi) law) will be opened. Regulatory or “nezamih” 
sources as Saudi policy-makers refer them,
57
 are regulations which are promulgated by 
the Saudi Council of Ministries using Royal Decrees.
58
 Royal Decrees play an important 
part in developing the Saudi legal system. They have the ability to fill in any legal gaps 
caused by the lack of statements recorded either in the Qur’an, Sunnah, or those efforts 
of the Muslim jurists (figh). The Electronic Transaction Regulation (ETR) 2007 [SA] is 
one example of those Royal Decrees issued by the Saudi Council of Ministries.
59
 Further 
examples can be seen in Royal Decree for the Regulation of Companies
60
, Royal Decree 
for the Regulation of Commercial Agencies
61
, Implementation Rules for Commercial 
Agencies Regulations,
62
 and the Royal Decree for the Regulation of Commercial Court.
63
 
Although the Royal Decrees in the KSA takes religious sources into consideration, the 
religious source still has the final word on these Royal Decrees. Article 67 of the Saudi 
Arabian’s Constitution points out that: “The regulatory authority lays down regulations 
                                                 
56
 This should be understandable as the Islamic law was designed to deal with a semi-feudal society that 
had not yet reached the industrialized age.  
57
 It is interesting to note that any law adopted by the Saudi Council of Ministries is usually referred to as 
regulation (nezam) rather than law. The reason for this is that in Muslim theory, the only one who is 
authorized to make laws is God. God is the only legislator on the earth and lawmakers would be referred 
as regulators. It should be aware of the fact that the difference here is largely formal i.e., it has no 
influence whatsoever with regard to application.  
58
 The Council of Ministers was established in 1953. Only in September 1993 was the Council given 
responsibility for drafting and overseeing the implementation of internal, external, financial, economic, 
educational and defence policies, and general affairs of state. The Council meets weekly, currently on 
Mondays, and is presided over by the King or his deputy. 
59
 The Saudi Electronic Transactions Regulation, 2007 will be subject to investigation in the following 
chapter.  
60
 No, M\6 of 1965 (as amended).  
61
 No, M\11 of 1962 (as amended).  
62
 No, 1897 of 1981.  
63
 No, M\32 of 1930.  
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and motions to meet the interests of the state or remove what is bad in its affairs, in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari'a”.64 
 
Realizing that the Saudi legal system contains religious sources (the Quran and 
Sunnah) on the one hand, and positive (wadi) law embodied in royal decrees on the 
other, Marar describes the Saudi legal system as a dual system (i.e. "a system within a 
system").
65
 Vogel, explains this Saudi duality thus: 
In most Islamic states…the legal system is bifurcated: one part is based 
in man-made, positive (wadi) law; the other part is Islamic law…Saudi 
Arabia also a dual legal system…the Islamic component if the legal 
system is fundamental and dominant. The positive law, on the other 
hand, is subordinate, constitutionally and in scope.
66
 
The result of such duality provides a continuous contradiction in the KSA. There have 
been some commercial issues that have been denied the right to be regulated by royal 
decrees because of an apparent contradiction with statement(s) in the divine sources. For 
instance, as interest rates (Riba) are forbidden according to the Qur'an and Sunnah,
67
 
Saudi Arabia remains the only country in the world which has not adopted regulations 
governing interest rates in commercial matters. Interest rates cannot be articulated in the 
country even though Saudi policy-makers may realise that there are commercial benefits 
associated with it. The consequence then must be that any country like the KSA, where 
Islamic law is the primary source of power and the essential ingredient of its legal 
system, the power to interpret and amend laws according to contemporary values and 
needs is more restricted, as compared to secular laws. The ability to create laws under the 
KSA legal system is constrained under the umbrella of Islam as a religion with various 
restrictions. Comparatively, most secular legal systems create laws based on a set of 
                                                 
64
 The Saudi Arabian constitution, art, 67. 
65
 Marar, A. (2006) The Duality of the Saudi Legal System and its Implications on Securitizations, Arab 
Law Quarterly. 20(4), p. 389. 
66
 Vogel, F. (1997) Islamic Governance in the gulf: A framework for Analysis, Comparison, and 
Prediction, The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. 
Gary Sick ct. al cds. Macmillan Press Ltd, p. 249.   
67
 Interestingly enough, disputes arising in Saudi Arabia between banks and their clients are settled out of 
court by a special committee. 
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principles and rules. It is easy therefore to argue that legal systems that depend on 
Islamic law can appear irrational and inflexible in this modern era. In contrast, under 
secular or positive legal systems, laws are devised by human being and are subject only 
to the interest of the public. That is to say, ideas and approaches will only remain 
acceptable in the KSA so long as those adopted ideas do not contradict or conflict with 
the principles and morals of Islam.  
5.4 Conclusion  
The previous discussion has presented research in support of an evaluation of the 
concept of Islamic law. Islamic law’s stand on any issue must be determined via 
consultation with the divine sources of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Therefore, revelation is 
the only source in Islamic law. The role of reason within Islamic law also depends on 
revelation. Both consensus and analogy must be traced back to statements narrated in 
revelation. However, such efforts will not be as reliable as the conclusive statements 
derived from divine sources (the Qur'an and the Sunnah). Statements derived directly 
from divine sources should be given priority over those that stem from reason.  When the 
divine sources are silent, human reasoning is accepted for use, however it is conditional 
as to not contradict with principles and morals of Islam. Human reasoning in this 
instance is not binding which means that other Muslim jurists/scholars can agree/disagree 
and create different human reasoning.  
  
After determining the main issues to be examined and the basis for doing so, I will 
begin discussing the enforceability of automated contracts under Islamic law.  In the next 
two chapters (6 and 7), ideas and hypotheses concerning the enforceability of contracts 
made by electronic agents will be examined in light of divine sources together with the 
Islamic figh to determine which idea/approach is more reliable. When no divine 
statement on an issue exists, reliance will be more on human reasoning based on the 
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interest of public. This is as I explained above, conditional on will not contradict with the 
spirit of Islamic law, or any of its general principles. Though Saudi law may have a 
position in regards to the use of these electronic agents in concluding contracts, any 
attempt to present different positions/approaches discussed in the coming chapters may 
create a motivation for change.  
 
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
109 
 
CHAPTER 6: The Enforceability of Automated Contracts and Islamic 
Principle of Mutual Consent 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the enforceability of automated contracts under Islamic law by 
establishing that mutual consent is the main condition for these types of contract. 
Contracting parties must mutually consent in order to make their contract binding. The 
aim in this chapter is to discover whether this condition of mutual consent is satisfactory 
and compatible in automated contracts so that these contracts can become binding under 
Islamic law. Thus, it is important first to discuss the Islamic concept of mutual consent.  
6.2 Principle of Mutual Consent under Islamic Law 
Analysis of the traditional Islamic texts reveals that Muslim jurists did not create 
general theories for contracts. Rather, they made very specific rules and individualized 
treatment for each contract. That is to say, there is no theory of contract to be found as 
existing in other legal systems.
1
 It follows that Islamic law, like Roman law, is a law of 
contracts rather than a law of contract.
2
 Muslim jurists adopt a classical method for 
discussing contracts and that is not to distinguish between civil and commercial 
transactions. Each contract has been classified into classes of nominated contracts with 
their own distinctive rules.
3
 In order to qualify as such, it must fit in one of those 
recognised contracts. Contract of sale is regarded as the model for all types of contracts. 
                                                 
1
 Alzarqa claims that it would make the rules of contract under Islamic law more understandable if they 
were developed in the same way as some Western legal systems. See, Alzarqa, (2004) Al-Fqh al-Aslamy 
fy Thwbh al-jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Anzryh al-Altzam al-amh fy al-Fqh al-Aslamy. Damascus: Dar Alqalem, p. 
23 (In Arabic). Similarly under common law, before Powell‟s first treatise on contract law, there was no 
theory of contract law. After Powell‟s Essay upon the Law of Contracts and Agreements, common law 
authors began to systematise the doctrine of contracts in the Anglo-American world. See, Hermida, 
J.(2004) Convergence of Civil Law and common Law Contracts in the Space Field,  Hong Kong Law 
Journal, 34 (2), p. 339. 
2
 Coulson, N.J. (1984) Commercial Law in the Gulf States: The Islamic Legal Tradition. London: Graham 
and Trotman, p. 17. 
3
 Contracts are discussed in Islamic texts using terms used at the time of emerging the Islamic law.  
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To form a contract of sale under Islamic law, there is no particular formality in the 
process of formation. There is no registration for example, that contracting parties must 
follow in order to make their contract valid.
4
 Mutual consent which is translated into 
Arabic as "Altraz'y" is the main pillar for contract formation.
5
 To form a valid contract 
under Islamic law, there must be mutual consent reached between contracting parties. 
The Qur‟an states: "O you who believe eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities; but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will".
6
 Also, the 
Prophet Mohammed is reported to have said: "The sale is complete when the two 
involved depart with mutual consent".
7
 
6.2.1 The Definition of the Concept of Mutual Consent  
The position of Islamic law on mutual consent is evident in which contracting parties 
must have an intention (nyh) to make their contracting binding. That is to say, in order 
for a contract to constitute its legal affects, the contract must be intended to indicate the 
party's satisfaction to enter into contract. Al-Shatbya states: 
Legal effects can be constituted only upon an intended act. However, an 
action made without the party's intention, according to the appropriate 
evidence, it is not the purpose of the Islamic law to give such action legal 
effects…8 
This intention must under Islamic law be manifested objectively before capable 
persons through an offer (ayjab) or subsequent acceptance (gbwl) of that offer. 
According to Muslim jurists, because intention is an internal matter, Islamic law is of the 
opinion that a person's intention has no legal recognition unless it is manifested 
objectively. That can be achieved by the existence of an offer (ayjab) and a subsequent 
                                                 
4
 Al-Zarqa, (2004) Al-Fqh al-Aslamy fy Thwbh al-jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Anzryh al-Altzam al-amh fy al-Fqh 
al-Aslamy. Damascus: Dar Alqalem, p. 421 (In Arabic). 
5
 Hamid, M. E. (1977) Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts in Islamic Law. Journal of Islamic 
and Comparative Law, 7(41), p. 42. 
6
 Yusuf Ali, the Holy Qur'an (Qur‟an 6: 29) Surah 3, Al-Nessa‟. 
7
 This Hadeeth is narrated by Al-Bukhari no (2893).  
8
 Al-Shatbya,(1998)  Almoafkat, 2
th
 ed Beirut: Dar Alkotop Alelmiah, p. 327 (In Arabic).   
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acceptance (gbwl) of that offer.
9
 Muslim jurists consider the rule of offer and acceptance 
as the only way to convey the subjective intention of contracting parties. In a similar 
fashion to common law, legal rules in Islamic law are affective only to what is shown 
and expressed by a party rather than what the party may sense or imply.
10
 As Alsnhwry 
puts it:  
What a party may sense is a psychological matter and an intangible mental fact; 
it cannot therefore be perceived or known by others.  Before the party 
manifests his intention objectively, it will remain known only to the party 
himself.
11
 
 
It is evident that Islamic law emphasises on an objective manifestation of assent, and 
not on assent as a subjective mental fact.
12
 Those who have not communicated their 
willingness to enter into contract cannot be claimed to have consented. The 
communication of the contracting parties must be approved by law in order to form a 
contract. Islamic law only approves communication that is expressed by persons with the 
capacity to complete contracts. The term „legal capacity‟ refers to the minimum mental 
capacity required by Islamic law for a party to be bound upon entering into the 
contractual relation. Those who have not reached adulthood like minors for example, 
cannot make an offer or an acceptance and in the event this occurs, such a 
communication has no legal influence in the eyes of the Islamic law.
13
 Islamic law 
recognizes three classes of persons who are generally not considered to have sufficient 
                                                 
9
 The offer and its acceptance is the general test under Islamic law for proving that there was intention 
from the contracting parties to enter into the contract. An offer is a communication by one party (the 
offeror) addressed to the other party (the offeree) and expressing the offeror‟s willingness to enter into a 
contract with the offeree on certain terms. Acceptance is the communication by the offeree of his/her 
willingness to enter into a contract with the offeror on the terms contained in the offer. Without an offer 
and subsequent acceptance of that offer, there can be no contract. See, Alalayli, B. (2005) Alnt'ryh Alamh 
llogwd fy Alfgh Ala'slamy. Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, p. 191(In Arabic). 
10
 See section 3.3.  Principle of Mutual Consent. 
11
 Alsnhwry, A. (1997) Mcuadr Alhg fy Alfgh Ala'slamy. 4
th
 ed. Beirut: Dar a'eya' Altrath Alarby, p. 81(In 
Arabic).   
12
 The theory that emphasises on assent as a subjective mental fact exists in civil law countries. Under this 
theory, to establish whether or not there was a valid contract, judges will look to the actual or subjective 
intentions of the parties and verify whether such parties really intended to be bound by the contract. 
Farnsworth, A. Contracts, 3rd Ed, Aspen Law & Business, 1999, 116. This means that subjectivists 
clearly consider a party's inner will as the determinant, not the declared will.   
13
 Alzarqa, (2004) Al-Fqh al-Aslamy fy Thwbh al-jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Anzryh al-Altzam al-amh fy al-Fqh al-
Aslamy. Damascus: Dar Alqalem, p. 421 (In Arabic). 
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
112 
 
capacity to be bound by their communication of an offer and an acceptance: those who 
are not of age, those with mental illness, and those who have declared bankruptcy. All of 
these persons are not entitled to assume contractual relations.
14
   
6.2.2 Application the Principal of Mutual Consent to Automated Contracts 
 
This position of Islamic law on mutual consent cannot easily be adapted to 
transactions made by electronic agents. One important consideration is that we cannot 
simply state that in these automated contracts there is an offer and an acceptance made by 
legal persons. In other words, the offer or the acceptance being communicated 
autonomously by the electronic agents should raise the question as to whether 
communication made by electronic agents can be attributed to the operators' assent and 
intent. S. 12 of the ETR 2007 [SA] 
15
 provide that: 
The electronic record is considered to be issued by the originator if it is 
sent by him or by another person on his behalf or sent by an automated 
system programmed by the originator to automatically act on behalf of 
the originator…16 
This passage asserts that any contract formed by the use of an electronic agent is 
legally correct and binding under Saudi law and the absence of any intervention by a 
human being in the contractual process would not affect its legal evidence.
17
 It also 
                                                 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 A royal directive was issued on 14 the February 1999 for the establishment of a Standing Committee on 
electronic commerce. The committee contained agents of the Ministry of Commerce, financial and 
national economy, Communications and Information Technology Commission, the King Abdul-Aziz City 
for Science and Technology (KACST), Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and consultant group 
of business men. See, Saudi Ministry of Commerce. (Online) Available at: 
 http://www.commerce.gov.sa/ecomm/book.asp [Accessed 04/Feb/2008] (In Arabic). The main function 
of the committee was to draft a comprehensive electronic commerce law. The regulation which is cited as 
Electronic Transactions Regulation, was drafted in 2004 and issued by the Saudi Council of Ministries on 
27
th
 of March, 2007. Issued by the Royal Decree No. M/18 dated 8.3.1428 AH (2007 AD), the Resolution 
of the Council of Ministers No. 80 dated 7.3.1428 AH (2007 AD) and the circular of the Minister of 
Justice No. 13/T/3098 dated 11.4.1428 AH (2007 AD). This is the first, and as yet only, attempt at legal 
regulation regarding electronic agents available in Saudi Arabia. The text of the ETR 2007 [SA] (Online) 
Available at: http://www.moj.gov.sa/adl/ENG/attach/27.pdf [Accessed 04/Feb/2008]. 
16
 S. 12.  See appendix I.    
17
 In here, the Saudi Electronic Transactions Regulation, 2007 applies similar principles to those adopted 
internationally for the use of electronic agents in contract formation. It affirms clearly that a person using 
an electronic agent for making a contract is legally bound by it. However, what is interesting under the 
Saudi regulation is that when a contract is formed between an automated computer and a natural person, 
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declares that when a contract is concluded by an electronic agent it is treated as if it was 
issued by the operator of the electronic agent. The assumption Saudi policy makes is that 
automated programs work automatically rather than autonomously. Electronic agents 
therefore are regarded as mere tools used by individuals to transmit their contractual 
relations. However, in automated contracts, when an offer or an acceptance is sent by an 
electronic agent, this communication is autonomous in which the operator has no 
knowledge about it. Therefore, such communication concluded by electronic agents is 
not intended by the operators. If electronic agents make actions which their operators 
have no knowledge about them, then it is fair to state that such actions are unintended by 
the operators and therefore the Islamic concept of mutual consent may not be 
satisfied/achieved.
18
 
 
It is true, as explained above,
19
 that the objective theory of mutual consent under 
Islamic law is clear, in which case Islamic law would not be concerned with whether or 
not actions made by electronic agents are intended by the operators. Judges under 
Islamic law would only be concerned with an objective communication of an offer and 
an acceptance.
20
 That is to say, if an offer is objectively communicated by a party, the 
party will be obliged upon it, regardless of any claims the party may make such as that 
s/he did not intend his/her communication.
21
 However, as Alalayli puts it, Islamic law 
                                                                                                                                                 
the natural person will not be bound by this contract unless he was aware that he was contracting with the 
automated computer. S. 11 (2) of the Saudi Electronic Transactions Regulation states that: "It is allowed 
for a contract to be created between an automated computer system and a natural person, only if the 
natural person knows or should have known the fact that he is contracting with automated system 
performing the task of forming and executing the contract." See appendix I.   The problem with this 
approach is that Saudi judges would find it difficult to decide/prove whether or not the contracting party 
was aware that he was contracting with an automated system.  
18
As pointed out in Chapter 2, this thesis assumes that electronic agents here are completely autonomous 
and independent of the operator.  The examples of electronic agents here do not only function within 
set/programmed parameters or do not have much space for autonomous initiative.  The viewpoint of this 
thesis is mostly based on hypothetical examples of completely autonomous electronic agents. See this 
discussion in section 2.2 Electronic Agent Technology which describes the nature of this developed 
electronic agents.  
19
 See section 6.2.1 Defining the Concept of Mutual Consent  
20
 Alalayli, B. (2005) Alnt'ryh Alamh llogwd fy Alfgh Ala'slamy. Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, p. 191(In Arabic). 
21
Ibid.  
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
114 
 
cannot ignore doubts about the intentionality of the actions made.
22
 In automated 
contracts, the communication of an offer or an acceptance made by electronic agents 
was designed by the electronic agents and not by the operators. Therefore, it is fair to 
have such doubts, attributing such communication to the intention of the operators. 
Speaking on the concept of intention under Islamic law, Abn Algym makes this 
observation: 
We cannot rely on what appears outside the world when it is clear that 
what has appeared was not intended by the contracting party. The 
demonstration of evidence by Islamic rules shows that such manifestation 
cannot result in any legal effects and the intention of a person when 
forming a contract must not be ignored.
23
  
Abn a'z'wh states that "it is against the spirit of Islamic law to ignore what a person 
wants when forming a contract".
24
 Abn Algym also argues: 
The law of Islam disregards those utterances and actions which people 
have not intended. Islamic law adopts that the main objective in contracts 
is a party‟s intention and not his formula.25  
Muslim scholars have varying opinions regarding a situation where what has appeared 
was not intended by the contracting party. Under the Hanafi school for example, consent 
is defined as: "a choice of a person (Akh'tyar) so that the effects of the choice will be 
represented on the appearance of the person".
26
 Following this definition, Hanafi jurists 
argue that the principle of mutual consent contains two important elements: choice and 
assent. First, the element of choice indicates an apparent manifestation to enter into a 
contract. Second, the element of assent refers to the acceptance of the contract 
implications i.e. the person is satisfied by the affects of the contract concluded.
27
 
According to the Hanafis, in order for a contract to be formed, a party needs only to make 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Abn Algym, (1993) Elam Almoqeen. 3
th
 ed Beirut: Dar Alketab Alelmiah, p. 34 (In Arabic). 
24
 Abn a'z'wh, p. 156. Cited by Alalayli, B. (2005) Alnt'ryh Alamh llogwd fy Alfgh Ala'slamy. Riyadh: Dar 
Alshwaf, p. 191(In Arabic). 
25
 Abn Algym, (1993) Elam Almoqeen. 3
th
 ed Beirut: Dar Alketab Alelmiah, p. 111 (In Arabic). 
26
 Abu zhrh, M. (1999) Almlkyh wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, p. 322 (In Arabic). 
27
 Ibid. 
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a choice and needs not be satisfied about his/her choice.
28
 That is to say, Hanafi jurists 
differentiate between the element of choice and the element of assent.  Assent of a party 
is not a condition for the acceptance to constitute legal results. Under the Hanafi School, 
it is sufficient that the party has made his choice.
29
 According to the Hanafis, this point of 
view is evident in the Hadeeth of the Prophet Mohammed. Prophet Mohammed even 
accepts one‟s joking act or the Arabic, hazl; even though such acts were meant only as 
joke and unintended by the person. The Prophet Mohammed states: “There are three 
matters in which seriousness is serious and joking is serious: marriage, divorce and 
taking back (one‟s wife)”.30 Hanafis argues that the Prophet Mohammed in this statement 
does not differentiate between a serious act and a joking act. The latter will be deemed 
serious and legal effects will be registered even though the person committing the act 
neither assented nor intended them.
31
 That is to say, the mere act of the party alone can 
create the necessary legal affects as the assent of a party is not seen as a condition under 
Islamic law. Following this perspective of the Hanafis vis a vis mutual consent, an act of 
a joking person, a drunk for example, or an act committed by a person under duress, can 
still be legally formed. Hanafis is only concerned with the choice of act, however he does 
not take into consideration the fact that these acts may not have been intended or 
assented.
32
 Thus automated contracts will be enforceable even if the operator did not 
assent or intend them.  
 
By contrast, the majority of Muslim jurists (Aljmhwr) adopt an opposite position in 
which a choice of a party cannot constitute its legal effects unless the choice was 
assented by the party. That is to say, the majority of Muslim jurists unlike the Hanafi 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Alsrkh'sy,(1993) Acuwl Alsrkh'sy. Beirut: Dar Alketab Alelmiah, p. 187 (In Arabic). 
30
 This Hadeeth was narrated by Abu Dawood (2194), al-Tirmidhi (1184), Ibn Maajah (2039); classed as 
saheeh by al-Haafiz Ibn Hajar in al-Talkhees al-Habeer (3/424) and al-Albaani in Saheeh Sunan al-
Tirmidhi (944).  
31
 Alsrkh'sy,(1993) Acuwl Alsrkh'sy. Beirut: Dar Alketab Alelmiah, p. 187 (In Arabic). 
32
 Ibid. 
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
116 
 
School, they do not differentiate between the elements of choice and assent; to them, 
both of these elements depend on each other. This means that a choice of a party cannot 
alone establish its legal affects except knowing that this choice is what the party 
wanted.
33
 According to the majority of Muslim jurists, any choice of a party needs to 
represent the party's assent in order to make legal effect. As Al-Shatby states:  
Certainly an intended act will constitute its legal affects under Islamic 
law. However, to assume an act made with no intention such as the act of 
mad or sleep person, such act cannot constitute its legal affect. Any 
chosen act of a person needs an intention of that person otherwise the act 
cannot be enforced under Islamic law. 
34
  
Following the view of the majority of Muslim jurists on mutual consent, the act of a 
joking person, a drunk, or an act made by a person under duress, is not valid. This is 
because such acts are not intended and therefore have no reason to be legally considered. 
Al-Sywty states: "the meaning of choice is to intend the act and to like its legal affects. 
The choice of a person should not be a result of duress of any kind whatsoever".
35
 As 
Ahmed bin Hanble points out: "An act made under duress lacks any meaning of 
choice".
36
 Al-Htab also states: "A person under duress is unable to stop doing what s/he 
has been forced to do. Therefore, the person cannot be obliged to that act as s/he has not 
chosen it and therefore has not assented it".
37
  
 
The arguments of Muslim jurists on mutual consent are important to the present 
discussion. This is because the Hanafi School considers the apparent act of a party to 
enter into contract is sufficient to form the contract. The act will form the contract even 
though the act was not assented or intended by the party. The underlying point under 
Hanafi school is that contracts do not depend on the intention of a party or Nyh/Gcud, as 
is called in Arabic. Instead, contracts depend more on what is shown by the party. 
                                                 
33
 Abu zhrh, M. (1999) Almlkyh wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, p. 322 (In Arabic). 
34
 Al-Shatby, (1998) Almoafkat. 2
th
 ed. Cairo: Dar Al-marifah, p. 327 (In Arabic).   
35
 Al-Sywty, Ftawa Alsywty, Mkhtwte Al'azhr no,131, 143. 
36
 Shrh Alkwkb Almnyr, 509 cited by Abu Zahra, M. (1999) Almlkyh wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, 
p. 322 (In Arabic). 
37
 Almgrby, (2003)  MwAhb Aljlyl. 4
th
 ed. Beirut: Dar a'alm Alktb, p. 245 (In Arabic).    
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However, the Muslim jurists argue the issue differently. If the apparent act of the party is 
not assented or intended, the act cannot form the contract. Ala'z bn a'bdalslam states: 
"Contract is all about intention of the party".
38
 That is to say, the act of the party to enter 
into a contract should indicate the assent of that person to create the contract and its legal 
implications. So, by communicating acceptance, legal affects will take place as a result of 
the party‟s satisfaction entering into the contract. As Algrh dag'y states: 
An act of a party to enter into contract should represent the intention of 
the party that is the contract is based on his full satisfaction. Contract 
should be based on what a party really wants and verbs are only a way of 
expression.
39
  
In some Hanafis texts, some jurists indicate the importance of the intention of a party 
in contracts. For example, scholar Al-Mrg'ny, states: "Intention is an objective in 
contracts".
40
 In the same vein, Abn njym states: "the objective in contracts is for the 
intention of the party and not for his words and phrases".
41
 Al-Grh dg'y argues that these 
statements by Hanafi jurists do not point to the importance of intention of the party in 
contracts. Instead, they point to the importance of figuring out the meaning of the 
utterances (Alfat) stated by the party(s).
42
 This means, that one should not look at the 
appearance of the utterances only, but to interpret those utterances in order to find out 
what the party really means.
43
 Therefore, the Hanafis rely on utterances and the correct 
interpretation of those utterances. It does not go on to find out whether these utterances 
are assented or intended. 
 
The evidence would suggest that the Hanafis seem to have gone too far with the 
independency on the appearance of a party by admitting acts are not intended or assented. 
                                                 
38
 Cited by Alzarqa, (2004) Al-Fqh al-Aslamy fy Thwbh al-jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Anzryh al-Altzam al-amh fy 
al-Fqh al-Aslamy. Damascus: Dar Alqalem, p. 421 (In Arabic). 
39
 Al-Grh dg'y, M. (2002) Mbd'a Alrz'a fy Ala'gwd: Drash  Mgarnh fy Alfgh Ala'slamy walgAnwn Almdny. 
Beirut: Dar AlbshAy'r AlA'slmye, p. 45 (In Arabic). 
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This perspective could be seen as being positive as it respects people's appearances. More 
importantly, it protects the public against this appearance as the public sometimes may 
not necessarily be aware of the contracting party‟s intention. Hanafis jurists argue that the 
issue is different depending on whether a person is committing financial or non-financial 
acts.
44
 According to jurists, while it is a condition for a party(s) to show his choice in all 
legal acts whether financial or non-financial, the assent of the party and the satisfaction of 
the act becomes a condition only for financial matters and does not extend to non-
financial matters. That is to say, for acts such as divorce and marriage, Hanafis do not ask 
for proof of intent or assent. It is sufficient that the person showed his/her choice to make 
the act of the divorce or marriage happen. Furthermore, this perspective is evident in the 
Hadeeth mentioned above, in which the Prophet Mohammed states that divorce, 
marriage, and taking back one‟s wife do not need the intention of the person to constitute 
legal affects. The Prophet Mohammed in this Hadeeth is very specific on these three 
matters and it does not appear that the rule applies outside of these matters i.e. to all 
matters.
45
 The Qur'an clearly indicates that the assent of parties is essential to financial 
and trade acts. It states: "O you who believe eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities; but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will".
46
 According 
to the Hanafis, this verse is evidence that consent is a condition only in trade and does not 
extend to non-financial acts such as divorce or marriage. This means that trade contracts 
require both a choice to be made and assent on this choice.  
 
However, Hanafi jurists argue that a contract can still be formed if not made 
deliberately, however, such a contract remains void and cannot therefore be enforced 
until the relevant party consents it. Al-bzdwy states: "A contract made jokingly by a 
person can be formed because of the choice the person made, however, the contract 
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cannot be enforceable because such contract was not assented and intended".
47
 Having 
reached this, the difference between the Hanafi School and the majority of Muslim 
jurists becomes largely formal. While the majority of Muslim jurists focus on the 
intention of the party, the Hanafis finds that intention is a condition for the enforcement 
of the contract.
48
 Thus, the difference between Muslim jurists on the principal of mutual 
consent is less important to my present thesis. This is because Muslim jurists agree that 
the first principal to be considered in contracts under Islamic law is that contracting 
parties must have an intention in order to make their contract enforceable. That is to say, 
automated contracts cannot be enforceable under Islamic law because they are made by 
electronic agents and therefore operators lack intention and knowledge about them.   
6.2.3. The Subject Matter  
 
Subject matter which translated from the Arabic, mhl alaqd, is the primary part that 
contracting parties must objectively consent to. Subject matter of contract is given a 
great importance under Islamic law and is surrounded by various rules and conditions. 
For example, the subject matter must first of all, be of legal value (licit).
49
 The 
lawfulness of the subject matter means that something can be permissibly traded, legally 
owned or authorized by the parties. Second, this something must exist and potentially be 
capable of delivery at the time of contracting. It is true that there might sometimes be 
obstacles to the process of delivery; however there should be a limit to the nature of 
obstacles. For example, in a situation where the subject matter is a car, it should at least 
be ready to be delivered to the buyer. Should there be a problem that stops it being 
delivered, the car should at least be at the stage of production at the time of contracting. 
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Third, the subject matter must have the potential to be precisely determined.
50
 The 
golden principle in these conditions is that contract under Islamic law should not contain 
any element of hazard (gharar).
51
 Muslim jurists agree that gharar can exist if 
contracting parties do not have perfect knowledge of the counter values intended to be 
exchanged as a result of their transactions.
52
  
 
Gharar is a concept that is difficult to identify under Islamic law due to the fact that 
the concept eludes more than one meaning; it includes risk, peril, uncertainty, 
speculation, want of knowledge and unknown outcome or results.
53
 Muslim jurists agree 
that gharar exists when there is uncertainty about the existence of the subject matter. 
Should there be uncertainty about the actual existence of the subject matter at the time of 
contracting, this would vitiate the contract. However, Muslim jurists differ on the degree 
of uncertainty that should be applied to a subject matter for it to be considered gharar.   
 
First, gharar exists when the non existence of the subject matter is almost confirmed, 
which means the degree of uncertainty takes the value between zero to one. Jurists have 
presented numerous examples in some sale contracts that contain a type of gharar. For 
example, it is gharar where a vendor sells fish in the sea or sells a foetus of an animal in 
its mother womb. Such transactions are considered as illegal under all Islamic schools.
54
 
Second, gharar exists when the probability of existence of the subject matter is equal to 
the probability of non-existence. Al-Kasani states: “Gharar is the risk where the 
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probability of existence and the probability non-existence have the same value”.55 While 
the majority of Muslim jurists agree that gharar exists in such cases, Maliki jurists do 
not.
56
 Third, gharar exists when the existence of the subject matter outweighs its non 
existence, to the degree that non existence takes the value between zero to one. Such 
transactions are also considered illegal under all Islamic schools.
57
 However, two 
exceptions have been made to this general rule; Slm and Alastcunaa' contracts. On the 
one hand, Alastcunaa' is a contract when a person goes into an on-the-spot purchase of a 
product to be manufactured using the same materials as the first manufactured product, 
according to the designated specifications against a determined price.  On the other hand, 
Slm is a contract where both commodity and consideration are exchanged simultaneously 
without the commodity being deferred. The majority of Muslim jurists agree that 
contracts of Slm and Alastcunaa are valid even though the subject matter of these two 
contracts does not exist at the time of contracting.
58
 These two contracts are permitted 
due to necessity and the need of the people at that time.
59
 
 
Furthermore, Muslim jurists agree that gharar also exists when the subject matter is 
not able to be handed over whether it exists or not. That is to say, contracting parties have 
uncertainty over the subject matter's availability. The subject matter here may exist, 
however uncertainty surrounds its availability at the time of contracting. Muslim jurists 
under all Islamic schools are in agreement that such transactions are gharar because the 
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subject matter cannot be delivered.
60
 The concept of gharar can contain other elements 
such as the lack of knowledge (jahalah- ignorance or uncertainty over the subject matter). 
While gharar in the above examples concerns the uncertainty affecting the existence of 
the subject matter and its availability, the present gharar is concerned with more detailed 
information on the subject matter, which is known to exist and able to take place. The 
gharar exists due to undefined subject matter such as the commodity or the price to be 
paid is unknown or unwell defined. In other words, if the object of sale is a car, the buyer 
should have knowledge about the colour of the car, its facilities, features...etc. If the 
contracting parties lack such knowledge, the contract is considered gharar. Thus 
according to Saleh, avoidance gharar in any transaction would require the observance of 
the following three rules: "(a) No want of knowledge regarding the existence of the 
exchanged countervalues; (b) No want of knowledge regarding the characteristics of the 
exchanged countervalues; and (c) Control of the parties over the exchanged countervalues 
should be effective".
61
 
 
Some jurists
62
 do not distinguish between the concepts of gharar and jahalah, instead, 
they treat them as one concept (gharar). For example, Aldhereer argues that the concept 
of gharar is wider than the concept of jahalah; every unknown commodity is gharar, but 
not every gharar is unknown.
63
 That is to say, gharar could exist and be well defined, but 
the vendor for example, cannot hand the subject matter over to the purchaser. Thus, 
gharar is prescribed when the existence of the subject matter is unknown even if it is well 
defined, whereas the element of jahalah is where the subject matter does exist but its 
                                                 
60
 Al-Kasani, (1910) Bdaya' Alcunaya' fy Trtyb Alshraya. Vol. 5 Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, pp. 147-148(In 
Arabic).    
61
 Saleh, N. (1986) Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. London: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 52. 
62
 For example, Hasanuzzaman argues that discussion on the concept of gharar reflects a confusion in 
clearly distinguishing between jahl and gharar. Gharar is found in the nature (asl) of contract itself, in 
juhalah it is not the nature but the condition or wasf of the contract that is defective. See Saleh, N. 
(1986).Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking. reviewed 
by Hasanuzzaman, S. M, (1991) Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, Vol. 3, p. 120.   
63
 Aldhereer, (1993) Algrr fy Ala'gwd watharh fy Alttbygat Alma'acurh. Jeddah: Alma'hd Ala'slAmy 
llbhwth w Altdryb, p. 45 (In Arabic). 
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
123 
 
features are unknown. To illustrate this, a person who buys a house for a certain price 
without knowing its features or whether it is suitable for dwelling has gone into jahalah.
64
 
As Kamali states, such transactions are prohibited so as to prevent dispute arising 
between the parties.
65
 
As will be discussed below, the concept of gharar (jahalah) can prove problematic in 
automated contracts.
 66
 Since these contracts are made by electronic agents, operators do 
not necessarily have a precise determination of the subject matter and price (quantity 
and quality). However, Muslim jurists disagree on what is the right way to determine 
and describe the subject matter. For example, if the subject matter is present, the Malikis 
and Shafis are in agreement that parties should view clearly the subject matter to 
determine its substance and attributes.
67
 The Hanbalis and Hanafis suggest that if the 
subject matter is present, it is not important for the parties to view it; it is sufficient that 
the subject matter is pointed out by the parties.
68
 More differences occur among Muslim 
jurists when the subject matter is absent so that the parties cannot either view or point 
out to the subject matter. For example, the Shafi school holds a radical view: by asking 
the parties to view the subject matter in order to prevent the element of gharar.
69
 The 
majority of Muslim jurists suggest that if the subject matter is absent, it is sufficient that 
the subject matter is well defined by the parties, or as the jurists put it, the subject matter 
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is given the „anti-ignorance description‟.70 Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim jurists 
assign a right to the contracting party called „option of inspection‟ or known as Khyar 
Al-rw'yh. This means that although the absent subject matter is well described to the 
purchaser, the purchaser holds a right to reject the purchase when he sees the product in 
case he is not satisfied with the product's description.
71
   
Abn Algym and Abn Tymyh consider gharar/jahalah as gambling; where a vendor 
sells a stray animal, the transaction is at risk and, therefore, the purchaser pays much less 
than its real price.
72
 Accordingly, should the subject matter of the contract, i.e. a stray 
animal is found, the purchaser wins the difference between the paid price and the real 
price of the animal. On the other hand, where the animal is not found, the vendor wins 
the reduced price for nothing and the purchaser losses what he has paid out to the vendor. 
Thus, in such transactions, one party unlawfully „eats‟ the other party's money which 
causes enmity and hatred.
73
 The principles of Islamic law aim to achieve fair equivalence 
between parties in a transaction in order to avoid any dispute, as much as possible, that 
might arise from one of the parties. In Muslims' belief, selling non existence is void in 
order to protect contracting parties against any sort of risk that are likely to cause 
imbalance of the benefits gained.
74
 It shows a general policy that uncertain subject matter 
is risky and this risk is avoided on the ground that it may lead to future disputes and 
litigation.
75
 Therefore, the element of gharar has been a significant issue in Islamic law 
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which affects the validity of the contract. Gharar may render the transaction totally null 
and void.
76
  
 
Unlike the usury interest (Riba) whose prohibition is narrated in Quran,
77
 gharar was 
forbidden by the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. For example, Abu Huraira reports 
that Allah's messenger forbids two types of transactions (Mulamasa and Munabadha). 
Mulamasa is when a man touches another's garment of cloth or anything else without 
turning it over. Munabadha is when a man throws his cloth to another, and the other 
throws his cloth back to the other, thus confirming their contract without inspection or 
mutual consent.
78
 Furthermore, Ibn Abbas reports Allah's messenger as saying: “He who 
buys food-grain should not sell it until he has taken possession of it.” Also Ibn Umar 
reports that the Prophet Mohammed forbids the sale of fruits until they are clearly in good 
condition.
79
 Given that these statements are derived from a divine source Sunnah, the 
forbidden of gharar becomes reliable. That is to say, the forbidden of gharar is not 
subject to human reasoning. Human reasoning in this instance is acceptable only for the 
interpretation of human beings in order to reveal its most precise meaning. In the next 
section, I will discuss whether the concept of gharar exists in automated contracts.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76
 Asherman, J. (1982) Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic Law, 
the International Lawyer, 16, p. 326. 
77
 See section 5.3.1 Qur‟an.  
78
 Muslim jurists are in agreement on these definitions. See for example, Abu Zahra, M. (1999) Almlkyh 
wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, p. 322 (In Arabic). 
79
 Almost all Muslim jurists (except Hanafis and Malikis) agree that the sale of fruits or agricultural 
products which have not yet ripened is permissible. Muslim jurists are in agreement about the legality of 
the sale of fruits and agricultural products after they have been collected from trees or picked up from the 
field. Divergence among Muslim jurists exists over the sale of fruits or agricultural products which have 
already ripened but have not yet been collected. Generally speaking, schools of law concur in considering 
that the sale of fruits or agricultural products cannot be lawful except when the signs of readiness are 
shown, but they disagree on interpretation of "signs of readiness". See, Saleh, N. (1986) Unlawful Gain 
and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59-60. 
Ch: 6 Islamic Principle of Mutual Consent  
 
126 
 
6.2.3.1. Existence of Gharar in Automated Contracts 
 
Automated contracts are completed by electronic agents autonomously and without 
the operators' direct intervention. It seems therefore that perceiving the existence of 
gharar may be problematical in automated contracts, the prohibited element which turns 
the contract illegal under Islamic law. Contracting parties' knowledge of the contract and 
its content should not be lacking. If contracting parties do not have perfect knowledge of 
the counter values intended to be exchanged as result of their transactions then this is 
relevant to the concept of gharar. As explained earlier, gharar can exist if contracting 
party lacks information about the nature and attributes of the subject matter, has doubts 
over its availability and existence, its quantity, or if it requires exact information 
concerning the price, the unit of currency in which the price is paid, and the terms of its 
payment. Any of these elements can render the contract totally null under Islamic law.
80
 
None of the above elements of gharar seem to be a problem in automated contracts. 
However, the condition that requires precise determination of the subject matter and 
price (quantity and quality) can indeed be a concern and may invalidate automated 
contracts. In the case of the simplest of electronic agents,
81
 those programmed to carry 
out a specific task, the operators may lack knowledge over some small details of the 
subject matter and it is certainly not the important ones. For example, in a specific deal, 
an operator may not exactly know what the price of the deal is or it is not known for 
certain to him. However it is evident that the price is within predefined limits 
determined by the operator such as highest and lowest acceptable price. This situation is 
what is called under Islamic law trifling or al-gharar al-yasir. According to Muslim 
jurists, gharar could be trifling (al-gharar al-yasir) or excessive (al-gharar al-kathir). 
A contract is hardly free of slight gharar. Some Muslim scholars believe that "in real 
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life, gharar cannot be avoided totally in trade, it is one of degree as most commercial 
transactions may be said to involve some element of uncertainty".
82
 The scholar Al-
Shatby also points out that: “it is difficult to remove from contracts all gharar, besides, 
it narrows the scope of transactions".
83
 Examples of such slight gharar include selling a 
lined overcoat though its lining cannot seen, or renting a house for a month, where the 
month can be thirty or thirty one days.
84
  
On the other hand, excessive gharar is when gharar dominates the contract so much 
that it comes to entirely characterize it.
85
 This includes delivery of a subject matter that 
is not attainable, when the price or the object of contract is unknown, a deferred sale in 
which the deferment period is unknown, such as when so and so arrives or dies, and the 
sale of that is not expected to survive. This is the variety of gharar which Muslim jurists 
generally agree renders the transaction invalid. On the other hand, al-gharr al-yasir is 
the variety which does not necessarily render transactions invalid.
86
 As scholar Abn 
Aljwzy points out: "gharar is prohibited and avoided under Islamic law, unless it is very 
little in which case it is tolerated”.87 
When an individual gives certain instructions which include the highest and lowest 
acceptable price and sends his electronic agent into the Internet to buy a ticket for him, 
the operator cannot claim that he does not know the price of the ticket just because the 
price was not precisely determined. The exact price may not be known to the operator but 
what is evident is that the price was within certain predefined limits set by the operator. 
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Such ignorance over the precise price or the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
operators on some other details such the time the transaction was being made, remains 
under this type of gharar. Under the Islamic law, these incidents are tolerated and 
permissible. Maliki and Hanbali jurists consider the validity of contract dependent upon 
the knowledge of the price to avoid gharar i.e., it is enough that the price is clearly 
determined. The Hanafi School suggests that when an object or its price is within sight, it 
needs no description, as there is no gharar involved. There is no disagreement among 
Hanafi jurists that the price in such instances has been clearly described.
88
  
However, when it comes to the advancement of electronic agents, the case will 
definitely be different. Chapter 2 clarifies that the central focus of this study is 
developed electronic agents whose tasks are not simply receiving orders and sending 
automatic confirmations. Instead they are more autonomous from their operators to the 
extent that they can complete transactions alone without their operators' intervention.
89
 
Such cases, with regards to advanced electronic agents, are not yet available and thus it 
is important to determine the vital details of the subject matter that the operators of 
electronic agents do not know. In addition, as a result of the fact that the concept of 
automated contracts is still really in its infancy, Muslim jurists have not come to realize 
this issue yet. However, if a transaction was completed independently of the operator by 
the electronic agent, the operators would normally lack very substantial details of the 
subject matter which therefore may constitute excessive or al-gharar al-kathir in 
automated contracts. 
For example, Muslim jurists have discussed lack of knowledge with regards to genus 
which includes the ignorance of the entity, type and attributes of the object. The Maliki 
School permits the sale of something belonging to an unknown genus on condition that 
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the purchaser has the right to option of inspection i.e. he has the right to rescind the 
sale.
90
 A person who enters into a contract dealing with a certain subject matter he has 
never seen it before has a right to cancel the contract when he sees it. This right is 
offered due to concerns inherent in gharar and the risks associated with such deals. The 
Hanafi School gives this right (i.e. “option of inspection”) to the purchaser without it 
even being stipulated in the contract.
91
 That is to say, if operators lack knowledge with 
regards to the genus of contract their electronic agents is making, this gives the operator 
the right to reject the goods within three days after the sight. This is according to a 
Hadeeth narrated by the Prophet Mohammed.
92
 Interestingly enough, the option of 
inspection is provided by international laws on electronic commerce law.
93
 The only 
difference under this legislation is that unlike Islamic law, if the purchaser is not happy 
about the genus of the goods or is not satisfied with other descriptions, the right to 
return the goods is open to the purchaser for longer than three days
94
 In the KSA, the 
ETR 2007 [SA] does not provide purchasers the right of inspection. So, without this 
right given to the purchasers, according to Islamic law, the transaction formed is 
considered gharar.
95
 
Furthermore, in automated contracts, operators may lack knowledge about the exact 
quantity. Knowledge of an object‟s quantity is a condition under Islamic law as it is 
                                                 
90
 Almgrby (2003) MwAhb Aljlyl. Vol. 4 Beirut: Dar a'alm Alktb, p. 245 (In Arabic). 
91
 Ibn Al-Humam, (1999) Fath Al-Qadir. Vol. 5 Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, p. 137(In Arabic).  
92
 The Prophet Mohammed says to a man that: "When you sell, say: no cheating and I have a choice for 
three days". This Hadeeth was narrated by Alhakm.   
93
 For example, under the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, 7. provides that in 
good time prior to the conclusion of the contract the supplier shall - (a) provide to the consumer the 
following information - (vi) "the existence of a right of cancellation...". 
94
 The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, 11 (2) states: "Where the supplier 
complies with regulation 8, the cancellation period ends on the expiry of the period of seven working days 
beginning with the day after the day on which the consumer receives the goods". However, I have my 
own observation on how this practically would be applied in trade world. It is usually difficult if not 
impossible if you are not happy with the product to return it within 7 days. It is just too short time. 
95
 Nevertheless, one can argue that as the right of inspection is already an Islamic rule on contract, the 
ETR 2007 [SA] did not need to adopt it.  
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invalid to sell an object when this information is unknown because it involves gharar.
96
 
In automated contracts, operators of electronic agents may possibly lack knowledge 
about the time it might take to deliver the object. Muslim jurists have discussed the lack 
of knowledge over the time in delivering the object and agreed that this is excessive 
gharar, which renders the contract invalid.
97
  
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the concept of mutual consent under Islamic law and 
presented the existing definitions of this concept, namely, the definitions of the four 
Islamic schools: the Malikis, Shafis, Hanbalis, and Hanafis. The chapter has concluded 
that the difference between Muslim jurists is largely formal. While the majority of 
Muslim jurists assert the intention of the party in contract formation, the Hanafis find that 
intention is a condition only for the enforcement of the contract. In other words, a 
concluded contract will not be enforceable if the party did not intend it. So, the first 
principal to constitute a party's assent in a contract is to intend that contract. Secondly, 
the party must have complete knowledge of the subject matter in order to avoid what is 
called gharar (an element which renders the contract invalid under Islamic law). This 
requires the party to have precise determination of the subject matter and price (quantity 
and quality) in order to prevent dispute from arising with the other parties. In 
circumstances, where a party lacks knowledge over small details of the subject matter, 
this type of gharar is considered small (Yasir) and therefore permissible. However, 
where a party lacks knowledge over excessive details of the subject matter, Muslim 
jurists agreed that this is a prohibited gharar and it would render the contract invalid. 
 
                                                 
96
 Al-Snhwry, A. (1997) Mcuadr Alhg fy Alfgh Ala'slamy. 4
th
 ed. Vol. 5 Beirut: Dar a'eya' Altrath Alarby, 
p. 40 (In Arabic).    
97
 Ibid.  
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The contract administered by the electronic agent limits the knowledge of the 
operators about the contract. Therefore, on the one hand, it creates doubts as to whether 
we should attribute the contract to the intentions of the operators. It was suggested that 
operators of electronic agents do not intend automated contracts since automated 
contracts are made by electronic agents autonomously about which the operators have 
no knowledge. On the other hand, it presents evidence of the existence of gharar as the 
operators in such instances may lack knowledge of some excessive details over the 
contract's subject matter. If a transaction is completed independently of the operator by 
the electronic agent, the operators would normally lack substantial details of the subject 
matter such as price, time of delivery and description. In this case the transaction 
constitutes excessive or al-gharar al-kathir and automated contracts would be 
considered invalid. 
 
 Having questioned the use of mutual consent for the enforceability of automated 
contracts under Islamic law on the ground that automated contracts are not consensual, 
in the next chapter, I will discuss the enforceability of automated contracts through the 
application of Islamic agency principles. I'll discuss whether electronic agents can be 
deemed as agents under Islamic law so automated contracts can be enforced under 
Islamic agency law. I first discuss Islamic concept of agency and then investigate 
whether the attribution of electronic agents as agents is applicable.  
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CHAPTER 7: The Enforceability of Automated Contracts and Islamic 
Agency Theory 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates whether electronic agents can be agents under Islamic agency 
theory. The aim of this discussion is to consider the applicability of Islamic agency 
principles for the enforceability of automated contracts in the KSA. Thus, it is necessary 
in this chapter to first discuss the Islamic law of agency and determine its requirements 
and criteria for agency. Second, the question of whether these requirements are 
applicable to electronic agents must be answered. To this end, barriers standing against 
such application will be explored along with the ways Islamic law can deal with such 
barriers. More specifically, this chapter is interested in the possibility under Islamic law 
of granting electronic agents with legal personality. Thus the Islamic concept of legal 
personality is investigated along with its attribution to non human beings such as 
electronic agents. 
7.2 Islamic Principles of Agency Law 
7.2.1 The Definition of Agency 
 
Modern Muslim jurists acknowledge that there has been almost no modification on the 
law of agency or “Al-Nyabh” since the early days of Islam.1 Agency agreement has been 
found in traditional Islamic texts as a nominated contract and has its own specific rules. 
An attempt to define agency relationship under Islamic law provides the following 
definition: "Authorizing a capable person, similar to him (the principal), to achieve 
something that can be authorized under the law of agency".
2
 This means that not every 
matter under Islamic law can be delegated for others to do. According to Muslim jurists, 
                                                 
1
 Mo'qbel, T.(2001) Alwakalh in Islamic jurisprudence.  Beirut: Dar Alkotop Alelmiah, p.22 (In Arabic). 
2
 Albhwty, (2003) Alrwz' Almrba' fy shrh zad Almstgna. Riyadh: Dar Al'argm lltbaa'h walnshr waltwzya', 
p. 280 (In Arabic). 
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there are certain acts a Muslim man cannot authorize others to do on his or her behalf. 
One obvious example is the pure religious acts, in particular, praying and fasting. 
Mo'qbel argues that this is not something exclusive to Islamic law.
3
 Law sometimes, for 
the exercise or performance, requires discretion or special personal skill, or for the 
purpose of doing an act which the principal is personally required, by or pursuant to any 
statute, to do in person.
4
 
7.2.1.1 Creation of Agency Relationship 
 
According to the above definition of agency, agency relationship involves two 
contracting parties: a principal and an agent. The definition points put that agents must be 
capable similar to the principal. Therefore, it is important to explore what the capacity of 
principals is under Islamic law.  Muslim jurists, generally speaking, agree that principals 
must be capable persons and not of those who do not have sound minds or those who are 
considered minors.
5
 That is to say, the principals, under Islamic law, must be in 
possession of good judgement and be of adult age. However, Muslim jurists disagree on 
whether a sound mind should act as a principal. The term (Alcuby Almmyz) or „sound 
mind‟ under Islamic law refers to individuals between the age of 7 – 15 years. This group 
of individuals is in a transition stage from being children to teenagers. In the next few 
sections, the term „sound mind‟ will be used to refer to this definition. 
 
Some Muslim jurists suggest that if individuals of sound mind wish to assign an 
agent, it is important first to decide whether the agent will contribute something 
beneficial to that individual. The sound-minded individual is permitted to assign an 
agent only when it is certain that the act of assignation will definitely be beneficial to 
                                                 
3
 Mo'qbel, op, cit., p. 22.  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Alzhiliy, W.(2000) Alfkr Al-a'slamy w'adlth. 4
th 
ed, Vol. 4. Cairo: Dar Alfkr Almoacur p. 256 (In 
Arabic). 
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him. Examples include: divorce, gift, and charity.
6
 However after centuries of 
deliberation, the majority of Muslim jurists assert that in cases relating to rental and 
purchasing it is often difficult to decide whether the agent is going to be beneficial or 
otherwise to the sound minded individual. In these cases, Muslim jurists agree that what 
the agent does on behalf of the sound minded would be conditional on the approval of 
his guardian.
7
 In other words, what this means is that if the agent bought a house on 
behalf of the sound minded individual, the guardian can withdraw the purchase if he 
found, for example, the price of the house was too high.
8
  
 
It would seem that this situation gives the right to the guardian of a sound-minded 
individual to cancel any transactions made with honest third parties who have not 
committed any negligent acts and, hence, this could threaten the stability of the trade. 
By contrast, the Shafi School suggests that because sound-minded individuals are not 
adults and lack legal capacity, they cannot therefore be principals.
9
 For the same reason, 
the majority of Muslim jurists prevent sound-minded individuals acting as principals. 
The same position also holds true for agents. The philosophy of the majority of Muslim 
jurists is that if sound-minded individuals cannot act on their own because they are not 
adults, they should therefore not be allowed to act on behalf of others. As Alzhiliy 
states: 
Acting on your own behalf is more important than on others' behalf. 
Taking the fact that a person is prevented to act for his own, it seems then 
appropriate for that person to be banned from acting on behalf of 
others.
10
   
 
                                                 
6
  Ebn Qedamh, (2003) Almughni. Vol. 4 Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, p. 205 (In Arabic). 
7
  Ibid.  
8
  Ibid.  
9
  Mo'qbel, T.(2001) Alwakalh in Islamic jurisprudence. Beirut: Dar Alkotop Alelmiah, p. 22 (In Arabic). 
10
Alzhiliy, W.  (2000) Alfkr Al-a'slamy w'adlth. 4
th 
ed, Vol. 4. Cairo: Dar Alfkr Almoacur, p. 256 (In 
Arabic). 
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The Hanafi school‟s position is very different: sound-minded individuals can act as 
agents, regardless of whether or not their guardian allows them.
11
 Alkafyf states: "it is not 
necessary for the agent to be an adult, he should only not be a mad person".
12
 In the same 
vein, Abu zhrh also states: "It is not an issue whether or not the agent is an adult, the only 
condition for the agent is to be wise".
13
 In the opinion of the Hanafis, the task of the 
agent is only to represent what the principal wants and the sound-minded individuals are 
able to do.
14
  
 
Al-Hmad
15
 argues that the position taken by the majority of Muslim jurists is not to 
allow sound-minded individuals to be principals or agents. This is a more secure outlook 
as it can save sound-minded individuals from damaging their interests.
16
 In KSA, the 
practice in courts and Ministry of Justice follows this position where sound-minded 
individuals are not allowed to be principals nor agents. The principal and the agent must 
both be wise and of adult age in the KSA. Thus, if acts are made by minors (infants or 
sound minded individuals) they will be deemed invalid, even though the person, on 
whose behalf the agent works for, chose to ratify them later.
17
 
  
To establish an agency relationship, the majority of Muslim jurists agree that the 
principal and the agent must also meet the condition of formula or “Alcuygh”. The 
condition of this formula seeks to give an indication to a communication of an offer and 
an acceptance between the principal and the agent which indicates the consent of the 
                                                 
11
 This position is similar to the one adopted under common law. See our discussion under 3.3.      
Principles of Agency Law.  
12
 Alkafyf, A. (n.d)  AhkAm Alma'amlat Alshra'yh. Cairo: Dar Alfkr Ala'rby, p.344 (In Arabic). 
13
 Abu zhrh, M. (1999) Almlkyh wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, p. 328 (In Arabic). 
14
 Alseeyti, J. A. (2001) Alashbah wa alnthaer fy qoaed Alfgh Alshafi'ih. Beirut: Dar Alkotop Alelmiah, p. 
318 (In Arabic). 
15
 Al-Hmad is a Saudi judge.  
16
 Al-Hamad, H. (2007) Agd Alwkalh fy Alfgh AlA'slamy wttbygath fy ktabat Ala'dl balmmlkh Ala'rbyh 
Alsa'wdyh, Mjlh Ala'dl, 7(23), p. 143 (In Arabic). 
17
 Ibid. 
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parties to enter into an agency relationship.
18
 The rule of the formula is not exceptional 
to Islamic law as the same requirement was also found under common law in which the 
agency relationship arises when one person (a „principal‟) manifests assent to another 
person (an „agent‟) that the agent shall act on the principal‟s behalf and the agent 
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.
19
  
 
This is not to state that the above type of agency i.e., agreement between the 
principal and the agent, is the only available way under Islamic law in which the agency 
relationship arises. This is similar to common law, where an agency relationship under 
Islamic law needs not to be contractual. That is to say, agency can be concluded in any 
available manner, as long as the manner used demonstrates the parties' mutual consent 
to have an agency relationship.
20
 For example, it is possible for an agent to bind a 
principal as a third party even though the principal did not make an offer to the agent 
and only showed willingness to be bound.
21
 Agency relationship can also still be created 
under Islamic law if an offer is made by the principal followed by the agent acting on 
the principal's behalf without either accepting or rejecting the offer.
22
  
 
Similar to common law, Muslim jurists have also discussed the possibility of the 
agent binding the principal as a third party even though there are no wilful signs or 
requests from the latter to the agent to do so. Agents, under Islamic law, are called fz'wl. 
In this context, agency relationship is not established by the previous consent of parties, 
but rather by subsequent consent. In other words, an act is completed by an officious 
agent in the name or on behalf of a person without the latter‟s authority at all. The 
person whose name or on whose behalf the act is carried out for, ratifies the act later and 
                                                 
18
 This shows that the agency relationship is not an exception. To form it, it demands consent of 
contracting parties.  
19
 See section. 4.3. Principles of Agency Law.   
20
 Al-Hamad, H. (2007) Agd Alwkalh fy Alfgh AlA'slamy wttbygath fy ktabat Ala'dl balmmlkh Ala'rbyh 
Alsa'wdyh, Mjlh Ala'dl, 7(23), p. 143 (In Arabic). 
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Ibid. 
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makes it as valid and effectual as if it had been originally carried out by an authority. 
This type of agency locates its roots in the Hadeeth of the Prophet Mohammed. Urwah 
ibn Abulja'd al-Bariqi narrated that Prophet Mohammed gave one of his companions a 
dinar
23
 to buy a sacrificial animal or a sheep. The companion bought two sheep, sold 
one of them for a dinar, and brought him a sheep and the remaining dinar. Muslim 
jurists state that the companion was an officious agent when he bought two sheep and 
sold one. Nevertheless, Prophet Mohammed invoked blessing on him in his business 
dealing.
24
  
 
In the next section, I discuss whether Islamic principles of agency law allow 
electronic agents to be agents so that they can have an agency relationship to bind the 
operators. I discuss this issue, its challenges, and more importantly how those 
challenges are confronted using Islamic available methods of interpretation that were 
outlined in the previous chapter.
25
 The importance of addressing this issue is the 
reference it establishes in the ETR 2007 [SA], which states that: 
It is allowed for a contract to be created through automated computer 
systems or directly between two automated computer systems-or more-
which are already programmed beforehand to perform tasks. These 
automated computer systems represent contracting parties and the 
contracts formed thereby are correct, valid, and create their legal effects, 
although there is no direct intervention from any natural person in the 
contract formation process.
26
 
 
  
This section states the fact that that automated computer systems represent 
contracting parties. As I see it, the word represent used here refers to the legal status of 
                                                 
23
 Dinar was the money used for buying and selling at that time and it is still the name of the official 
currency in several Islamic countries today. 
24
 This Hadeeth was narrated by Alhakm.  
25
 This includes those sources which have been discussed in the previous chapter, mainly to use human 
reasoning when the divine sources are silent or human reasoning is used without evidence from the divine 
sources as human reasoning in this instance is not binding. As discussed above, in such circumstances, I 
can agree/disagree and create different human reasoning.   
26
 S. 11(1). See appendix I.  
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automated computer systems
27
 when they conclude transactions for their operators. The 
concept of representation can be taken as a significant indication that Saudi policy 
makers view the work that this computer software carries out as similar to the work of 
ordinary agents. This suggests that the relationship between this computer software and 
the operators is that of an agency relationship. As such, an interesting question that 
emerges is whether this attribution is applicable under Islamic law or not. Since the Saudi 
regime depends totally on Islamic law as the only source of its law, it is important to 
examine whether Islamic law would allow electronic agents to be agents so that the 
rational underpinnings of the ETR 2007 [SA] can be grounded within its legal system.  
 
7.2.2 Application of Principles of Agency to Automated Contracts  
 
The proposition of treating electronic agents as agents can be very challenging since, 
as indicated above, there is intense debate between Muslim jurists over the capacity of 
agents. The majority of Muslim jurists place a lot of stress on the capacity of agents to 
the extent that they are of the opinion that sound-minded individuals are not competent to 
act as agents under Islamic law. By contrast, the principles of agency under common law 
state that agents must only have a minimum capacity. That is to say, the right of being an 
agent is open to all persons with sound mind. This includes infants and other persons 
with limited or no capacity to contract on their own behalf and are competent to act and 
contract as agents under common law.
28
 
 
                                                 
27
 This is another term used to refer to electronic agents. It must be noted here that there are also many 
other names that can be used to refer to the agent technology. For instance, “software agents”, “software 
robots”, “softbots”… etc. See, Jennings, N. & Wooldridge, M. (1998). Applications of Intelligent Agents, 
Heidelberg, Germany p. 56. (Online) Available at: 
 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/3/sichman.html [Accessed 07/Feb/2008].  
28
 In common law as we have seen, minor may act as an agent, even to bind a principal when the minor 
would lack capacity to bind him or herself to the same transaction. Children for example under common 
law, who cannot contract for themselves, can contract on behalf of principals. See section. 4.3. Principles 
of Agency Law.   
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It seems that Islamic law considers the work of agents as significant to the extent that 
it is not open to sound minds. This sensitive proposition, regarding the capacity of agents 
and the work agents do on behalf of the principal, can indicate the difficulty in accepting 
electronic agents as agents under Islamic law. There is no doubt that the enterprise of 
granting electronic agents agency under Islamic law is very complex indeed. This is 
because if sound minds, let alone infants, are prohibited to act as agents under Islamic 
law, we must ask the question, Will Muslim jurists treat computer programs as agents? 
Thus, the first and the most difficult issue that emerges in this discussion is that while 
Islamic law requires agents to be wise and be an adult, electronic agents lack this 
capability.  
 
7.2.2.1. Lack of Capacity of Electronic Agents 
 
The position of Islamic law is clear in which agents need to possess these traits to 
constitute the capacity of the agents to act on behalf of the principals. Alalayli
29
 in an 
interview, argued that at the time of the Prophet Mohammed only wise and adult were 
considered capable to play the role of agent. Infants and sound minds are prohibited to 
act as agents only because Muslim jurists believe that they lack the competence to 
perform actions for others and therefore are banned from being agents. Likewise, one that 
lacks sound judgment is prohibited to act as an agent because logically, he would not be 
able to perform functions for others. In other words, he is of the opinion that it is not an 
objective of Islamic law that agents must necessarily be wise and of adult age. These 
conditions were set out by traditional Islamic jurists only to ensure the agents' ability to 
                                                 
29
 An interview carried out in Aug-2008, King Saud University, Riyadh-Saudi Arabia. Alalayli is a 
professor at the King Saud University, Riyadh-Saudi Arabia. I deliberately interviewed Alalayli because 
he is aware of both western and Islamic laws and this makes him exceptional in the KSA. Al- Alalayli 
holds a PhD from a France university and this makes him aware of positive laws in particular and western 
laws in general. Alalayli also holds high diploma degree in Islamic law from the University of Al'azhr 
Alshryf, Cairo, the most famous Islamic university in the world. His father was appointed a decade ago as 
a scholar of Lebanon (mfty) and this has helped him significantly to understand and to improve his 
knowledge of Islamic law. So, I believe that speaking to Alalayli on such novel issue i.e., whether 
electronic agents can be agents, would make a considerable contribution to my thesis.   
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carry out their duties. So, if it is evident now that electronic agents are sophisticated 
enough to work as agents and have the ability to act on behalf of someone else, then this 
computer software need not, in order to act as an agent, be wise and adult as it is 
understood in the traditional sense.
30
 In the same vein, Shryfat states that: 
The main role of electronic agents on the Internet is not merely to 
transfer and deliver the words or intention from one person to another. It 
is a fact now that these automated agents can act independently to create 
contracts on behalf of the operators. They do not only deliver what would 
have been told by the operators, rather they use their own characteristics 
such as autonomy to complete transactions. This way of operating makes 
it pointless to ask for electronic agents to be wise and adult in order to be 
treated agents as what electronic agents can do now for their operators is 
sometimes better than what a wise and adult' person can do for his 
principal.
31
 
 
 
In addition, the conditions for agents to be wise and of adult age are not mentioned in 
the Qur'an nor narrated in the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed. Rather, they are only 
the requirements of traditional Muslim jurists and are not based on any divine statement. 
That is to say, these requirements were not reached through consulting divine sources. 
Accordingly, these conditions can be suggested to be dispensed. The previous chapter 
highlighted how human reasoning is accepted in Islamic law when the divine sources are 
silent, however such instances are conditional on not contradicting the principles and 
morals of Islam.
32
 The acceptance of electronic agents would not in principle contradict 
the spirit of Islamic law or any of its general principles so long as electronic agents are 
competent enough to act for their operators. 
   
Nevertheless, the humanity of agents seems to be another obstacle. It is a 
fundamental principle in Islamic law that the capacity to act is exclusive only to human 
beings.
33
 Because Islamic law is essentially a religious law, capacity to act has been 
                                                 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Shryfat, M. (2006)  Al-t'aqed abra Internet, Beirut: Dar a'hya' Altrath Alarby, p. 65 (In Arabic).   
32
 See section 5.3.3 Human Reasoning. 
33
 In the next section when discussing the possibility to grant electronic agent legal personality, I will 
clarify more the concept of capacity under Islamic law prospective. 
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conferred only to humans, who in the Islamic belief, is a creation with has a mission; as 
a vicegerents on earth. As such, capacity to act under Islamic law is ethical in essence 
and cannot easily be conferred to non human beings. Thus, no matter how great and 
sophisticated electronic agents are, they remain at the end a mere computer program. In 
other words, since electronic agents are not human beings, they cannot therefore under 
Islamic law have the capacity of agents. 
  
In addition, the work of agents requires them to be honest and loyal. The Qur'an 
states in the context of the story of Joseph when he said: "Set me over the store-houses 
of the land: I will indeed guard them, as one that knows (their importance)."
34
 Muslim 
interpreters suggest that Joseph was, over the store-houses of the land, an agent on 
behalf of the King and he suggested himself because he was loyal and honest.
35
 The 
loyalty of agents requires them to act reasonably and to refrain from conduct that is 
likely to damage the principal‟s enterprise. Moreover, an agent has a duty to take action 
only within the scope of the agent‟s authority. An agent also needs to comply with all 
lawful instructions received from the principal and persons designated by the principal 
concerning the agent‟s actions.36 Islamic law views these qualities as ones that both 
humans and electronic agents cannot accordingly own.
37
  
 
Although this argument is reasonable, nevertheless, it can be countered by the fact 
that minors are also humans who are not permitted to act as agents under Islamic law.
38
 
As already shown, minors have been banned by Muslim jurists as lacking competence 
                                                 
34
 See the Holy Qur'an, (Yusuf Ali translation), American Trust Publication, 1977, Surah 12. Yusuf 
(Joseph). (Online) Available at: 
 http://www.harunyahya.com/Quran_translation/Quran_translation_index.php [Accessed 01/Feb/2009]. 
35
 Altbry, (2003) Jama' Albyan fy tfsyr Algran. Beirut: Dar Alktb Ala'lmya, p. 381 (In Arabic). 
36
 These duties are fundamental in agency laws. See, Alzhiliy, W.(2000)  Alfkr Al-a'slamy w'adlth. 4
th 
ed, 
Vol. 4. Cairo: Dar Alfkr Almoacur, p. 256 (In Arabic).   
37
 Unlike positive law, in Islamic law, there are no debates recorded about the statement that concepts 
such as loyalty are not inclusively conferred to human beings. For example, under positive law, it has 
been suggested that animals such as dolphins and dogs possess the character of loyalty. To view those 
debates, see Bates, J. (1994) The Role of emotion in believable agents, Communications of the ACM, 
37(7), pp. 122-125. I also found such arguments on the Internet by groups of animal rights.  
38
 See Section 7.2.1.1 Creation of Agency Relationship. 
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as agents. By contrast, because wise and adult persons are in principle able to execute 
functions on behalf of others, they are allowed to be agents.
39
 So, the point of agency 
can arguably be said to revolve around the capacity and efficiency of agents to perform 
functions assigned by principals much more than the agents as being human beings.  
 
Nevertheless, by following this interpretation and treating electronic agents as agents 
under Islamic law (despite their inanimate character), there is still no guarantee that 
Islamic principles of agency law would not pose other barriers to the proposal. Under 
common law, it has been seen that there are a number of agency principles that 
electronic agents find difficult to fulfil and for them to be granted the agency role. For 
example, according to the notion of common law, agents become liable in a number of 
disputes, mainly when they exceed the principals' mandates. Electronic agents, by 
contrast, obviously cannot be held liable when they exceed their operators' mandates.
40
 
Furthermore, there were dilemmas associated with the type of authority that electronic 
agents have to have to bind the operators; is it actual, apparent, or ratification authority. 
Under each one of these authorities, a set of requirements need to be satisfied before the 
agents can be granted. Electronic agents are faced with a major challenge in meeting 
those requirements as it was necessary for the issue to be resolved, or they will not be 
granted.
41
 
  
Islamic agency law can also pose similar challenges. Principles of Islamic agency 
law also provide that agents would be held responsible in a number of disputes, whereas 
electronic agents, as stated, cannot be held liable. For example, an agent may be held 
liable to a third party if at the time of contracting, the agent did not disclose the identity 
of the principal. The law of Islamic agency will make both the agent and the principal 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 See Section 4.3.1.  Application the Principles of Agency on Automated Contracts.  
41
 Ibid.  
Ch: 7 Islamic Agency Theory 
 
143 
 
liable even though the actions made by the agent were authorized by the principal.
42
 In 
the same way as common law, Islamic law holds agents liable when they exceed the 
principal's structures.
43
 Muslim jurists highlight that agents must comply strictly with 
the principal's instructions. The agent is usually given certain instructions in which he 
must act accordingly. In case the agent does not act according to these mandates (i.e. 
their actions exceed the authority), the principal will not be held liable for these actions. 
Rather, it is the agent who will in such cases, be held liable.
44
 This appears today a 
fundamental principle under agency laws. 
  
Another challenge that can be posed by Islamic agency law, as noted previously, 
relates to the concept of agency relationship, defined as a consensual relationship where 
no special formality is required; only an agent and a principal consenting to their 
association with each other are needed.
45
 When the agent consents to act on behalf of 
the principal, the agent then has the authority to bind the principal.
46
 The same argument 
discussed under common law could also be raised here.
47
 That is to say, even electronic 
agents are deemed competent to act as agents, however, because they lack legal 
capacity, they would be challenged on how to consent – a requirement set out as 
necessary for forming an agency relationship with the principal.  
 
There are further issues surrounding the proposal of granting electronic agents the 
agency role. What is the type of agency that would bind electronic agents to the 
operators: is it specific or general agency? General agency theory grants the agent 
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authority to bind the principal on general matters as opposed to specific ones. For 
example, the principal asks the agent to act whenever the agent thinks it will benefit the 
principal.
48
 If the principal restricts the agent to only specific acts such as buying a 
certain item, then this is what is called specific agency.
49
 If electronic agents complete 
transactions on the Internet on behalf of the operators and without the latter's 
knowledge, this is not considered to be specific agency but rather general agency. While 
all the Islamic schools allow principals to grant specific agency to their agents, I found 
that Muslim jurists tend to disagree on whether general agency should be allowed under 
Islamic law. On the one hand, the Shafis and the Hanbalis suggest that general agency 
cannot be permitted because this type of authority could be dangerous to the interest of 
principals.
50
 That is to say, the principal must mention clearly to the agent the matters 
required to be achieved on his behalf. Following this position, operators also need to 
name their electronic agents at every transaction they require to complete. On the other 
hand, the Hanafis say that general agency should be allowed to be granted to agents 
because a person can have massive business deals with multiple tasks to be achieved. It 
sounds unreasonable to ask the person to appoint an agent each time he wants these 
tasks to be done.
51
 In the same vein, some other Muslim jurists suggest that agents can 
possibly be granted general agency however, the agents are not permitted to act on 
personal matters of the principals such as divorce and marriage. Such matters are 
important and therefore require a particular delegation from the principal.
52
 The practice 
in the KSA is that general agency is permissible and a business owner can authorise a 
person such as the executive manager to act in the interest of the business.
53
 This means 
                                                 
48
 Al-Hamad, H. (2007) Agd Alwkalh fy Alfgh AlA'slamy wttbygath fy ktabat Ala'dl balmmlkh Ala'rbyh 
Alsa'wdyh, Mjlh Ala'dl, 7(23), pp. 148-149 (In Arabic). 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Ebn Qedamh, (2003) Almughni. Vol. 4 Riyadh: Dar Alshwaf, p. 205 (In Arabic). 
51
 Al-Kasani, (1910) Bdaya' Alcunaya' fy Trtyb Alshraya. Vol. 5 Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, pp. 15-27(In 
Arabic). 
52
 Al-Hamad, H. (2007) Agd Alwkalh fy Alfgh AlA'slamy wttbygath fy ktabat Ala'dl balmmlkh Ala'rbyh 
Alsa'wdyh, Mjlh Ala'dl, 7(23), pp. 148-149 (In Arabic). 
53
 Ibid.  
Ch: 7 Islamic Agency Theory 
 
145 
 
that if electronic agents are treated under Islamic law as agents, they can enjoy general 
agency to bind their operators on the Internet and it would not be necessary to ask the 
operator to authorise every transaction made by the electronic agent.  
  
Commenting on the issue above i.e. challenges to Islamic agency law, Alalayli 
suggests that electronic agents can be conceptualised agents as an exception to the 
general rule under Islamic law which requires agents to be wise and adult.
54
 This 
consequently requires that any rule or principle created for agents should not 
exceptionally be applied to electronic agents that would hold electronic agents liable.
55
 
There is a fundamental requirement under Islamic law to make exceptions to general 
rules. One of the main roles human reasoning plays in Islamic law is in making 
exceptions to rules mentioned in the Qur'an, Sunnah, or edicts promulgated by 
traditional Muslim jurists. Making exceptions in such ways are only applicable in the 
existence of public interest, where there is damage to be eliminated, or to permit 
unlawfulness because it is necessary to the public.
56
 In both the ancient and modern 
history of Islam, a number of exceptions have been made to conclusive divine 
statements. For instance, the Qur'an states: 
Verily the Sadaqat (charity) are (only) for the poor, needy, those 
employed on it, those whose hearts are to be reconciled, slaves, debtors, 
those in the way of Allah and the wayfarers.57 
 
This statement has restricted the recipients of charity, or "zakah" to eight categories. 
One of the groups mentioned is those whose hearts are to be reconciled, called in Arabic 
"Al-muallafatu qulubuhum". They include certain types of leaders, chiefs, influential 
people or heroes whose beliefs are not yet settled. Islam sees it fit to give them from the 
zakah as reconciliation for their hearts, settling their beliefs, utilising them for the benefit 
of Islam and Muslims and to influence their communities. These individuals used to 
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come to the prophet of Islam and the president after him (Alkhlyfh 'Abw bkr Alcudyg) 
and take their share from the zakah.  When the presidency came to Omr Abn Alkhtab, 
such people arrived to take their share of charity. Alkhlyfh Omr Abn Alkhtab prevented 
them from their share and stated that:" no need of you, God (Allah) has strengthened us 
by Islam".
58
  
 
Muslim jurists state that Omr Abn Alkhtab made an exception here to a general rule 
indicated clearly in the Qur'an in which charity should be given to eight categories 
including Al-muallafatu qulubuhum. Because Omr Abn Alkhtab at that time felt Muslims 
are strong enough and therefore do not need to reconcile types of leaders, chiefs, 
influential people or heroes, he made an exception to give charity only to seven instead 
of eight categories.  Muslim jurists also, as discussed in the previous section,
59
 made an 
exception to the general rule which provides that the subject matter of contract must exist 
at the time of contracting. Muslim jurists permitted two contracts, Slm and Alastcunaa' 
exceptionally on the ground that these two contracts were necessary at that time to the 
needs of public.
60
  
 
It is interesting to note that this perspective i.e. making exceptions to some agency 
principles corresponds to common law. Authors writing about common law have called 
for exceptions to agency principles and suggested that the aspect of the capacity concept 
relating to the liability of the agent should not be applied to electronic agents.
61
 However, 
if electronic agents possess rights similar to those given to a human person or a legal 
entity, these exceptions to agency law would not then be necessary. This is because by 
granting electronic agents legal personality, electronic agents will be capable of agency 
with the ability to enter into contracts, acquire rights and duties on behalf of others and 
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carry out liability that would result from their actions. Therefore, in the next section, I 
shall discuss this challenge to Islamic law i.e. whether Islamic law can grant electronic 
agents legal personality for the aim of easing the proposal of attributing agency to 
electronic agents.   
7.3 Electronic Agents and Legal Personality 
7.3.1 The Concept of Legal Personality under Islamic Law 
 
The concept of legal personality under Islamic law does not exist in traditional Islamic 
texts.
62
 Instead, classical Muslim jurists adopt a term called dhimmah. Dhimmah has 
different meanings under Islamic law.
63
 In this context, dhimmah refers to the capacity 
(Ahliyyat) for acquiring rights and obligations. The term ahliyyay in Arabic means ability 
or capacity, and is used technically to refer to the capacity for acquiring rights and 
duties.
64
 The definition of dhimmah is debatable among Muslim jurists. Algrafy defines 
the term in question as: "…juristic (shra'y) meaning presumed in an adult allows obliging 
and being obliged as well".
65
 According to Algrafy, dhimmah requires the person to be 
wise and adult before he can have dhimmah.  So, whoever grows up to be unwise, he 
does not have dhimmah.
66
 In a similar definition, Taj Aldyn Alsbky states: 
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Our scholars state that dhimmah is presumed meaning in an adult allows 
him to oblige as well as being obliged and this meaning should make it 
clear that a human being who is not wise and adult does not have 
dhimmah.
67
 
 
Unlike the above definitions, Aljrjany defines dhimmah "as a description which 
enables any human being to oblige and be obliged". He asserts that "unlike animals, 
every human being is born with dhimmah to oblige and be obliged".
68
 Alzraga defines 
dhimmah as a repository, that is, "as a juristic container presumed in a person in order to 
encompass all its debts and obligations that are related to it".
69
 Abu zhrh states that 
dhimmah: "is a matter presumed to be a place for rights and duties".
70
 One of the 
interpretations of the Journal of Juristic Rules (Mjlt Al'Ahkam Ala'dly)
71
 states: "dhimmah 
is the soul of the person". The author goes on to write: "this is how article 612 of the 
Journal of Juristic Rules defines dhimmah, it is a description which grants any human 
being a capacity to own his money and carries out whatever obligation on that money".
72
 
Khlaf argues: "dhimmah is a human inherent description that enables human beings for 
rights before others and bears duties for others." 
73 In the same vein, Alsnhwry states that 
dhimmah is a "juristic (shra'y) description that is presumed by the legislator to exist in a 
human being and according with which [the person] becomes able to oblige and be 
obliged".
74
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On the one hand, the difference in the above definitions is largely formal. Dhimmah as 
seen, is described by Muslim jurists sometimes as a juristic description, presumed matter, 
inherent description, or presumed meaning, but they all agree that dhimmah is a place for 
acquisition rights and duties. However, on the other hand, Muslim jurists disagree in 
these definitions about whether only adults can have dhimmah and whether dhimmah is 
inherent or innate in humans. The majority of Muslim jurists (Aljmhwr) holds the 
position that dhimmah is attributed to every human being when born. Nevertheless, 
Aljmhwr differs between two capabilities or ahliyyat of dhimmah: capacity to acquire 
rights and bear obligations (ahliyyat al-wujub) and capacity of performance (ahliyyat al-
ada). On the one hand, ahliyyat al-wujub is defined by Muslim jurists as a condition that 
is required for the acquisition of individual rights or duties. On the other hand, ahliyyat 
al-ada refers to the ability for executing or exercising rights and duties.
75
 Although these 
concepts are equally important elements of dhimmah, it is the first concept, ahliyyat al-
wujub, which is the core issue of dhimmah. Ahliyyat al-wujub corresponds to the living 
status of human beings and it, therefore, exists ipso facto and ab initio to every living 
human being. Dhimmah can exist without ahliyyat al-ada but can under no 
circumstances exist without ahliyyat al-wujub. The concept of dhimmah is said to 
necessarily coexist with the concept of ahliyyat al-wujub.
76
 Therefore, ahliyyat al-ada 
has nothing to do with the acquisition of rights and duties. One may completely lack 
ahliyyat al-ada and still be able to gain rights and assume duties (ahliyyat al-wujub). 
Exercising rights and duties in such an instance only becomes available if performed 
through the guardian or the testamentary guardian of that individual. Full capacity for 
executing is assigned to those who reach the age of maturity or discretion unaffected by 
any deficiency hindering them from being fully mentally developed. Imperfect or 
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deficient capacity, on the other hand, is assigned to those processing some discretion 
such as children at the age less than seven or the insane.
77
 
 
As such, numerous Muslim scholars argue that ahliyyat al-wujub holds similar 
definition with dhimmah as they both have been granted to every human being and 
defined by dint of the way a human being becomes capable of acquiring rights. Algrafy 
for example states: "indeed, dhimmah among Muslim jurists was a difficult term to be 
defined where mostly believe that dhimmah is ahliyyat al-wujub".
78
 Alkht'ry bk also 
asserts that:"ahliyyat al-wujub depends on dhimmah which is a juristic description 
enables a human being to oblige and be obliged".
79
 Alsnhwry argues that clearly there is 
a similarity between the concepts of, ahliyyat al-wujub and dhimmah. Alsnhwry states:  
As ahliyyat al-wujub is defined as the capacity of human beings for 
acquiring rights and duties, the relationship between dhimmah and 
ahliyyat al-wujub becomes serious. Dhimmah is the capacity of a human 
being to have rights and duties and ahliyyat al-wujub is this capacity. 
Dhimmah is associated with human beings, a human being is born with 
separate dhimmah and accordingly is granted ahliyyat al-wujub. Ahliyyat 
al-wujub hence is based upon the existence of dhimmah.
80
 
 
In the same vein, Khlaf states ahliyyat al-wujub is:  
The capacity for a human being for having rights and duties and it is 
significant because it differs human beings from all kind of animals to 
make them able to have rights and duties and this is what is called 
(dhimmah)...this capacity e.g., ahliyyat al-wujub is proved for every 
human described as a human being whether male, female, whether 
foetus, child or adult, wise or unwise, mad or sick, dhimmah is totally 
based on inherent description of humans.
81
 
 
The authors of the above statements have found that there is no distinction between 
dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub. Both dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub are bestowed on 
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every human being so that no human being lacks these capacities.
82
 Nevertheless, other 
Muslim scholars argue that ahliyyat al-wujub is distinct from dhimmah. Algrafy, for 
example, argues that the distinction lies in the fact that ahliyyat al-wujub is a condition 
required for the acquisition of individual rights or duties.
83
 It often varies in accordance 
with the rights and duties concerned. Dhimmah, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for 
having any right or duty. To put it another way, dhimmah is a condition in the entity to 
which the right or duty is being attributed, that is, meeting the conditions for acquisition 
of a particular right or duty. Within this, we could have equal subjects with different 
abilities for acquisition or ahliyyat al-wujub. More specifically, Algrafy states: 
When state that someone has a dhimmah, this means he has the capacity 
to be dealt with and this makes the two concepts, dhimmah and ahliyyat 
al-wujub different...these two concepts do not depend on each other. An 
act can legally be recognized without dhimmah such as a sound mind 
who has a capacity to act despite he lacks dhimmah, this is according to 
most opinions of Muslim jurists.
84
 Vice versa is true. Dhimmah can exist 
without capacity such as slaves who are interdicted for their master 
rights. Dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub can exist together only in the 
free, adult, wise person.
85
 
   
In light of this statement, the difference between dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub lies 
in the mandate‟s condition. While dhimmah requires the person to be adult and wise, 
ahliyyat al-wujub does not as such capability is acquired automatically by every human 
being at birth.
86
 As shown in the above discussion, the opinion of Algrafy in which 
dhimmah is attributed only to adults is debatable since many Muslim jurists have 
disagreed with his notion and established that every human is born with separate 
dhimmah.
87
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7.3.1.1 Concept of Dhimmah 
 
Most importantly, Muslim jurists while defining dhimmah, discuss that the concept of 
dhimmah under Islamic law embraces all rights and obligations, whether they are 
religious or financial. Alzarqa states that: “the concept of dhimmah represents that aspect 
of legal personality which is supposed to contain an account of the entire person's rights 
and obligations whether they are religious or financial in nature".
88
 Alftlawy also finds 
the doctrine of dhimmah which means: “a presumed or imaginary repository that contains 
all the rights and obligations relating to a person here and hereafter.”89 Echoing this, 
Alsnhwry states: 
...[D]himmah does not only depend on the capacity of human beings to 
acquire financial rights. Rather, it is a description that allows all rights 
and duties whether non financial such as prayer or even financial rights of 
religious nature such as donation (zakat). The concept of dhimmah 
therefore is wider under Islamic law.
90
  
 
The attribution of religious rights and obligations to the concept of dhimmah comes 
from the relationship that Muslim jurists espy between dhimmah and vicegerency. In 
Muslims' believe, human beings have been created to be God's vicegerents on earth. The 
objective of this vicegerency is to bring the ethical imperatives constituting the ethical 
arm of the divine will into actuality. The main explicator of these imperatives is divine 
sources whose message is to bring ethics or moral standards to their completion. As such, 
the imperatives detailed in divine sources are ethical in essence, though they might be 
clothed in legal forms and enactments; the latter are used as means to the former. In this 
way, the nature of dhimmah is determined. It has been conferred on human beings to 
enable them to assume and bear their mission as vicegerents. As such, it is a capacity for 
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acquiring rights and obligations that are ethical in essence and this makes the concept of 
dhimmah under Islamic law to be based on moral personality.
91
 This should come as no 
surprised because Islamic law has the nature of a multidimensional system wherein the 
law is based on ethics, it is reasonable for the concept of dhimmah, as the capacity of 
acquisition in this system, to have this nature too. This result is particularly important 
with regard to the present discussion i.e., the possibility to attribute legal personality to 
none human beings such as electronic agents. 
 
Some commentators therefore argue that dhimmah has no association with the concept 
of legal personality as it stands in law.
 
In their perspective, dhimmah contains religious 
rights and obligations and it is therefore implausible to distinguish between legal 
personality and dhimmah.
92
  According to these commentators, two differences make 
these concepts non-identical to each other. The first difference concerns their source: 
while the giver of dhimmah is God, it is the state that assigns legal personality.
93
 On the 
one hand, it is true that that the definition of legal personality, as discussed previously, is 
secular in which it is used as a mere device and makes it possible for policymakers to 
vary in its granting or withdrawing from a particular entity. In other words, legal 
personality is used as a mere device to make it possible for policymakers to either grant 
or withdraw from a particular entity.
94
 On the other hand, one could argue that legal 
personality is a quality inherited in humans and to claim it as assigned by the state 
dismisses this fact. The lawmaker or the state does no more than recognize what already 
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exists in humans. The real assigner therefore, cannot be the state; it is either God or 
Nature, according to one's belief.  
 
The second difference concerns their ability to encompass rights and duties: while 
dhimmah expands to embrace matters related to the hereafter, legal personality is limited 
to those connected to this world.
95
 This claims that dhimmah is wider than legal 
personality, the capacity for acquisition in Islamic law, the trans-ethical, religious, and 
legal system makes it true. It is true that dhimmah embraces rights and obligations related 
to this world and hereafter, rights and obligations of different nature, i.e., ethical, 
religious, and legal. Therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that the term dhimmah 
instead of legal personality should be used to refer to one's ability to have rights and 
duties in Islamic law. Associating the term "legal personality" under Islamic law instead 
of dhimmah can inaccurately give the impression that only "legal" rights and duties can 
be gained through this ability. Furthermore, this objection can still hold true, in my 
opinion, even if dhimmah is similar to "legal personality" understood as an ability to have 
"legal" rights and duties, since legal enactments and procedures are used in Islamic law 
as a means to actualize imperatives of an ethical nature. That is to say, legal rights and 
duties here are no more than ethical ones' clothed in legal wording. 
 
Therefore, in the rest of the thesis, the term dhimmah, instead of legal personality, will 
be used to refer to one's ability to have rights and duties in Islamic law. The second 
reason for the preference given to the term dhimmah, when talking about the capacity for 
acquiring rights in Islamic law, is that, unlike the term legal personality, dhimmah evokes 
the concept's special origin. In other words, when the term dhimmah is utilized, it evoked 
the idea of being endowed by God, and so it seems more appropriate to use it when 
talking about the capacity for acquiring rights in Islamic law, the way ordinate by God. 
                                                 
95
 Alzhiliy, W.(1997) Alfkr Al-a'slamy w'adlth, 4
th
 ed. Vol. 4.  Damascus: Dar al-Fkr. p. 2961 (In Arabic). 
Ch: 7 Islamic Agency Theory 
 
155 
 
7.3.2 Application of the Concept of Dhimmah to Electronic Agents 
 
In the previous discussion, I have clarified that the concept of dhimmah under Islamic 
law embraces rights and obligation related to this world and hereafter (religious and 
financial). This meaning, as I see it, makes dhimmah a religious rather than a legal 
concept. This result is important to the present discussion. If dhimmah is a religious 
concept developed to signify an aspect that characterizes religious rights and obligations, 
which means dhimmah under Islamic law is based on a non legal factor, i.e. humanity or 
the quality of being human, considering that religious rights and obligations can be 
gained only by human beings. By contrast, the concept of legal personality under secular 
laws associates only with the financial rights and obligations of a person. This makes the 
concept of legal personality purely a legal matter in the hands of policymakers to either 
grant or withdraw it from a particular entity and being human is not seen as a condition 
in order to be recognised a legal person.
96
 
 
Thus, by stating humanity is an essential condition for the attribution of dhimmah, this 
makes it an unavailable option to attribute dhimmah to non human beings such as 
electronic agents. This is clearly expressed by some Muslim jurists. For example, the 
Hanafis suggest that dhimmah cannot be attributed to non human beings such as 
endowment (waqf)
97
, public treasury (bait al-mal), hospitals, mosques...etc.
 
 Alkhfyf 
states: "there is no such clear statement of Muslim jurists which indicates that such 
entities have the capacity of dhimmah".
98
 In the same vein, Regaah argues that 
companies under Islamic law are not recognized dhimmah and this is one of most 
important distinctions between dhimmah and legal personality under positive laws. In his 
words, the author states: 
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Islamic law does not recognize dhimmah to companies separated of their 
members. This is because Islamic law attempts only to regulate the 
relationship between people each other and what helps people to worship 
their God (Allah).
99
 
 
 Therefore, the main focus of Islamic law is in human beings, granting them dhimmah 
to help them to comply with their duties here and hereafter. Whilst defining dhimmah as 
including religious‟ rights and duties, it is easy to understand that dhimmah is not a 
concept created to be attributed to companies or entities, otherwise, it would perfectly be 
followed to ask companies and entities to perform religious duties. Dhimmah under 
Islamic law therefore exists only for human beings.
100
 
 
However, some modern jurists, by contrast, argue that in the early days of Islam, the 
waqf was permitted to be a contracting party, is obtained rights and is obliged by 
liabilities and obligations.
101
 According to these commentators, this should be taken as 
evidence that non human beings can be granted dhimmah. For example, it is articulated 
in traditional Islamic texts that if the administrator
102
 of the waqf, before being dismissed, 
bought something for the endowment and did not pay the price, the next administrator of 
the waqf had to pay the amount to the seller. Furthermore, according to these modern 
jurists, it is a fundamental rule that the tenancy contract is terminated once the tenant or 
the landlord is dead. By contrast, in traditional Islamic texts, it is found that in the 
tenancy contract the administrator of the waqf made (such as renting a plot of land for the 
benefit of the waqf) is not terminated even when the administrator has died. In the same 
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Regaah, A. (2005) Almdkhl ldrast Ganwn Alshrkat. 2th ed sudan: Regaah, p. 165.  
101
 See for example, Abu Zahra, M. (1999) Almlkyh wnt'ryh Alogwd. Cairo: Dar Alma'rfh, p. 264 (In 
Arabic); Alkafyf, A. (n.d) AhkAm Alma'amlat Alshra'yh. Cairo: Dar Alfkr Ala'rby, pp. 236-237 (In 
Arabic). In English see these discussions in Zahraa, M. (1995) Legal Personality in Islamic Law, Arab 
Law Quarterly, 10(3), pp. 205-206; Lerrick, A. & Main, Q. J., (1982) Saudi Business and Labour Law: its 
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vein, when attempting to separate rights and liabilities between non human beings, 
traditional Muslim jurists provided that if an administrator of a mosque hired someone to 
refresh the carpet and then the administrator was dismissed and replaced by someone 
else, the new administrator would be obliged to pay the amount while the previous 
administrator would not be asked to pay at all.
103
  
 
According to Alsanhury and Alzraga, the administrator in the above-mentioned 
examples appears as a mere guardian.
104
 None of the transactions carried out by the 
administrator on behalf of the waqf or mosque, involved the administrator's own 
dhimmah. According to these authors, as a separation of dhimmah which was made 
between these entities and the administrator, this is clear evidence that these entities were 
having separate dhimmah. Therefore, Islamic law permits dhimmah to be granted to non-
human beings.
105
 The practice in the KSA is that corporate bodies are attributed separate 
dhimmah and this is according to Saudi Arabian Company Law.
106
 
 
Even though we may agree that non human beings such as waqf were granted 
dhimmah under Islamic law, the analogy to electronic agents is inapplicable. I discussed 
earlier the concept of dhimmah and claimed it refers to two capacities: one refers to the 
capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations (ahliyyat al-wujup) and the other refers to 
the capacity of performance.
107
 Dhimmah which modern Muslim scholars attempt to 
prove to waqf and mosque refers only to ahliyyat al-wujup i.e., a capacity of these 
entities to acquire rights and bear obligations. That is to say, dhimmah given to such 
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entities does not include ahliyyat alada i.e., a capacity of performance and to conduct 
affairs.  
 
What makes this point easier to understand in a commercial legal context is when 
corporation bodies lack this capacity of performance and therefore cannot act on their 
own behalf; acts in these cases are completed through human beings (representatives, 
agents, etc) who act on behalf of these bodies (ahliyyat alada) and deliver to them later 
the legal effects (ahliyyat al-wujup).  Human beings as discussed earlier are the only 
beings who can have dual capacities; to conduct affairs by themselves and to acquire 
rights and bear obligations.
108
 What must be granted to electronic agents is not merely a 
capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations as is the case with corporation bodies. 
Rather, because electronic agents conduct affairs on their own and not via 
representatives, electronic agents should therefore also be granted the capacity of 
performance. That is to say, dhimmah that is suggested to be given to electronic agents is 
similar to that conferred to human beings and not to that conferred to non human beings. 
This makes electronic agents unable to have dhimmah under Islamic law. 
 
Some modern Muslim scholars have discussed whether animals can have dhimmah, 
similar to human beings and this could benefit the attribution of dhimmah to electronic 
agents under Islamic law. Alnjar argues that it is possible under Islamic law to attribute 
dhimmah to non human beings such as animals. In his words, Alnjar states: 
Sympathy and aid are rights narrated for animals by the Prophet 
Mohammed and these rights necessary require dhimmah for animals. 
Dhimmah for animals is granted for religious rather than for legal 
purposes.
109
  
 
 
Interestingly enough, Alnjar proceeds to argue that those who reject the idea i.e., 
attributing dhimmah to animals, the rejection is only on the real (natural) dhimmah and 
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not the juristic dhimmah as it is understandable that the former is attributed only to 
human beings.
110
 
 
In opposition to Alnjar‟s argument, Alnjyry finds that Islamic law should abstain from 
attributing dhimmah to non human beings such as animals.
111
 From his point of view, 
dhimmah that is today granted  to corporate bodies refers to a group of individuals or 
money set out for a particular continuous  purpose and dhimmah therefore allows them to 
enjoy their own rights and duties within both legal and social frameworks. Animals, by 
contrast, do not fit into such frameworks and so cannot be judged in this way.
112
 While 
this argument would seem to be flawed given that animals can also achieve a particular 
continuous  purpose, the main concern with Alnjar‟s argument is his lack of evidence for 
the distinction between the real (natural) and the juristic dhimmah. Dhimmah as defined 
above does not distinguish between two different types of dhimmah. It is granted to 
human beings in order to encompass all their debts and obligations that are related to it 
whether religious or financial.
113
 Hydr states: "dhimmah might not mean directly the 
brain of a human being, nonetheless the brain relates to it. Animals should therefore be 
excluded from having dhimmah".
114
  
 
More importantly, Alnjyry argues that rights such as sympathy and aid which have 
been recognized for animals by the prophet of Islam are not the kind of rights that require 
dhimmah. According to Alnjyry, Alnjar was wrong when he thought that sympathy for 
animals means dhimmah for them. Rights are divided into four categories. The first is 
human rights which refer to basic rights such as the right to live, to maintain dignity and 
to achieve equality to name a few. These are for any human being which enables them to 
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perform their duties in the society that they live in. The second is civil rights which are 
associated with the individual himself such as the right to think, to express ideas, to 
perform actions and hold on to a specific belief. The third is rights which regulate the 
protection of one‟s body, name, reputation and privacy. Finally, ethical rights which are 
set up religiously and legally such as the right to greet others on the street, to provide 
advices to the society, to move damages from the street, to visit penitents and to smile at 
people. Alnjyry argues that: 
All these rights are strictly related to human beings. Rights of animals 
such as sympathy and aid are ethical rights presented religiously, 
therefore, they cannot be asked by law. Such ethical rights are not 
imposed by law and any right that is not imposed by law does not need 
dhimmah to be achieved.
115
 
 
  
Furthermore, even though we may agree that animals should be granted dhimmah 
under Islamic law in order to help them to acquire rights such as aid and sympathy, the 
analogy to electronic agents is also not yet applicable. This is because dhimmah in this 
case refers only to ahliyyat al-wujup i.e., a capacity of these entities to acquire rights and 
bear obligations. It does not include ahliyyat alada i.e., a capacity of performance and to 
conduct affairs. I have already clarified that electronic agents is not merely a capacity to 
acquire rights and bear obligations as the case with corporation bodies. Rather, because 
electronic agents conduct affairs by their own and not by representatives, this also 
suggests electronic agents to be granted the capacity of performance. That is to say, 
dhimmah that is suggested to be given to electronic agents is similar to that conferred to 
human beings and not to that suggested to animals. 
 
However, referring back to the concept of dhimmah, it was found that the concept is 
designed originally to human beings to enable them to assume and bear their mission as 
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vicegerents.
116
 As such, the attribution of separate dhimmah to none human beings such 
as waqf and mosque should be taken as an exceptional to the general rule for the concept 
of dhimmah under Islamic law. This is understandable because as stated above, when 
there is al-maslih al-mursalh or public interest, it is a fundamental interest under Islamic 
law to make exceptions to general rules. Therefore, if the public interest was the reason 
to attribute the capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations (ahliyyat al-wujup) to none 
human beings such as waqf and mosque or modern companies, it seems then same 
analogy can be applied to electronic agents. That is to say, the capacity of performance 
(ahliyyat alada) can also be developed to be granted exceptionally to electronic agents 
because there is clearly a public interest for using this advanced technology i.e., 
electronic agents in conducting businesses today. When there is no precise evidence in 
the divine statements on the issue in question, the principle of public interest must play a 
major role within the framework of Islamic law to reform and develop its rules. Such 
human reasoning also serves the spirit of Islamic law since it complies with what has 
been explained in the introduction of the concept of Islamic law that human reasoning 
can be made in according to the interest of public and on principles such as; “changing 
rules according to the changing of times circumstances and places”.117 According to 
Alkardawi, there is a consensus between Muslim scholars on this issue, especially Maliki 
and Hanbali school of Islamic law.
118
Among them, Abn Algym and Abn Tymyh are 
recognized for using the public interest as the basis for reforming orthodox Islamic law.  
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the enforceability of automated contracts in terms of 
Islamic agency principles. On one side, according to Islamic agency principles, the 
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rationale for enforcing contracts made by electronic agents is that electronic agents must 
be competent to act as agents. Under Islamic law, agents must be wise and be adults to 
the extent that even the sound minded, let alone infants, are prohibited to act as agents 
under Islamic law. The concept of (wise and adult) was presented as a traditional 
understanding of the term which requires agents to be human beings. This is where the 
proposition regarding accepting electronic agents as agents appeared unattainable under 
Islamic law. This lack of capacity of electronic agents will also prevent them to consent – 
a requirement set out as necessary in order to form an agency relationship with the 
principal. Furthermore, electronic agents cannot be held liable whereas Islamic agency 
law principally holds agents liable in some instances. Accordingly, automated contracts 
cannot be enforced through the application of Islamic agency principles. 
 
However, the more convincing argument is that the concept of wise and adult is not 
presented in terms of the traditional understanding of this concept, as this would require 
agents to be human beings. Rather, it was presented to ensure the agents' ability to carry 
out their duties. Therefore, it is possible to present an argument that electronic agents are 
sophisticated enough to work as agents and have the ability to act on behalf of another in 
the same way any wise and adult individual would do for their principals. Other Muslim 
jurists argued that since it is a fundamental interest under Islamic law to make exceptions 
to general rules, electronic agents can be agents under Islamic law exceptional to the 
general rule which requires agents to be wise and adult. It followed that any rule or 
principle created for agents should not exceptionally be applied to electronic agents such 
that which would hold electronic agents liable.  
 
Furthermore, these opinions of Muslim jurists which determined the requirements of 
agency (wise and adult) have not been derived from divine sources (the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah). Accordingly, such efforts are not reliable and binding which means that there is 
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a legitimate reason to dispense these requirements of agency and create a modern human 
reasoning that accepts electronic agents as competent to act as agents. This proposition 
does not conflict with any principle or moral of Islamic law and this is the only condition 
under Islamic law for making new human reasoning.  
   
The attempt to grant electronic agent legal personality under Islamic law, in order to 
ease the application of agency principles to electronic agents, was shown to be 
confronted by a conservative view toward the term legal personality. First, it was shown 
that the term legal personality does not exist under Islamic law. Concept of dhimmah was 
developed instead which was defined as a place for acquisition rights and duties with two 
capacities; one refers to the capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations (ahliyyat al-
wujup) and the other refers to the capacity of performance. The concept of dhimmah, 
with its two types of ahliyyat, has been explained to have different meaning than legal 
personality in positive laws. While the latter includes only financial rights and obligation, 
the former includes religious rights and duties as well. The attribution of religious rights 
and duties to the concept of dhimmah was explained on the ground that dhimmah is 
conferred on human beings to enable them to assume and bear their mission as 
vicegerents. For this understanding of legal personality, it was easy to realize that it is a 
concept designed to human beings and cannot therefore be granted to electronic agents. 
 
It is true that non human beings were arguably granted dhimmah nevertheless, these 
entities were only given the capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations (ahliyyat al-
wujup) and not the capacity of performance, the capacity that is suggested to be given to 
electronic agents. However, if ahliyyat al-wujup for the public interest, was developed to 
be granted to none human beings, then I suppose for the same reason a development can 
be achieved under Islamic law to the concept of ahliyyat alada to include electronic 
agents.  
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to establish how contracts made by electronic 
agents might be made enforceable under Islamic law. This question is significant 
because automated contracts are new and their enforceability under Islamic law has not 
been subjected to previous investigation, research or legal analysis. The enforceability 
of automated contracts under Islamic Law is especially important in Saudi Arabia 
where Islamic law constitutes the legal system.  
 
The discussion found that there were a number of conceptual obstacles preventing 
automated contracts from being enforceable under Islamic law. Some of these 
obstacles have proven to exist only under Islamic law while others have proven to exist 
only under common law. This similarity between the two legal systems regarding the 
enforceability of automated contracts proves that Islamic law is not alone in its 
inability to enforce contracts made by electronic agents. This may indicate that the 
challenge of automated contracts is an international problem. In the next paragraphs, I 
summarise the conclusions reached in the previous chapters and reflect on their 
significance to the enforcement of automated contracts concluded under Islamic law. 
 
The concept of mutual consent both under Islamic and common law is resistant to 
adaptation to contracts made by electronic agents. Under Islamic law, the contract 
being administered by the electronic agent limits the operator‟s knowledge‟ about the 
contract. Therefore, on the one hand, it creates doubts about attributing the contract to 
the intention of the operators. It has been suggested that the operators of electronic 
agents do not intend automated contracts since such contracts are made by electronic 
agents autonomously and the operators have no knowledge about them. On the other 
hand, there is the possibility of the existence of gharar because the operators in such 
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instances may lack the knowledge of some excessive details about the contract's 
subject matter. If a transaction is completed independently of the operator by the 
electronic agent, the operator would normally lack substantial details of the subject 
matter such as price, time of delivery and description. In this case the transaction 
constitutes excessive or al-gharar al-kathir and automated contracts would be 
considered invalid. 
 
Under common law, because a transaction is made by an electronic agent 
autonomously and without the operator‟s knowledge there are  limits to the application 
of the objective approach to mutual consent. This objective approach requires a 
reasonable man to believe that offer and acceptance to the contract had been 
manifested by the contracting party. This is what would make the objective approach 
applicable; "apparent intention" to rely upon by the other party. For some 
commentators, it becomes difficult to argue that a reasonable person would conclude 
that the communication of the offer and acceptance in automated contracts was 
apparently made by the operators as what is really apparent is that such communication 
was made by electronic agents. Those who conduct their business with the electronic 
agents have no reasonable belief that the contract communication was made by the 
operators. Arguments that some people may have limited knowledge of these facts 
remain unconvincing, as the use of electronic agents in forming contracts becomes 
more and more widespread. That is to say, the public cannot deny their knowledge that 
automated contracts are formed by electronic agents autonomously and without the 
operators' awareness or direct intervention.  
 
      For the effective application of agency principles to electronic agents, several 
requirements under both Islamic and common law must be fulfilled. These concern a 
common definition of agency theory that bars the idea that electronic agents can be 
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treated as agents. According to Islamic agency principles, electronic agents must be 
competent to act. Under Islamic law, agents must be wise and of adult age; even the 
sound-minded, let alone infants, are prohibited to act as agents under Islamic law. The 
concepts of „wise‟ and „adult‟ have been subject to a traditionalist understanding which 
requires agents to be human beings. This is where the proposition regarding accepting 
electronic agents as agents appeared unattainable under Islamic law. This lack of 
capacity of electronic agents will also prevent them to consent – a requirement set out as 
necessary in order to form an agency relationship with the principal.  
 
       The lack of personality of electronic agents was also a barrier to treating them as 
agents under common law. Moreover, even if common law allowed electronic agents to 
be agents to bind their operators, another difficulty is the type of authority they have in 
making transactions on behalf of the operators. Dilemmas arose regarding the type of 
authority that electronic agents must possess in order to bind their operators. Authority 
could fall into one of several categories: actual, apparent, or ratificational. Under each 
one of these authorities, a set of requirements needs to be satisfied before the agents can 
be recognised. Electronic agents are faced with a major challenge in meeting those 
requirements as it was necessary for the issue to be resolved or they will not be 
considered as agents. Furthermore, agency law as it applies in both the Islamic and 
common systems raised other issues including the possibility of agents being held liable 
in some instances but not electronic agents who, in return cannot be held liable. 
Accordingly, automated contracts cannot be enforced through the application of Islamic 
or common agency principles. 
 
There have been attempts to overcome the barriers erected by agency principles 
through granting electronic agent legal personality. These efforts have been opposed 
by conservative view of the term „legal personality‟. First, it was argued that the term 
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„legal personality‟ does not exist under Islamic law. The concept of dhimmah was 
developed instead which was defined as a place for acquisition rights and duties with 
two capacities; one refers to the capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations 
(ahliyyat al-wujup) and the other refers to the capacity of performance. The concept of 
dhimmah, with its two types of ahliyyat, has been explained to have different meaning 
than legal personality in common law. While the latter includes only financial rights 
and obligation, the former includes religious rights and duties as well. The attribution 
of religious rights and duties to the concept of dhimmah was explained on the ground 
that dhimmah is conferred on human beings to enable them to assume and bear their 
mission as vicegerents. With regard to this understanding of legal personality, it can be 
seen that it is a concept designed for human beings and cannot therefore be granted to 
electronic agents. Similarly, because the legal personality that is assumed by electronic 
agents is most like that conferred to human beings; the agents become subject to tests 
of moral entitlement to this legal personality, such as consciousness, free will, 
rationality etc. However, it is difficult to attribute these concepts to electronic agents 
because they are linked to the innate biological or mental characteristics that define 
human beings. 
  
This conclusion can create a duality in the Saudi legal system. This is because on 
the one hand, there are conceptual obstacles which question the enforceability of 
automated contracts under Islamic law and on the other hand, as has been explained in 
Chapter 6, the Electronic Transactions Regulation (ETR) 2007 specifically S. 12 
articulates that contracts issued by these automated agents should be valid and 
enforceable. The Saudi regime states in its constitution, art. 67 that Islamic law is the 
only source of law however, the rational underpinnings of the ETR 2007 [SA] on the 
enforceability of automated contracts does not seem grounded in Islamic law. This 
duality within the Saudi legal system is apparent in the case of interest rates (Riba). On 
Ch: 8 Conclusion 
 
168 
 
the one hand, interest rates are forbidden according to the Qur'an and Sunnah.
1
 
However, on the other hand, interest rates remain used in Saudi Arabia and in 
commercial trade, although there are no specific rules governing them as yet. A further 
example of this duality is in insurance contracts. Insurance is prohibited by the 
majority of Muslim jurists, especially among jurists in Saudi Arabia. In their opinion, 
insurance contracts have the element of uncertainty (gharar) with respect the subject 
matter and hence, the contract should totally null and void under Islamic law. 
However, insurance is practised and regulated under the Saudi Arabian Commercial 
Court Law of 1931.
2
  
 
To overcome this duality, it is important to avoid the traditional narrow 
interpretation of concepts of agent, legal person and all related conception conditions, 
otherwise difficulties and barriers against the enforceability of automated contracts 
under Islamic law may continue to arise. Electronic agents should be treated as agents. 
Operators delegate their duties to electronic agents to carry out specific tasks on their 
behalf and this relationship is an agency relationship. Treating electronic agents as 
agents under agency law reflects the electronic agents' actual role in contract formation 
as they are no longer merely communication tools and passive conduits. The premise 
and accompanying characterization of electronic agents as communication tools 
appears to be flawed and an erroneous approach to this advanced technology. This is 
because these labels are only applicable to the first generation of electronic agents 
which could only make or accept an offer if, and only if, they were pre-programmed by 
their operators. The later, advanced generations can operate autonomously and without 
operators' direct intervention, knowledge, or expectation. They can execute 
                                                          
1
 The Qur‟an states: O you who believe fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for usury 
if you are indeed believers …  But if you repent, you shall have your capital sums: deal not unjustly, 
and you shall not be dealt with unjustly (Qur'an 1:29).  
2
 The Saudi government‟s view is that insurance contracts should be permitted due to necessity and the 
need of the society. 
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transactions on behalf of their operators who may not necessarily be conscious of the 
activity. The role of electronic agents therefore is a key aspect of automated contract 
formation; the characterization of electronic agents as tools denies and neglects this 
fact.  
Such reformation of established agency principles can arguably be pursued and 
implemented under Islamic law. On the one hand, traditionalists may call this 
reformation in order to dissolve the rules that have been established over the past 
several hundred years by the “great scholars” of Muslim history. This will ensure that 
the arguments imposed by some modernists (Muslim and non-Muslims) mean that 
Muslims' reasoning is restricted to encrustations of the past several hundred years.
3
 
Moreover, it will ensure the repetitive allegations which claim that Islamic law is not 
incompatible with this modern trade framework since the rules and cases covered in 
orthodox Islamic law are finite and the changing demands (social and economic) of the 
public are beyond measure.  
     On the other hand, radical reformers may advocate the purposeful elimination of 
Islamic influence from the trade movement and the adoption of secularity; electronic 
agents will be treated as agents regardless of any position that may be taken by Muslim 
traditionalists. This secularization, as I see it, is not the path towards realizing the issue, 
coupled with the Saudis‟ resistance to secularization. Any new idea or approach cannot 
be achieved through secularization. Without a firm Islamic-based justification for any 
new proposition on economic and legal issues, the changes being promoted will fail to 
be accepted as legitimate by individual citizens, particularly in the KSA. That is to say, 
it is important to find a balance between these two extremes which should embrace “a 
broadened doctrine of human reasoning” that would accept the need for electronic 
                                                          
3
 I have already showed in the introduction some examples of these views. See page 6-7.  
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agents to be treated as agents under the Islamic agency theory. The use of this new 
method of online trade is deemed to be for the benefit of public.  
        As has been seen in the discussion of the concept of Islamic law, the principle of 
public interest is well known to Muslim jurists and has played a major role within the 
framework of Islamic law to reform and develop its rules.  As Alkardawi points out, the 
evidence suggests that Islam, in its every rule, serves people‟s best interests.4 The object 
of Islam is to free human beings from any suffering or damage whether spiritual or 
physical, real or expected.
5
 The principle of public interest can and should play an 
important role in the evolution of a more modern, liberal form of trade. An ideal 
expression of this is the application of agency principles to include electronic agents 
under Islamic law.  
      The principle of public interest is an active mechanism under Islamic law and is a 
great path for reforming the established principles of Islamic law. The acceptance by 
Muslim jurists that they must satisfy the public interest when they make laws and 
policies will help to dispel all those gross misinterpretations of Islamic law such as that 
Islamic law is rigid or is an immutable „law of God‟ based on unchanging texts written 
in the Middle Ages. From my prospective, the application of the public interest to 
extend the concept of agency to include electronic agents sends an important message 
that Islamic law is an imminently flexible, dynamic jurisprudence, fully compatible with 
the modern trade framework.  
The approach taken in this dissertation to the analysis of automated contracts is not 
the only approach that can be adopted for the analysis of such contracts under Islamic 
Law. However, this dissertation is the first of its kind and so can be considered as a 
                                                          
4
 Alkardawi, Y. (2000), Alsyasah Alshra'iah fi dhou'a nsous Alshria'ah wmkasdha, Cairo: Alresalah, p. 
210. 
5
 Ibid.  
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starting point for future research in the field. Given that the Saudi Government has 
established a governmental committee whose mandate is to reform the Electronic 
Transactions Regulation (ETR) 2007 [SA], the researcher hopes this study will pave 
the way for further detailed study upon which regulation can be made about the sort of 
contracts under discussion. That is to say, expanding the concept of agency and legal 
personality under Islamic law to include electronic agents can be one of the choices 
available and it remains for other researchers to present more options to overcome 
barriers related to such contracts. This, as stated above in Chapter 5, is conditional on 
not contradicting the principles of Islamic law and the rules laid down in the Qur'an or 
Sunnah.  
 
The novelty of automated contacts and the absence of any studies on their 
enforceability under Islamic law has presented a great opportunity to re-examine the 
basics of Islamic legal concepts and principles and their capacity to grapple with 
contemporary issues. For example, further researches might expand the concept of 
agency and legal personality under Islamic law to include electronic agents, and in the 
process develop legal grounds for such expansion. Further researches may also find 
that expanding legal concepts is not necessary as the ones already in existence are 
sufficient to address this problem and enforce these types of contracts. Other research 
could adopt an extreme position by arguing that Islamic law does not permit this 
technology and contracts concluded thereof. Therefore Islamic law should not be a 
reference point for the enforceability of these contracts in Saudi Arabia. This 
conclusion means that there is a risk of negative impact on the development of 
automated contracts in the country. For example, when the Islamic law forbidding 
interest rates was overruled in Saudi Arabia, there was not much interest from the 
public in these types of product because although they were legal in the country, they 
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were contradictory to Islamic law.
6
 Therefore, the enforceability of automated 
contracts through Islamic law is important to avoid the public‟s lack of confidence in 
using these contracts in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Many experts
7
 hold that agent technology will become one of the platforms for 
future electronic trade, and that electronic commerce as practised today is only a first 
step towards the formation of true electronic marketplaces. That is to say, whatever 
impact automated contracts and their enforceability causes traditional Islamic 
principles of contract, it is important to confront them and present solutions in light of 
Islamic law. The topic of automated contracts and their enforceability is an 
interdisciplinary area; law and technology. This could be a challenge to those 
undertaken the topic. Therefore, it requires in-depth knowledge to frame a clear view 
regarding the electronic agents‟ technology and how they work to complete 
transactions independently. It requires knowledge about technical details and analysis 
of information that might appear very scientific and unavailable information to legal 
researchers. Lacking such details over the technology of electronic agents may result 
inappropriate assessment of their role in contract formation and this therefore can 
affect any suggestion that would be presented in support of their legal status.  
Furthermore, this research could be taken further by not just involving electronic 
agents in contract formation, but also by covering issues such as the involvement of 
electronic agents in crimes such as the violation of privacy and intellectual property 
right. There are numerous questions and problems associated with the impact of the 
use of electronic agents on privacy and related interests. There needs to be more debate 
about the various risks to privacy occasioned by electronic agents' operations and of 
the way in which data protection rules under Saudi law can moderate these risks. In 
                                                          
6
 Abdul Karim, A. (2008) The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A Comparative Study with 
Muslim Countries, Arab Law Quarterly, 22 (2) pp. 180-198. 
7
 Bing, J. (2004) Electronic agents and intellectual property law, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 12 (1-
2), pp. 39-52. 
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2008, the IT Criminal Regulation was designed in Saudi Arabia to formulate rules to 
fight crimes resulting from the abuse of IT and the internet.
8
 The IT Criminal 
Regulation declares that any Internet activities that damage individuals and society‟s 
rights will be punished by a fine of 500,000 Riyals ($130.000) and one year in prison.
9
 
In the absence of specific data protection rules, there seem to be questions about 
whether this regulation can fully cover the range of electronic agents‟ operations. An 
aspect of electronic agents' operations that have not been articulated in the IT Criminal 
Regulation is when these agents, during the execution of certain operations in the 
interest of an individual, disclose personal information about this individual without 
their knowledge. This might include sensitive details that unwittingly aid advertising 
companies in their implementation of what is known as direct marketing. Electronic 
agents can also send certain unsavoury links to individuals - especially to children.
10
 
All the operations of electronic agents have not been articulated in IT Criminal 
Regulation and so there are important question(s) revolve about liability. Should the 
operator, Internet Service Provider (ISP), or programmer of the electronic agent be 
responsible?  
                                                          
8
  The IT Criminal Regulation. (Online) Available at: 
 http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sa00000_.html. [Accessed 31/March/2010]. (In Arabic) 
9
  See IT Criminal Regulation, article 3. 
10
 For more details on the impact of the use of electronic agents on privacy, see, Bygrave, A. (2001) 
Electronic Agents and Privacy: A Cyberspace Odyssey, International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, 9 (3), pp. 275-294.  
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Appendix I 
 
Electronic Transactions Regulation 
Issued by the Royal Decree No. M/18 dated 8.3.1428 AH (2007 AD), the Resolution 
of the Council of Ministers No. 80 dated 7.3.1428 AH (2007 AD) and the circular of 
the Minister of Justice No. 13/T/3098 dated 11.4.1428 AH (2007 AD). 
 
Chapter I I I : Electronic Transaction Execution 
Article 10 
1. Acceptance and approval of contracts can be expressed by an electronic 
transaction; the contract is considered valid and executable when it is executed in 
accordance with the provisions of this act. 
2. The contract shall not lose its validity or executability for the mere reason that it 
is executed through one or more electronic records. 
Article 11 
1. Contracts may be concluded through automated or direct electronic data 
systems between two or more electronic data systems which are prepared and 
programmed in advance to perform such functions as representatives of the parties to 
the contract. The contract shall be considered valid, effective and legally binding in 
spite of the lack of direct interference by a person of a natural capacity in the contract 
conclusion process. 
2. Contracts may be concluded between an automated electronic data system and 
a person of a natural capacity if it is known or presumed that he knows that he is 
transacting with an automated system which will undertake the task of concluding or 
executing the contract. 
Article 12 
The electronic record is considered to be issued by the originator if it is sent by him or 
by another person on his behalf or sent by an automated system programmed by the 
originator to automatically act on behalf of the originator. The mediator will not be 
considered as automatically act on behalf of the originator. 
 
Uniform Commercial Code §2 2003 
§ 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions 
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires (g) "Electronic agent" means a 
computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to 
initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, 
without review or action by an individual. 
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PART 2. FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT 
§ 2-212. ATTRIBUTION 
An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of 
the person or the person's electronic agent or the person is otherwise legally bound by 
the act. 
 
 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 1999 
SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS 
(a) [General definitions.] In this [Act]: 
(27) "Electronic agent" means a computer program, or electronic or other automated 
means, used independently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or 
performances, on the person's behalf without review or action by an individual at the 
time of the action or response to the message or performance. 
SECTION 107. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC RECORD AND 
AUTHENTICATION; USE OF ELECTRONIC AGENTS  
(d) [Party bound by electronic agent.] A person that uses an electronic agent that it has 
selected for making an authentication, performance, or agreement, including 
manifestation of assent, is bound by the operations of the electronic agent, even if no 
individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's operations or the results of the 
operations. 
SECTION 212. DETERMINING ATTRIBUTION 
(a) [When attribution established.] An electronic authentication, display, message, 
record, or performance is attributed to a person if it was the act of the person or its 
electronic agent, or if the person is bound by it under agency or other law. The party 
relying on attribution of an electronic authentication, display, message, record, or 
performance to another person has the burden of establishing attribution. 
 
 
Official Comments 
5. Electronic Agents. Operations of an electronic agent generally bind the party that 
used the electronic agent for that purpose. Subsection (d). This rule is limited to 
situations where the party selects the agent, and includes cases where the party 
consciously elects to employ the agent on its own behalf, whether that agent was created 
by it, licensed from another, or otherwise adopted for this purpose. The term "selects" 
does not require a choice from among several electronic agents, but merely a conscious 
decision to use a particular agent. The concept here embodies principles like those in 
agency law, but it does not depend on agency law. The electronic agent must be 
operating within its intended purpose. For human agents, this is often described as 
acting within the scope of authority. Here, the focus is on whether the agent was used 
for the relevant purpose. For a similar concept in a different context, see Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), aff'd, 168 F.3d 
486 (5
th
 Cir. 1999). Cases of fraud, manipulation and the like are discussed in Section 
206. 
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3-Nature of Attribution. Subsection (a) clarifies that the party seeking to attribute the 
source of an electronic authentication, message, record or performance to a particular 
party bears the burden of doing so. "Burden of establishing" means "the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the existence of a fact (e.g., attribution) is more probable 
than its non-existence." In effect, a party (either the licensor or the licensee) that desires 
to attribute an order or a shipment or license to a particular party bears the burden and 
the risk of being able to do so. Attribution might involve reliance on agency law 
principles. 
 
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 
 
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.  
In this [Act]: (2) "Automated transaction" means a transaction conducted or performed, 
in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or 
records of one or both parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in 
forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an obligation 
required by the transaction. 
(3) "Computer program" means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
indirectly in an information processing system in order to bring about a certain result  
(6) "Electronic agent" means a computer program or an electronic or other automated 
means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or 
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual. 
SECTION 14. AUTOMATED TRANSACTION.  
In an automated transaction, the following rules apply: (1) A contract may be formed by 
the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or 
reviewed the electronic agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements. (2) A 
contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual, 
acting on the individual's own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction 
in which the individual performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform 
and which the individual knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to 
complete the transaction or performance 
 
Official Comments 
2. "Automated Transaction." An automated transaction is a transaction performed or 
conducted by electronic means in which machines are used without human intervention 
to form contracts and perform obligations under existing contracts. Such broad coverage 
is necessary because of the diversity of transactions to which this Act may apply. As 
with electronic agents, this definition addresses the circumstance where electronic 
records may result in action or performance by a party although no human review of the 
electronic records is anticipated. Section 14 provides specific rules to assure that where 
one or both parties do not review the electronic records, the resulting agreement will be 
 v 
 
effective. The critical element in this definition is the lack of a human actor on one or 
both sides of a transaction. For example, if one orders books from Bookseller.com 
through Bookseller's website, the transaction would be an automated transaction because 
Bookseller took and confirmed the order via its machine. Similarly, if Automaker and 
supplier do business through Electronic Data Interchange, Automaker's computer, upon 
receiving information within certain pre-programmed parameters, will send an 
electronic order to supplier's computer. If Supplier's computer confirms the order and 
processes the shipment because the order falls within pre-programmed parameters in 
Supplier's computer, this would be a fully automated transaction. If, instead, the 
Supplier relies on a human employee to review, accept, and process the Buyer's order, 
then only the Automaker's side of the transaction would be automated. In either case, the 
entire transaction falls within this definition. 
5. "Electronic agent." This definition establishes that an electronic agent is a machine. 
As the term "electronic agent" has come to be recognized, it is limited to a tool function. 
The effect on the party using the agent is addressed in the operative provisions of the 
Act (e.g., Section 14) An electronic agent, such as a computer program or other 
automated means employed by a person, is a tool of that person. As a general rule, the 
employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of that tool since the 
tool has no independent volition of its own. However, an electronic agent, by definition, 
is capable within the parameters of its programming, of initiating, responding or 
interacting with other parties or their electronic agents once it has been activated by a 
party, without further attention of that party. While this Act proceeds on the paradigm 
that an electronic agent is capable of performing only within the technical structures of 
its preset programming, it is conceivable that, within the useful life of this Act, 
electronic agents may be created with the ability to act autonomously, and not just 
automatically. That is, through developments in artificial intelligence, a computer may 
be able to "learn through experience, modify the instructions in their own programs, and 
even devise new instructions." Allen and Widdison, "Can Computers Make Contracts?" 
9 Harv. J.L.&Tech 25 (Winter, 1996). If such developments occur, courts may construe 
the definition of electronic agent accordingly, in order to recognize such new 
capabilities. The examples involving Bookseller.com and Automaker in the Comment to 
the definition of Automated Transaction are equally applicable here. Bookseller acts 
through an electronic agent in processing an order for books. Automaker and the 
supplier each act through electronic agents in facilitating and effectuating the just-in-
time inventory process through EDI. 
1. This section confirms that contracts can be formed by machines functioning as 
electronic agents for parties to a transaction. It negates any claim that lack of human 
intent, at the time of contract formation, prevents contract formation. When machines 
are involved, the requisite intention flows from the programing and use of the machine. 
As in other cases, these are salutary provisions consistent with the fundamental purpose 
of the Act to remove barriers to electronic transactions while leaving the substantive 
law, e.g., law of mistake, law of contract formation, unaffected to the greatest extent 
possible. 
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The Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act 2000 
 
SEC. 106. DEFINITIONS. 
(3) ELECTRONIC AGENT.—The term ‗‗electronic agent‘‘ means a computer program 
or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or 
respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part without review or 
action by an individual at the time of the action or response. 
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Office of the Grand Imam, Rector of Al-Azhar  
            Investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits 
Dr. Hasan Abbas Zaki, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Arab Banking 
Corporation, sent a letter dated 22/10/2002 to H.E. the Grand Imam Dr. Muhammad 
Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of Al-Azhar. Its text follows: 
 
"H.E. Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi,  
                       Rector of Al-Azha 
                       Greetings and prayers for Peace, Mercy, and blessings of Allah Customers 
of the International Arab Banking Corporation forward their funds and savings to the 
Bank to use and invest them in its permissible dealings, in exchange for profit 
distributions that are pre-determined, and the distribution times are likewise agreed-upon 
with the customer. We respectfully ask you for the [Islamic] legal status of this dealing. 
 
                                                                                                [Signature] 
 
This is the text of the fatwā 
 
Those who deal with the International Arab Banking Corporation Bank – or any other 
bank – forward their funds and savings to the bank as an agent who invests the funds on 
their behalf in its permissible dealings, in exchange for a profit distribution that is pre-
determined, and at distribution times that are mutually agreed-upon … 
        This dealing, in this form, is permissible, without any doubt of impermissibility. 
This follows from the fact that no Canonical Text in the Book of Allah or the Prophetic 
Sunnah forbids this type of transaction within which profits or returns are pre-specified, 
as long as the transaction is concluded with mutual consent. 
       Allah, transcendent is He, said: "Oh people of faith, do not devour your properties 
among yourselves unjustly, the exception being trade conducted by mutual consent…" 
(Al-Nisā":29) The verse means: Oh people with true faith, it is not permissible for you, 
and unseemly, that any of you devour the wealth of another in impermissible ways (e.g. 
theft, usurpation, or usury, and other forbidden means). In contrast, you are 
permitted to exchange benefits through dealings conducted by mutual consent, provided 
that no forbidden transaction is thus made permissible or vice versa. This applies 
regardless of whether the mutual consent is established verbally, in written form, or in 
any other form that indicates mutual agreement and acceptance. 
    There is no doubt that mutual agreement on pre-specified profits is Legally and 
logically permissible, so that each party will know his rights. It is well known that banks 
only pre-specify profits or returns based on precise studies of international and domestic 
 xii 
 
markets, and economic conditions in the society. In addition, returns are customized for 
each specific transaction type, given its average profitability. 
Moreover, it is well known that pre-specified profits vary from time period to another. 
For instance, investment certificates initially specified a return of 4%, which increased 
subsequently to more than 15%, now returning to near 10%. The parties that specify 
those changing rates of returns are required to obey the regulations issued by the relevant 
government agencies. 
This pre-specification of profits is beneficial, especially in this age, when deviations from 
truth and fair dealing have become rampant. Thus, prespecification of profits provides 
benefits both to the providers of funds, as well as to the banks that invest those funds. 
It is beneficial to the provider of funds since it allows him to know his rights without any 
uncertainty. Thus, he may arrange the affairs of his life accordingly. It is also beneficial 
to those who manage those banks, since the pre-specification of profits gives them the 
incentive for working hard, since they keep all excess profits above what they promised 
the provider of funds. This excess profit compensation is justified by their hard work. 
It may be said that banks may lose, thus wondering how they can pre-specify profits for 
the investors. In reply, we say that if banks lose on one transaction, they win on many 
others, thus profits can cover losses. 
In addition, if losses are indeed incurred, the dispute will have to be resolved in court. In 
summary, pre-specification of profits to those who forward their funds to banks and 
similar institutions through an investment agency is Legally permissible. There is no 
doubt regarding the Islamic Legality of this transaction, since it belongs to the general 
area judged according to benefits, i.e. wherein there are no explicit Texts. In addition, 
this type of transaction does not belong to the areas of creed and ritual acts of worship, 
wherein changes and other innovations are not permitted. 
Based on the preceding, investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits or returns is 
Islamically Legal, and there is no harm therein, and Allah knows best, 
                                                                                           [Signed] 
                                                                                      Rector of Al-Azhar 
                                                                       Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi 
                                                                             27 Ramadan 1423 A.H. 
                                                                              2 December 2002 A.D. 
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  انزحيى ٍبسى الله انزحً
 
 
  /فضيهة انشيخ
  ...انسلاو عهيكى ورحًة الله وبزكاتو
 
فئٟٔ أسجٛا ث١بْ سأ٠ىُ اٌفمٟٙ ِغ الاسزشٙبد ثبٌذٌ١ً فٟ ) فأسبٌٛا أً٘ اٌزوش إْ وٕزُ لا رؼٍّْٛ: (ِٓ ثبة لٌٛٗ رؼبٌٝ
 :اٌّسأٌخ اٌزبٌ١خ
 
ٌٚؼً ِٓ أدذس اٌطشق . خصٛصب فٟ ث١ئخ الإٔزشٔذلا ٠خفٝ ػٍٝ فض١ٍزىُ رطٛس طشق اٌزؼبلذ فٟ اٌؼصش اٌشا٘ٓ ٚ
اٌّسزخذِخ ٚاٌزٟ ثذأد رض١ش اٌىض١ش ِٓ اٌّشبوً ٚرض١ش إٌضاػبد ث١ٓ الأطشاف ٟ٘ اٌزؼبلذ ػجش ثشاِج دبسٛث١خ رؼًّ 
 :ٌٚزمش٠ت اٌصٛسح فئٌ١ىُ اٌّسأٌخ الافزشاض١خ اٌزبٌ١خ. ثشىً رٍمبئٟ ثؼ١ذا ػٓ س١طشح اٌّشغً ٔفسٗ
 
اٌشخصٟ ػٓ طش٠ك اسزخذاَ إدذٜ ثشاِج اٌسٛفذ ٚ٠ش اٌّزخصصخ ٌٍم١بَ فٟ غ١بثٗ ثج١غ ٚششاء  ثشِج ص٠ذ وّج١ٛرشٖ
ٔظشاً ٌغ١بة ص٠ذ ػٓ اٌج١ٛع اٌزٟ ٠جش٠ٙب ٌٗ وّج١ٛرشٖ ٚػذَ ػٍّٗ ثٙب رضبس اٌىض١ش ِٓ اٌّشىلاد . أسُٙ ػجش الإٔزشٔذ
ٗ دض١ضخ ٌٍزؼبًِ لبٔٛٔ١بً ِغ ٘زٖ اٌجشاِج اٌذم١مخ أْ ٕ٘بن جٙٛداً دٌٚ١. ِٓ ٔبد١خ ِذٜ صذخ ٚششػ١خ ِضً ٘زٖ اٌؼمٛد
ٚاٌٙذف ِٓ ِضً ٘زا اٌزٛجٗ ٘ٛ رفبدٞ الإشىبٌ١بد اٌزٟ . ػٍٝ أٔٙب ٚولاء ػٓ اٌّشغٍ١ٓ ٌٚ١سذ فمظ أدٚاد أٚ أجٙضح
ػبدح ِب ٠ض١ش٘ب ِزطٍجبد اٌؼمذ الأسبس١خ خبصخ رٍه اٌزٟ رشزشط ٌصذخ اٌؼمذ أْ ٠زشاضٟ أصٕبء اٌؼمذ طشف١ٓ رٚ أٍ٘١خ 
 . لبٔٛٔ١خ
أٔٗ ً٘ ِٓ اٌّّىٓ فٟ اٌفمٗ الإسلاِٟ رجٕٟ ِضً ٘زا اٌزٛجٗ ثّؼٕٝ أْ ٠زُ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ ٘زٖ  /اٌسؤاي اٌّطشٚح ا٢ْ ٘ٛ
اٌجشاِج اٌّزمذِخ ػٍٝ أٔٙب ٚولاء ػٓ اٌّشغٍ١ٓ ثذ١ش ٠ٕطجك أدىبَ ػمذ إٌ١بثخ فٟ ِضً ٘زٖ اٌؼمٛد؟ فٟ رصٛس 
بَ إٌ١بثخ فٟ اٌفمٗ الإسلاِٟ ٔفسٙب ِب ٠ّٕغ ِٕخ غ١ش الإٔسبْ صفخ فض١ٍزىُ ِب ٌزٞ ٠ّٕغ ِضً اٌزٛجٗ؟ ً٘ فٟ ثٕ١خ أدى
اٌٛو١ً؟ ٚفٟ ٔظش فض١ٍزىُ ِب ٔٛع ٘زٖ الأدىبَ؟ ً٘ الإشىبٌ١خ فمظ فٟ وْٛ اٌجشاِج لا رزّزغ ثصفخ طج١ؼ١خ ٚثبٌزبٌٟ 
اٌّشٚٔخ ٌّضً ٘زٖ  غ١ش لبدسح ػٍٝ لجٛي ػمذ اٌٛوبٌخ أَ أْ ٕ٘بن ِلاثسبد أخشٜ؟  ً٘ الأدىبَ فٟ رارٙب ٌٙب لبثٍ١خ
اٌجشاِج ٌىٓ ِب ٠ّٕغ ٘ٛ وْٛ ٘زٖ اٌجشاِج لا رسزذك ِضً ٘زٖ اٌصفخ اٌششػ١خ؟ ً٘ رشْٚ أْ الإجبثخ ثؼذَ إِىبٔ١خ رجٕٟ 
ِضً ٘زا اٌزٛجٗ لذ ٠ضغ أدىبَ اٌفمٗ الإسلاِٟ فٟ صاٚ٠خ الارٙبَ وّب ٘ٛ اٌّؼزبد؟ ً٘ الإشىبٌ١خ ٕ٘ب ٔظش٠خ أَ إشىبٌ١خ 
 رطج١ك؟ 
 
 .ي وتقديزي نًا يسطزه يدكى ىنا انذي أسأل الله أٌ  يسجم نكى في ييزاٌ خدية ىذا انفقو انعظيىيع خانص شكز
 انباحث     
 ونيد يحًد انًاجد  
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In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
Sheik/ 
Peace be upon you and the mercy of God... 
 
As Allah says in the Holy Book: "Ask those who have attained the correct religious 
knowledge when seeking an Islamic judgement about a certain matter", I hope, 
therefore, that you will give me guidance on an issue into which I am conducing 
research. 
It is no secret that there has been an evolution in the methods of forming contracts in 
the current era, especially in the context of the Internet. One of the newest methods 
used, which has started to raise a lot of challenges, is forming contracts via computer 
programs which work autonomously and without the control of the operator himself. 
To make this issue clearer, I provide the following example: 
 
Zaid programmed his computer software to buy and sell shares on the Internet on his 
behalf. Since Zaid will be absent and will have no knowledge of transactions made 
by the computer, the principle of mutual consent, which requires two contracting 
parties to consent to each other, may not be satisfied. This will consequently raise 
concerns about the validity and the enforceability of these transactions. To avoid this 
consequence, it has been suggested that these computer programs could be treated as 
agents so that transactions made by these computer programs can be enforced based 
on agency principles.  
The questions now are: is it possible in Islamic law to adopt this approach, i.e., to 
treat computer programs as agents so that transactions made by these computer 
programs can be enforced based on agency principles? In your opinion, what can 
prevent such an approach? Are there principles under Islamic agency law which 
would prevent non-human beings, such as these computers, being treated as agents? 
Can you explain what these challenges are? Does the problem exist only in the fact 
that these computer programs do not have a legal personality and are therefore 
unable to be treated as agents, or are there other challenges?  
With my sincere thanks and appreciation 
  
              Researcher 
Walid Mohammed Almajid 
 
 
 xv 
 
 
Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Electronic Agents and Legal Personality:  Time to Treat Them as 
Human Beings 
 
Walid Mohammed Almajid
*
 
 
 
Note: this paper, which is a part of chapter 3 of the dissertation, has been published on 
proceedings of the 2007 Annual BILETA Conference, Hertfordshire, 16-17 April, 
(online) Available at:  
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Electronic%20Agents%20and%20Lega
l% (last accessed March/31/2010). It has been cited by the following articles: Katz, A.  
(2009) Intelligent agents and Internet Commerce in Ancient Rome, Computers & Law, 
20 (1), pp. 35–38; Hildebrandt, M; Olivier, D; Koops, B; Chiffelle, J. (2010) Bridging 
the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society? Minnesota 
Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 11(2), pp. 55-68; and Kokswijk, V. (2008) 
Granting Personality to a Virtual Identity, International Journal of Human and Social 
Sciences, 2(4), pp.208-215.  
 
 
 
 xvi 
 
1. Introduction 
Most legislations whether internationally or nationally deal with intelligent agents in a 
way which does not reflect the certainty of their features. In the past, no one other than 
human beings could do the functions that intelligent agents do at present. Intelligent 
agents ramble quickly into various places, search for information, and achieve several 
stages of a transaction from product and merchant brokering through to negotiation, sale, 
distribution and payment. Nonetheless, legislations chose to classify them as 
communication tools. The reason to choose this is perhaps there doesn‘t appear to be any 
difficulty in implementing it or
1
the legislations could lack the legal tools that may well 
recognize the acts of intelligent agents. However, by doing so, intelligent agents become 
legally irrelevant to contracts formed through them, all generated legal effects are totally 
attributed to users regardless of whether intended, predicted, or mistaken.
2
It seems a 
crucial issue, in order to adopt different approaches of the contractual capacities of 
intelligent agents, to prove that these legal effects are indeed generated by the intelligent 
agents‘ own intention. The problem here, as will be shown, is that the cognitive intention 
or the (autonomy) of intelligent agents is still debatable and has not been evidenced yet.
3
 
However, as the autonomy of intelligent agents increases, the idea that treats intelligent 
agents as no more than passive adjuncts would quickly be limited. By then, holding the 
users unwittingly liable would become unjust and would discourage using agent 
technology in conducting commerce on-line. Accordingly, this paper suggests granting  
intelligent agents legal personality analogous to other legal entities. This would bring 
good economy and commercial interests not less than encouraging businesses to rely on 
this new technology in conducting business without concerns that they will be 
overwhelmed by liabilities get done all their properties. It will examine the possibility of 
the idea with no intention to provide the final answer. The idea of attributing legal 
personality to intelligent agents deserves indeed, further study and research. 
First, the paper demonstrates the issue of intelligent agent‘s autonomy. Secondly, it 
explains legal issues associated when using intelligent agents in contracts formation. This 
will be included that the idea of a mere communication tool does not solve those issues in 
question. The paper then discusses the idea of legal personality. It will be shown here 
whether this can be achieved by its traditional requirements, or other requirements, such 
as insurance, are necessary for the success of this approach.  
2- Autonomy: Source of Concern 
The term ―intelligence‖ used to describe intelligent agents was employed, as Jennings & 
Wooldridge state, in order to refer to their capability of flexible autonomous 
actions.
4
Although autonomy is always used to describe the function of intelligent agents, 
its extent is still very ambiguous. If autonomous programs are not such a new 
phenomenon for example, we have EDI and cash machines, what makes intelligent 
agents so special? Many authors have attempted to answer this question. Intelligent 
agents are mostly described as they function; with no direct intervention or control from 
any human beings, based on their own experiences with no full forecasting of their 
behaviour. 
A hypothesis is necessary here. Suppose Tom programmed his software agent to book 
the lowest flight price, with a top price of 300 Pounds, from London to New York. The 
program, after gathering information from the internet, decided to buy from a travel 
agent known as (Bot Agency) which offered to sell the flight for only 150 Pounds. The 
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disaster happened when Tom discovered that Bot Agency was nothing more than a fake 
agency. Moreover, it was common knowledge among people that this sham agency was 
convicted for several fraud cases.  For the first step, one may say that the purchasing 
process from the agency was entirely up to the intelligent agent and Tom could do 
nothing about it. A better and accurate explanation may say that Tom had already 
predetermined the destination and date. The price of the flight was obviously not known 
to him for certain, but it is clear that the price was within predefined limits, and not 
unenforceable. Accordingly, the contract was not actually formed through the will of the 
intelligent agent or, as is sometimes delegated, through its own experience.
 
The will of 
the human being to conclude the contract exists and is predetermined.
5
The only thing 
the intelligent agent has to do is specify the contracting party. This illustrates the limited 
autonomy of intelligent agents which indicates that there is direct intervention and 
control from human beings. Nonetheless, the limited autonomy allowed a contract with 
an agency which was totally unfavourable to the user which in turn proves that users do 
not always forecast their intelligent agents‘ behaviour. Moreover, intelligent agents 
cannot make decisions based on their self-created instructions.
6
This is not to deny the 
fact that once those intelligent agents set to work, no further intervention of users is 
necessary,
 
but the entire function of intelligent agents, generally speaking, totally 
depends on the instructions that are set by users.  
 
The example given above is merely a hypothesis and other hypothesises can, of course, 
lead to different results. This is the cost when issues under examination remain at the 
research stage because there are no cases which could discipline the analysis in question. 
However, although there are various opinions regarding the degree of intelligent agents' 
autonomy, there is a general consensus that their involvement in generating contracts 
with little or no human discretion has produced legal problems. The following section 
will illustrate these problems. 
 
3- Contract Legal Problems 
The limited degree of intelligent agent's autonomy, as illustrated above, has not 
encouraged the law to decide whether intelligent agents deserve to be attributed a 
separate (intentional state) from its user. Thus, this limited autonomy remains 
unrecognised with intelligent agents still lacking contracting capacity i.e. they are not yet 
considered to be legal persons in the eyes of the law. The law apparently prefers to wait, 
either studies or researches decide on the issue or future technology development offers 
new software with clear independence.  
This attitude toward intelligent agents assumes that transactions can never be concluded 
between intelligent agents and human beings. Accordingly, this led to another legal 
problem which is the ambiguity in specifying contracting parties. In order to clarify the 
contracting parties, there must be two parties involved in contract-making. Since 
intelligent agents are not considered by current law to be legal persons, the buyer and 
seller are the only parties who can be relevant to the contract. In the example given 
above, where Tom‘s software bought a ticket from the agency, the contract is then 
formed between Tom and the travel agency. If we adopt this fiction, it would threat 
another legal requirement. This is where Tom is not aware of the fact that his software 
has actually made a transaction with the agency. Here, one party has no actual knowledge 
of who he is dealing with. Accordingly one cannot argue that there was mutual consent 
between contracting parties. Therefore, on what ground is Tom bound by the transaction 
made with the travel agency? 
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Furthermore, because intelligent agents are no more than a communication tool, this has 
also created another dilemma which seems to be the most difficult issue associated with 
using intelligent agents in contracts formation so far. In the present era, it is well known 
that although intelligent agents are called ―intelligent‖7 they are not always perfect in 
their performance. People must have heard passive cases of errors and damages occurring 
on the internet by intelligent agents.
8
Users, as Leon Wein has mentioned, quite often 
programmed or designed their intelligent agents to perform in a manner which would be 
non-negligent, however the intelligent agents‘ decision to behave in a certain way could 
be considered negligent.
9
In cases where intelligent agents are not yet legal persons, it is 
absurd to attribute the responsibility of these damages to someone other than the users. 
In fact, this new phenomenon, the involvement of intelligent agents in generating 
contracts, created two main dilemmas or questions. First, the law faces a question of 
validity of contracts concluded by such programs i.e., whether or not users can be bound 
to contracts where their knowledge of the existence of the communications and contracts 
is lacking. Secondly, law also faces a question of liability of who is going to bear those 
errors and losses which occur as a result of intelligent agents.   
 
4-Legal Personality to Intelligent Agents 
Law, in order to grant intelligent agents legal personality, must first recognise an 
intentional state to them. Those acts that are done through intelligent agents must be 
legally taken as potentially done by them. This will allow intelligent agents to be a part 
of contracting and acquiring rights and duties not merely on behalf of others but as for 
their own selves as well. If they are given an intentional state, contracts formed through 
them would be deemed formed between buyers (customers) and intelligent agents. 
Sellers whose intelligent agents work on their behalf will later be attributed the contracts‘ 
legal effects. 
On one hand, there would not be a question of validity here since the contracts were 
actually formed between two legal persons, hence the acts which occurred as a result 
would be attributed to those who intended to form them. On the other hand however, the 
question of liability still seems unsettled. Since intelligent agents became a part of the 
contracting, they would be responsible for any losses or damages during their 
performance. In the example given above, the intelligent agent would be held liable for 
the damages caused to Tom when it negligently bought from an agency with a bad 
reputation. A non-natural legal person surely must be object of asset in order to ensure 
that it could fulfill its financial obligations and liabilities. Corporate bodies, as legal 
persons, are legally allowed to be sued because if they are held liable, their assets would 
be affected directly and sometimes liquidated. Now, because intelligent agents lack 
assets, holding them liable for damages indeed appears to be an absurd approach as well 
as meaningless. Therefore, as long as intelligent agents have no assets, the idea to grant 
them legal personality would not solve the issue of liability and therefore is not of 
benefit. 
In order to solve this matter, Sartor Giovanni had suggested a
 
banking deposit to function 
as an asset for intelligent agents.
10
This fund would represent a warranty for 
counterparties, which would need to be secured when finalising a contract with 
intelligent agents. A minimum amount of ―capital‖ should be established by users, 
similar to what happens to commercial corporations. Intelligent agents then have to 
ensure that they will not act beyond the fund deposited in the bank. This is practically 
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impossible because intelligent agents are given legal personality on the basis that they are 
cognitive tools with no human beings‘ control upon them. Therefore, nobody, including 
users, can guarantee that intelligent agents will act within the limited amount. 
Accordingly, it is expected that acting beyond the fund deposited would probably 
happen, but then, the question is, who would be held liable for those excesses? The fund 
deposited in the bank does not seem as though it could compensate all those who would 
suffer from the intelligent agent‘s errors. Particularly, damages that may occur by 
intelligent agents take several forms such as breaching someone‘s privacy or making 
damages to other computers by sending viruses. Furthermore, while the bank deposit‘s 
idea may warrant counterparties, users are left without warranty. 
Therefore, the bank deposits idea does not seem a good solution to the problem in 
question. The following section discusses an alternative option, which is purchasing 
insurance in order to create assets for intelligent agents.   
 
5- Insurance Policy  
The idea of insuring intelligent agents, which is suggested by Lawrence Solum, is not 
sufficiently clear.
11
There are many questions associated with this idea that are left 
without answers. As consequences, the idea of insurance has been strongly criticized by 
Curtis Karnow on the basis that it ignores an important principle of insurance contracts 
known as causation analysis.
12
This principle, as will be seen below, is complex to 
implement when insuring intelligent agents. Beside that, there are other issues, although 
they are not doctrine, one cannot overlook their essentiality. For example, Jean-Francois 
Lerouge questioned this idea with several points e.g., at what extent are insurance 
companies ready to insure those risks associated with intelligent agents?
13
 Due to the 
absence of any human being‘s control, insurance companies could expect huge losses 
and damages. 
Furthermore, Anthony Bellia found purchasing insurance for intelligent agents to be of 
no benefit.
14
He argues that if the approach that treats intelligent agents as mere tools is 
criticized on the basis that it lays huge liabilities on the shoulders of users, what new 
ideas can insurance make in this regard? If the insurance fee is paid by users, not 
intelligent agents, in addition to the increase of instalments when compensating damages, 
why then deemed intelligent agents (persons) if the users ultimately bear all the risk of 
loss?
15
In fact, this argument can easily be invoked. When insurance premiums increase, 
wherever the cost reaches, it remains limited compared to the liability when intelligent 
agents are deemed to be merely transmitting the will of users. However, the rest of the 
paper will focus on causation analysis that has been illustrated by Curtis Karnow. 
Most insurance companies are based on traditional tort causation analysis (proximate 
cause analysis).
16
In simple words, insurance companies must know, before compensating 
for damage, the proximate cause from all the causes which will be held ultimately 
responsible for the damage.
17
In order to illustrate this, let us suppose that an intelligent 
agent sent an innocent message to a computer system. Suppose also that this message 
initiated a process leading the addressed system to crash due to a fault of that system. 
Assume that this message was a necessary condition for the crash to happen (without the 
message the crash would not have occurred).
18
Before the insurance company would 
compensate, it is necessary to identify the real cause of the crash. Therefore, the company 
would have to decide, out of many possible factors which had caused the injury. For 
example, did the message really cause the crash? Or was some defective procedure of the 
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addressee system the real cause, with the message only providing the occasion for the 
internal fault to operate?
19
Furthermore, there are may be other intelligent agents involved 
in causing the crash. The insurance company would find it extremely hard to specify the 
proximate cause of the damage and cannot guarantee that the insured intelligent agent 
involved was potentially a cause of the crash. This is particularly the case in a complex 
environment where it is practically hard to identify the source of an agent or its code 
which caused the damage.  
As a result of proximate cause being difficult to determine, insurance companies may 
find it the fundamental reason why they should not insure intelligent agents. Curtis 
Karnow accordingly, suggested an insurance company named (Turing Registry), which 
does not depend on the proximate cause relationship between the injury and the 
intelligent agent. He proposed therefore that, the only thing that would make the Turing 
Registry compensate is the mere presence of the intelligent agent in the disaster which 
occurred, with there being no need to investigate what, who, when or why.
20
 
However, the Turing Registry has been strongly criticized
21
 and even Curtis Karnow 
does not find his proposal the best solution. In fact, not taking into account the causation 
relationship may hold innocents liable and those who are irrelevant to the injury. 
Although this seems unfair, in a complex environment where intelligent agents work, 
online companies may accept it as an ideal proposal.  
 
6- Conclusion 
In conclusion, the idea of attributing legal personality to intelligent agents is optimistic 
and therefore needs more analysis. It is not necessary to reflect on the right solution to 
the intelligent agents‘ problems but at least it shows that the law is able to comprehend 
agent technology via different approaches.  
If the issue of asset could be solved, intelligent agents could be granted legal personality. 
The issue of whether their limited autonomy deserves personality is potentially a matter 
of time as the autonomy, mobility, and intelligence of intelligent agents increase. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean we have to sit back and wait. Finally, as result of having 
to use intelligent agents in digital economy, we must pay the price. 
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